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Abstract
Energy users are investing in solar panels, batteries and smart-home energy
systems. New technology is creating both new opportunities and new needs.
New opportunities arise when users are empowered to respond to market
signals. New needs arise when network topology is transforming. Decentralized
renewable energy, electric vehicles, and storage are changing the face of electricity
distribution networks. Taking advantage of new opportunities means opening
the market to all participants. Making the best use of decentralized resources
means identifying decentralized network needs and constraints. This dissertation
is divided into two main parts to study the coordination of demand response
-user participation- procurement. The first part studies the integration of
demand response into the wholesale market design. The second part analyses
local network needs and studies how user participation can be coordinated to
provide local flexibility services.
The integration of demand response into the wholesale electricity market is
studied in Part I of the thesis. Demand response needs to be aggregated to
make a difference at a wholesale market level. The aggregation of demand poses
challenges to market design regarding interactions between actors, procurement
procedures and remuneration mechanisms. What’s more, aggregation has effects
on current market participants. The aggregator trades flexibility provided by
consumers who already have contracts with retailers. These retailers foresee
needs of their customers and trade energy accordingly. When a third party,
the aggregator, is also making decisions on their forecasted load, conflicts arise.
The exact nature of these conflicts is explored in detail. It is found that when
consumers are asked to modify their consumption patterns at one hour, they
are likely to make up for it at a later hour. This is defined as the rebound effect.
Aggregators impact balancing responsible parties (BRPs) on two main levels:
market profits and retail profits. Proposals for transfer payments from the
aggregator to the BRP to solve these conflicts are modelled using an empirical
approach. The BRP is modelled as a portfolio owner of generation and load.
The aggregator supplies demand response flexibility to the market during the
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best possible hours as a result of an optimization. It is found that demand
response will be deployed as long as the transfer payment is less than the
peak and off-peak market price. Demand response has an arbitraging effect
in the market therefore can be profitable for the party attributed balancing
responsibility.
Part II of the dissertation is aimed at reaping the possibilities of demand
response at a local level. While the focus of Part I is geared towards wholesale
market benefits, the focus of Part II is in using flexibility to deal with grid issues
and avoid network reinforcements. It is found in current literature and ongoing
projects that there is no consensus on a framework design for the procurement
of local flexibility. The transmission system operator, the distribution system
operator (DSO), an independent aggregator, and a third party actor have all
been proposed as local market operators. A method is proposed to analyze the
need that can be fulfilled by local flexibility in the distribution system. Demand
and price criteria for flexibility services are defined from the point of view of the
DSO. The value of flexibility to the DSO is defined by an analysis of the savings
achieved by avoiding grid reinforcements. Congestion in the distribution grid is
chosen a use-case to test the methodology.
A first case is studied where the DSO procures flexibility directly at cost-value
in order to avoid network reinforcements. It is found that flexibility use can save
up to two thirds of the cost of grid reinforcements for the DSO compared to
the case without flexibility. A second case is studied where a profit maximizing
making aggregator is introduced. In this case, the DSO competes with a BRP
for the flexibility resources that would solve its problems in the grid. A quantity
demanded and a valuation of flexibility for the BRP is proposed. The BRP
needs flexibility to cover deviations in its short term to intraday renewable
energy profiles. The BRP is willing to pay for flexibility as long as it costs less
than the balancing penalties it would otherwise incur. The two actors, DSO
and BRP, have different decision horizons. The DSO needs to make a decision
to buy flexibility or reinforce the network in advance, while the BRP needs
flexibility on an almost real-time horizon. The aggregator needs to make the
decision of who to sell to in advance, so the market is bilaterally organized. It
is shown that as the DSO’s willingness to pay is higher than the BRP’s most
of the time, so it wins the bid for most of the available flexibility with respect
to the BRP. There is still a long way to travel for users to deliberately affect
the functioning of electricity markets and grids. This dissertation opens up a
discussion on a whole scale and a local level in an effort to exploit different
possible uses of flexibility.
Beknopte Samenvatting
Energiegebruikers investeren in zonnepanelen, batterijen en smart-home
energiemanagement systemen. De opkomst van nieuwe technologieën creëert
zowel opportuniteiten als uitdagingen. Opportuniteiten ontstaan waar
eindgebruikers de mogelijkheid hebben om in te spelen op marktsignalen.
Nieuwe noden ontstaan dan weer wanneer elektriciteitsnetten bijvoorbeeld een
wijziging in topologie ondergaan. Gedistribueerde hernieuwbare energiebronnen,
elektrische voertuigen and energieopslag hebben een impact op distributienetten.
Het volledig benutten van nieuwe opportuniteiten vereist dat eindgebruikers
toegang hebben tot de elektriciteitsmarkt. Optimaal gebruik van gedistribueerde
energiebronnen veronderstelt daarenboven het in kaart brengen van de noden
en beperkingen van distributienetten. Deze thesis behandelt vraagstukken
met betrekking tot de coördinatie van de aankoop van vraagrespons en is
ingedeeld in twee grote delen. Het eerste deel focust op de integratie van
vraagrespons in de groothandelsmarkt (“wholesale market”) voor elektriciteit.
In het tweede deel worden de lokale noden van elektriciteitsnetten bestudeerd
en wordt geanalyseerd hoe eindgebruikers op een gecoördineerde manier lokale
flexibiliteitsdiensten kunnen aanbieden.
Deel 1 van de thesis focust op de integratie van vraagrespons in de
groothandelsmarkt voor elektriciteit. Vraagrespons dient geaggregeerd te worden
om een verschil te maken op de groothandelsmarkt. Die aggregatie van flexibele
vraag leidt tot uitdagingen voor het ontwerp van de elektriciteitsmarkt, meer
bepaald wat betreft de precieze interacties tussen actoren, aankoopprocedures
en vergoedingen. Bovendien heeft aggregatie ook effecten op de huidige
marktspelers. Een aggregator verhandelt flexibiliteit van eindgebruikers die reeds
een bestaand contract hebben met energieleveranciers. Die laatste voorspellen
de energienoden van hun klanten en handelen ernaar op de markt. Wanneer een
derde partij, in dit geval een aggregator, eveneens beslissingen neemt op basis van
voorspeld verbruik, kunnen conflicten ontstaan. De onderliggende mechanismen
van deze conflicten worden in detail belicht. Eén van de bevindingen is
dat wanneer eindgebruikers hun consumptiepatroon flexibel aanpassen in een
iii
iv BEKNOPTE SAMENVATTING
bepaald uur, ze dit meer dan waarschijnlijk compenseren op een later tijdstip
(“rebound” effect). Acties van aggregatoren beïnvloeden de inkomsten van
evenwichtsverantwoordelijken (balancing responsible parties of BRPs) op twee
niveaus: Inkomsten gegenereerd uit activiteiten op de groothandelsmarkt en
inkomsten uit retail activiteiten.
Mogelijke compensatievergoedingen tussen een aggregator en de BRP van
de eindgebruiker, worden via een empirische benadering gemodelleerd. De
evenwichtsverantwoordelijke is gemodelleerd als een eigenaar van een portfolio
bestaande uit zowel elektriciteitsopwekking als verbruik. Het model optimaliseert
de activering van vraagrespons door een aggregator naar de best mogelijke
momenten. Hieruit blijkt dat vraagrespons ingezet wordt zolang de compensa-
tievergoeding lager is dan de piek en dal marktprijzen. Vraagrespons leidt tot
een arbitrage-effect in de elektriciteitsmarkt en kan daarom voordelig zijn voor
een partij met evenwichtsverantwoordelijkheid.
Deel 2 van de thesis focust op de mogelijkheden die vraagrespons bieden op
lokaal niveau. In deel 1 kwamen vooral de voordelen op de groothandelsmarkt
aan bod, terwijl in deel 2 flexibiliteit ingezet wordt voor het oplossen van
lokale netproblemen en het vermijden van investeringen in het elektriciteitsnet.
Noch in literatuur, noch in lopende projecten werd een consensus gevonden
voor een ideaal kader voor de aankoop en inzet van lokale flexibiliteit.
De transmissienetbeheerder (TNB), de distributienetbeheerder (DNB), een
onafhankelijke aggregator en een derde partij zijn mogelijke actoren die de rol van
lokale markt operator kunnen opnemen. Deze thesis stelt een methode voor om
te analyseren welke noden door lokale flexibiliteit in het distributienet opgelost
kunnen worden. Criteria voor de vraag naar en de prijs van flexibiliteitsdiensten
worden gedefinieerd vanuit het standpunt van een DNB. De waarde van
flexibiliteit voor een DNB wordt bepaald door een analyse van de besparingen
gerealiseerd door het vermijden van netinvesteringen. De methodologie werd
getest aan de hand van een use case met betrekking tot congestie in een
distributienet.
In een eerste gevalstudie, koopt de DNB rechtstreeks flexibiliteit op aan
de reële kost met het oog op het vermijden van netinvesteringen. Hieruit
blijkt dat het gebruik van flexibiliteit kan leiden tot 2/3 kostenbesparingen
in vergelijking met traditionele netinvesteringen. Een tweede gevalstudie richt
zich op een aggregator die zijn winsten maximaliseert. In dit geval concurreert
een DNB met een BRP om flexibiliteit te bekomen voor het oplossen van
netproblemen. De vraag naar en waardering van flexibiliteit voor een BRP
worden behandeld. De BRP heeft nood aan flexibiliteit om afwijkingen van
voorspelde hernieuwbare energieproductie op te vangen. Als gevolg hiervan,
is een BRP bereid te betalen voor flexibiliteit zolang de kost lager is dan
de onbalanskosten. De DNB en de BRP hebben echter een verschillende
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tijdshorizon voor het nemen van beslissingen. Een DNB moet op voorhand
beslissen flexibiliteit aan te kopen of het distributienet te versterken, terwijl een
BRP flexibiliteit bijna real time nodig heeft. Een aggregator moet bijgevolg
beslissen aan wie hij vooraf bilateraal flexibiliteit verkoopt. Uit de analyse blijkt
dat de betalingsbereidheid van DNBs in de meeste gevallen groter is dan BRPs.
Er is nog een lange weg te gaan voor eindgebruikers om effectief en doelbewust
invloed te hebben op elektriciteitsmarkten en netten. Deze thesis geeft inzichten
voor verschillende exploitatiemogelijkheden van flexibiliteit, zowel op het niveau
van groothandelsmarkten als op lokaal niveau.
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“We put thirty spokes together and call it a wheel,
But it is on the space where there is nothing that the usefulness of the wheel
depends.
We turn clay to make a vessel,
But it is on the space where there is nothing that the usefulness of the vessel
depends.
We pierce doors and windows to make a house,
And it is on these spaces where there is nothing that the usefulness of the house
depends.
Therefore just as we take advantage of what is, we should recognize the usefulness
of what is not.”
- Lao Tze, Tao Te Ching
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Smart Grid Context: Changing Electricity
Production and Consumption
The electricity industry is undergoing policy and technology driven changes.
From a policy point of view generation of electricity is moving towards a more
renewable and sustainable system. Installed capacity of renewable generation
sources (RES) has expanded significantly in Europe over the past 20 years.
Figure 1.1 shows the growth in installed generation capacity for the EU28
countries from 1990 to 2014 [1]. A steep growth in variable renewable generation
such as wind and solar energy can be observed during the last decade. It is
expected that RES will continue to grow during the next decades. According
to the European Commission the share of renewable electricity generation in
Europe will grow from 25% today to 50% in 2030 [2].
Technology driven changes refer, among others, to users that have access to
in-home energy systems that can generate and store energy, and manage their
consumption profiles. New technology enables a shift towards the ’smart grid’,
defined as any combination of enabling technologies, hardware, software, or
practices that collectively make the delivery infrastructure of the grid more
versatile, secure, accomodating, resilient and ultimately useful to consumers [3].
Smart grids allow users to actively make decisions upon their electricity
consumption based on prices. Users now have access to new technologies
such as solar panels, batteries, heat storage and smart metering devices. The
consumer is becoming an active decision agent instead of a price-taker.
1
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fig. 1.1. Electricity generation capacity, EU28, 1990-2014.
However, the current electricity market structures were not designed with this
shift in mind. Traditionally in power systems load was taken as a given and
generation had to adjust to keep system balance. Current structures focus on
a market where generation follows the needs set by demand. In a smart grid
environment new market arrangements are needed to take advantage of the new
available technologies both on the consumption and on the generation arenas.
In this new environment available generation drives the behavior of demand.
Flexibility contracting is a potential solution to manage this shift. Flexibility is
defined as the modification of generation injection and/or consumption patterns
in reaction to an external signal (price signal or activation) in order to provide
a service within the system [4]. An actor who can offer flexibility to the grid or
the market is called Flexibility Service Provider (FSP). Flexible resources may
be contracted by several parties such as Balancing Responsible Parties (BRPs),
DSOs , TSOs, and aggregators [4].
FSPs need to be aggregated in order to reach a critical mass that can participate
in the wholesale market. Due to the scale of the power system a response from
many consumers at the same time is needed in order to make a difference. The
average consumption of a household is between 4-10 kWh, and can only offer a
small portion of that as flexibility; while renewable energy generation is in the
order of magnitude of thousands of MWh. Consumers need to be aggregated
to be able to respond to system needs. Aggregation is also useful given that
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consumers might not have the necessary knowledge or interest in market trading
to make the best decisions. The need for an intermediary between consumers
and the markets becomes apparent.
The independent aggregator is a new role that arises as an intermediary
between the end-consumers, generators, the system operators, and the other
existing market participants. Aggregation is a commercial function of pooling
consumption changes (but also e.g. distributed generation changes) from
customers to provide energy, flexibility, capacity and services to other actors in
the system [5]. The aggregator’s function is to pool and manage the flexibility
of small consumers to reach a critical mass so that their participation can be
significant enough for the market and useful for the system. The interactions of
the aggregator with current market participants are source of debate.
The introduction of the aggregator as a new market participant poses challenges
to the existing market design. The main issue being that the aggregator offers
flexibility based on demand response contracts with consumers that already
have retail contracts with another party. For the rest of this thesis it is assumed
that the BRP acts as retailer. The BRP must procure enough energy to meet
the needs of the consumers in its portfolio. It will do so by participating in
the long and short term markets for electricity supply. A BRP is defined as a
trader on the power exchange market on behalf of members of its portfolio [6].
BRPs are market parties responsible of ensuring that energy supply and load
match during a given time period: if the balance is not maintained, the BRP is
required to pay imbalance costs [7].
Market design enables actors to trade flexibility among themselves. The way
in which markets are designed defines which actors have access to flexibility
resources at specific times and places. Market design changes are necessary to
allow flexibility service providers access to markets that value the resources
being offered. The importance of market design is highlighted by the European
Commission (EC): ’market design is the set of arrangements which govern
how market actors generate, trade, supply and consume electricity and use the
electricity infrastructure. It is important that these arrangements, or in other
words the design, can transform the energy system and enable network operators,
generators and consumers - both households and industry- to take full advantage
of new technology. The wholesale and retail markets should provide the basis for
investment decisions, and boost the development of new services by innovative
companies [2].’
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1.2 Thesis Motivation: Challenges to Integrate
Demand Response into Electricity Markets
The integration of demand response into electricity markets has consequences
for current commercial transactions and grid operation on two levels:
• System wide impacts: affect the entire balance of the grid at the
transmission level. On a commercial level the effect of system wide
impacts is dealt with by the wholesale market.
• Local impacts: relate to effects on distribution grid management.
Renewable energy has an impact on grid management due to non-
controllable variability, partial unpredictability and locational dependency
characteristics [8].
1.3 System Impact of New Technologies
System wide impacts of new technologies are given by changes on both sides
of the market. Supply sees the integration of variable generation and demand
sees evolving load patterns given by the introduction of batteries, smart home
systems, and in the future electric-vehicles.
At a system-wide level balance must be kept at all times. In electrical power
systems total production must instantaneously and continuously match total
load. When this equality is maintained the system is said to be in balance and
the frequency (of 50 or 60 Hz) is maintained. Balancing becomes a challenge
due to new technology introduced in both generation and load.
1.3.1 Variable Generation
The system’s reserves must be able to cover variability in renewable energy
generation. The variability of RES generation adds complexity to network
balancing [9]:
• Uncertainties in forecasting lead to plant scheduling challenges.
• Variability of resources leads to possible large and hard to predict
fluctuations in power output that require special countermeasures.
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fig. 1.2. Wind generation in Belgium, December 2015.
Wind power generation is characterized by possible fast peaks and drops in
generation. The system operator must have adequate reserve capacity to deal
with fast acting changes even when they are accurately predicted in order to
maintain system balance. Figure 1.2 exemplifies the expected and measured
wind generation pattern in Belgium during December 2015. A large part of the
wind generation is connected to the distribution grid, this means that variability
must be managed on a local level when congestion could occur. In Belgium,
over 50% of RES installations are connected to the distribution grid [10]. In
addition, large fluctuations in wind power can be caused by sudden storm
disconnections [9].
Solar power generation presents a characteristic pattern that goes from zero in
the early morning, reaches a peak throughout the day depending on irradiation
patterns, and decreasing to zero again at night. Solar energy is also subject to
seasonal variability, meaning that firm power output might vary significantly
throughout the year.
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fig. 1.3. Real time load for a week in Belgium, May 2015.
1.3.2 Evolving Load Patterns
Load patterns are given by user behavior and dependent on system characteristics
and seasonal needs. Grid users present different power needs throughout the
day depending on their activity. Weekdays differ from weekends and holidays.
Seasonal effects can also be observed, for example when electricity is the main
source of heating in households load will be higher in winter. Figure 1.3
represents a typical load pattern throughout a week in Belgium in May 2015.
Consumption tends to be low at night, rising throughout the day and peaking
at around 18h to 21h.
Load patterns are expected to change with the introduction of new technologies
such as electric vehicles (EVs), heat pumps, and end-user storage capabilities.
EVs will make an important contribution towards the decarbonization agenda in
Europe [11]. In the future, it will be necessary to accommodate demand growth
for EV charging in the distribution grid. EV charging represents a challenge for
the grid if all users decide to charge their vehicles at the same time, presumably
in the evening as soon as they arrive home from work. This could potentially
SYSTEM IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 7
overload the grid and increase the necessary peaking power and grid capacity
significantly. Adding peaking generators and reinforcing the grid might not be
an efficient solution, given that a big part of the capacity is idle during many
hours throughout the day.
1.3.3 Commercial Solutions
As stated earlier demand response flexibility is needed to deal with the
integration of renewable energy. Given the right signals, demand can
accommodate the variability of renewable generation. Stakeholder interactions
dictate how actors in the market communicate, trade, activate services, and settle
their positions. On the one hand, DSOs and TSOs are regulated parties subject
to remuneration schemes based on quality of service provision and efficiency. On
the other hand, providers of flexibility are private actors motivated to participate
in the market if it is in their best interest. The decision making process on each
side is different. Different actors want access to the same flexibility resources
for different purposes. The coordination of the provision of services depends
on the market design in place, and the mechanisms that allow the parties to
engage in trade.
The buyers of the DR as a commodity could be commercial actors, or system
operators. Commercial actors seek to buy energy at a lower price, they include
retailers who need to fulfill load commitments, or renewable energy generators
who need to cover variations in their forecasting. Procurement procedures for
commercial parties and for system operators - regulated parties- are different in
nature. Commercial parties participate in the long and short term competitive
electricity markets. System operators are regulated parties who tender for
reserves on a long to mid-term basis.
System wide challenges relate to the appropriate balancing of differences that
arise between long term commitments and short term resource availability. In
the short term, system operation comes into play and system boundaries need to
be respected. A contracting framework that enables the use of flexibility without
endangering system reliability is needed. If the short term price adequately
reflects the needs of the system it will provide the necessary signals for long
term investment. Therefore, this thesis focuses on examining the short term
wholesale market design enabling the use of flexibility.
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1.4 Local Impact of New Technologies
On a local level distributed energy resources (DER) consist of small-to-medium
scale resources connected mainly to the lower voltage levels (distribution grids)
of the system or near end users. These include distributed generation, energy
storage, and demand response capabilities [12]. The introduction of RES has
contributed to the growth of Distributed Generation (DG) as users install solar
panels in their homes, and other other units, such as CHP (combined heat
and power) are installed in the distribution grids. DG are all installations
connected to distribution systems or on the consumer side of the meter [13].
Distributed generation is growing because RES and Combined Heat and Power
units are suitable for medium and small-scale installations. The European
Commission proposes that DG should be taken into account when planning
network expansions [14]. These technologies, coupled with the introduction of
EVs and storage systems are causing in the topology of the distribution network.
Distribution system operators (DSOs) are now faced with a number of issues
regarding the impact of distributed generation: voltage deviations, increased
losses, protection sensitivity, system balance and reserve, network robustness
and power quality [15], [16]. Congestion issues in distribution arise when
transformers and cables are overloaded. In areas with low demand, electricity
generation from RES may exceed local consumption, and distribution systems
have to be reinforced and extended [17]. In addition, generation connected
to the distribution grid might cause backflows, energy flowing from the
distribution system to the upstream transmission system [18]. This impacts
the distribution network capacity and congestion given that overload of feeders
may take place due to high generation during low consumption periods [19].
Distribution networks were not originally designed to accommodate generation
[20]. Distribution grids were built with a ‘fit and forget’ approach to be able
to deal with the expected peak loads. Applying this approach to distributed
renewable energy sources (DRES) connections in the distribution grid will
cause the need for incremental reinforcement of the network [21]. These grid
expansions would probably only be used during a limited number of hours per
year, making them an expensive and inefficient solution.
Technical solutions to the technical challenges include investment in new lines,
power electronics, advanced protection schemes, system reconfiguration and
storage [18]. Another way to deal with these issues is through market based
solutions that seek to adapt user behavior to generation and network conditions.
An active Distribution system operator would be able to monitor the grid and
adjust technical settings to optimize operation. Distribution grids of the future
will implement a mix of technical and market based solutions. The analysis
of technical solutions is out of the scope of this work. This thesis deals with
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market based solutions to manage congestion, taking the grid as a constraint.
In a local context the commercial challenge relates to appropriate incentives
for investment in active distribution systems. Investment is needed on both
sides of the market. Investment needs to be carried out by the system operators
impacted and by the users installing DERs or providing demand response
flexibility. DSOs have to invest either in grid expansion or in grid management
systems. Consumers can decide to invest in solar panels, batteries, smart home
systems, and ICT to enable demand response. The trade-off in the cost of
contracting flexibility or building new lines represents the cap-price at which it
is feasible for a system operator to buy flexibility. Investments are carried out
if each stakeholder estimates that costs can be recovered through either savings
or direct remuneration. Long term contracting enables investment by ensuring
income for the involved stakeholders.
1.5 Research Objective: Market Coordination Mech-
anisms
This thesis studies the integration of demand response as a solution to the
challenges presented above. The challenges posed by the evolving power sector
are observed on both a system and a local level. Therefore, the integration
of demand response into electricity markets is analyzed on a system wide
level through wholesale market integration, and on a local level through the
proposition of possible local flexibility market designs.
It can be said that the integration of demand response needs to be coordinated
on two levels of procurement:
• Wholesale market: user participation in the wholesale market is enabled by
aggregated demand response possibilities. If users have visibility of market
conditions they have a chance to decide whether they want to consume
electricity at a certain hour and price. User response can be thought of
as a tradeable commodity since it contributes to system balancing. The
introduction of a third party aggregator acting on a load portfolio owned
by a BRP causes ambiguity over the balancing responsibility of both the
aggregator and the existing BRP. For example, the BRP has esteemed
that one of its consumers needs 100 kWh at a certain hour. The aggregator
has an agreement with that same consumer to reduce its consumption
to 80 kWh during that same period of time. If the BRP is unaware of
the actions of the aggregator it will be imbalanced by +20 kWh due to
actions out of its control.
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• Local market: System operators can also make use of demand response
services. Traditionally only the TSO has engaged in reserves contracting,
while the DSO has kept a more passive role. Now, distributed energy
resources cause a need for the DSO to also use reserves.
In order to study these two procurement needs this thesis provides answers to
the following research question and sub-questions:
• On a wholesale level:
– How is aggregated demand response integrated into the wholesale
market?
– What is the effect of the participation of aggregated demand response
in the wholesale market?
– How are the costs and benefits of demand response in the wholesale
market allocated among market participants?
• On a local level:
– Why is a local market necessary?
– How can a local market for flexibility be organized?
– What is the local need for flexibility and what is its value?
– How can a DSO-led reserves market for flexibility be organized?
– If the DSO competes for flexibility with the BRP who is better off?
1.6 Thesis Outline
To answer the research questions proposed above, the thesis is set up in two
parts. Part I of the thesis focuses on the integration of flexibility into the
wholesale market. The main challenges and proposed solutions for wholesale
demand response integration are discussed and modelled empirically. Part II
focuses on local flexibility contracting. The conditions that lead to local demand
for flexibility are discussed and quantified. Two possible local market design
approaches are concluded and modelled: a local market for reserves, and local
competition for flexibility.
Part I
Chapter 2 sets demand response within wholesale market design. Key aspects
of electricity market design form the basis for the analysis. Demand response is
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placed inside a conceptual design framework. Demand response remuneration is
highlighted. The question of whether demand response should be remunerated
in same terms as other resources is posed. Proposals in literature and market
implementations are discussed.
Chapter 3 analyzes the specific effects of demand response aggregation in
the wholesale market and specifically in the BRP’s portfolio. The rebound,
when consumers resume their load patterns after a demand response event, is
defined. Two effects of demand response are analyzed: a market, and a retail
effect. The attribution of the imbalance caused by demand response is discussed.
Adjustment mechanisms to deal with these effects are proposed.
Chapter 4 proposes an empirical analysis of the effects of demand response
introduced in chapter 3. A decision making model is introduced to exemplify
the ideal outcome of the market taking into account an independent aggregator
and BRP’s who own both load and generation portfolios.
Part II
Chapter 5 explores the first available concepts of local grid management
through microgrids and virtual power plants (VPP). The concept of flexibility
and locality are introduced. The evolution of concepts towards the need for a
local market to handle DER growth is outlined. A definition of a local market
for flexibility is proposed. Current local market design proposals are described
to arrive at main characteristics that form local market design. The chapter
concludes on two main variants of local flexibility contracting: flexibility as a
reserve and local competition for flexibility.
Chapter 6 studies the contracting of local flexibility in a reserves-type market.
The DSO’s demand for flexibility is quantified based on an analysis of network
congestion. The value of flexibility is given by the alternative cost of reinforcing
the network in order to solve the foreseen congestion. A decision model where
the DSO either buys flexibility or invests in grid reinforcements is proposed.
Chapter 7 studies the case of local competition for flexibility. A BRP and
a profit maximizing aggregator are introduced. The BRP’s need for local
flexibility is found to come from variations in RES profiles at times when there
is congestion in the network. The valuation of the BRP’s flexibility is given by
the cost of the imbalance caused by the variations in RES profiles. A decision
making model where a profit maximizing aggregator decides who to allocate
flexibility to is proposed.
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Chapter 8 summarizes the conclusions of this PhD dissertation. Key
contributions are outlined and future research possibilities are described.
Part I

Chapter 2
Demand Response in the
Wholesale Market
Traditionally electricity consumers have been passive participants in the
commodity markets. It has been assumed that all load must be supplied
at all times, and it does not vary too much with respect to prices. One of the
main reasons for this is that consumers are not generally aware of electricity
market conditions. They have little or no visibility on the price of the electricity
that they are consuming at a certain hour. Final consumers negotiate their
electricity consumption through a retailer, who then represents them in the
wholesale market. The tariffs that consumers pay to the retailer might not be
reflective of the prices in the wholesale market. It is up to the retailer to offer
deals that reap a profit margin with respect to the wholesale market prices.
The introduction of smart meters and communication technologies open the
door for consumers to take a more active role in the electricity market. If
consumers are exposed to real-time price signals, they can make decisions to
change their behavior and modify their load patterns. The system is at a need
for this type of response due to the growth of renewable energy. Therefore the
system is on the verge of experiencing a shift of paradigm from the traditional
view where supply is adapted to the needs of demand to a new market where
demand responds to the available supply. Figure 2.1 depicts how load patterns
can adapt to exploit renewable energy availability. Demand response is defined
as the changes in electricity usage by end-use customers from their normal
consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity over
time [22].
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fig. 2.1. Responsive load can adapt to renewable energy availability
In order to promote the best use of renewable energy, electricity market design
needs to create the appropriate signals for consumers to respond to. When
there is a high amount of renewable energy available the market price should
be low to promote consumption, and when there is a low amount of renewable
energy prices should be high. As consumers respond to these price signals the
full potential of renewable energy can be exploited. This chapter focuses on
short-term contracting of demand response by commercial actors. Specifically,
the integration of demand response into the day ahead wholesale market is
studied.
In order to place demand response within electricity market design, a definition
of flexibility and demand response is given in section 2.1. Then, key dimensions
of electricity market design are analyzed in section 2.2. Demand response
is placed within the possible contracting frameworks for electricity trade in
section 2.3. Third, demand response remuneration at either the full marginal
price or the marginal price minus a deduction is discussed in section 2.4. Finally,
chapter conclusions are presented in section 2.5.
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2.1 Definition of Flexibility and Demand Response
Flexibility is defined in chapter 1 as the modification of generation injection
and/or consumption patterns in reaction to an external signal (price signal or
activation) in order to provide a service to the system [4].
System flexibility is defined as the ability of a power system to cope with
variability and uncertainty in both generation and demand, while mainatining a
satisfactory level of reliability at a reasonable cost, over different time horizons
[23]. From a broad system perspective flexibility is defined as the ability of
a power system to maintain continuous service in the face of rapid and large
swings in supply and demand [24]. In [25] flexibility is defined as the ability of
a system to deploy its resources to respond to changes in net load, where net
load is defined as the remaining system load not served by variable generation.
Flexibility can come from a variety of sources, such as electricity storage, flexible
supply, flexible demand and inter-regional capacity [26].
In a historical view the flexibility of power markets is characterized by their
ability to efficiently cover fluctuating demand [27]. As RES grows this definition
of flexibility needs to be revised, there is a need for demand to adapt to generation
availability. Parties capable of offering flexibility, such as aggregators, generators,
consumers, BRPs involved, are called Flexibility Service Providers (FSP). In this
thesis flexibility coming from demand response is studied in detail. Flexibility
coming from generation resources is out of the scope of the analysis.
Demand response is defined as modifications of electricity consumption in
response to price and the implementation of more energy efficient technologies
[28]. In another proposed definition DR encompasses a series of automated or
manual actions taken by final consumers aimed at intentionally changing their
electricity consumption profile in response to signals that are in line with the
market or network conditions [29].
In a definition by the U.S. Department of Energy demand response refers to
changes in electric usage by end-use customers from their normal consumption
patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity over time, or to
incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at times of high
wholesale market prices or when system reliability is jeopardized [30].
The wider implementation of demand response should arise from coordinated
actions of the involved stakeholders along the electricity supply chain [28].
Dynamic pricing and demand bidding, are usually adopted by large consumers
but responsive technologies can also enhance the responsiveness of small
and medium retail consumers [31]. It was recognized that when demand
is unresponsive to prices, generators are tempted to manipulate the market
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towards high prices [32]. Therefore it is important to implement initiatives that
empower consumers to respond to market conditions.
2.2 Key Aspects of Electricity Market Design
In order to integrate demand response and RES into existing markets it is
necessary to take a look at the key aspects of electricity market design. During
the de-regulation of electricity markets several variants of market design were
proposed. The main differentiating factors are those concerning temporal, price
clearing, spatial, and contractual dimensions of trade.
2.2.1 Temporal
The temporal dimension refers to the moment when electricity is contracted for
a specific delivery time period. Three distinctions are studied below:
• Long-term markets.
• Short-term markets.
• Real-time markets.
Long-Term Markets
In the long-term, buyers and sellers contract electricity several months or years
before delivery date. In a forward market two parties agree on a price, a
quantity and a future date for delivery. The negotiation process for a forward
contract can be lengthy and involve substantial transaction costs. In order to
facilitate long-term transactions standardized forward contracts, called futures
contracts, can be drafted. In a market for futures contracts, participants can
buy or sell physical or financial products, called derivatives, for delivery on a
specified future date at today’s prices [33]. These contracts allow buyers and
sellers to contract prices and quantities over a period of time in order to hedge
risk [34]. Futures can also be traded by speculators that will not necessarily do
the physical delivery of the commodity [35].
Long-term contracts are traditionally negotiated as either a fixed price contract
where the price per MWh is known in advance, as an indexed price contract
where the price is indexed to either inflation or the cost of another commodity
(such as fuel prices or electricity spot prices), or as a tolling contract which
KEY ASPECTS OF ELECTRICITY MARKET DESIGN 19
provides the buyer the right to use the seller’s facility to convert fuel into
electricity [36]. Traded products in long-term contracts can be base, peak,
seasonal and annual.
In view of intermittent resources and distributed generation there is a need to
take into account variability of the output profile at all time frames. From a
long-term perspective, a large share of renewable energy complicates real-time
system operation since availability of these resources is uncertain. Long-term
contracts become more important as a hedge to increasing variations in spot
prices. However, long-term contract risk is increasing since their price is
negotiated based on the expected short-term price close to actual delivery,
which is becoming harder to predict. The predicted contract price used for the
long-term contracts has a high chance of being different from the short-term
electricity price.
Due to predictability issues, wind and solar power generators have more
difficulties stepping into long term electricity contracts. If they sign such
contracts they are more exposed to spot price variations than conventional
generation units. In case they produce less than contracted, they will have
to buy the missing electricity on the short-term market to cover their short
positions. During those moments, they are expected to face prices higher than
the long term contract prices as they are typically set by the marginal generation
cost of peaking units.
Short-Term Markets
The short-term electricity markets, also referred to as spot markets, are the
day-ahead and intraday markets. The day-ahead market is either an exchange
or a pool and is operated as an auction [37]. As in the long-term markets, the
short-term can include financial transactions in the form of commitments to sell
or buy without the backing of physical assets. The only truly physical market
is the real-time market where short or long positions must be settled [37]. The
markets closer to real time become more important due to variability of RES.
The amount traded in these markets is related to errors in prediction patterns
of RES and expected load.
Real-Time Market
Real-time electricity markets (RTM) are defined as the non-discriminatory
transaction platforms for providing necessary balancing services, where the
market clearing is very close to real time operations of power systems [38].
20 DEMAND RESPONSE IN THE WHOLESALE MARKET
RTMs can be operated independently by a market exchange or by a system
operator for use in system balancing. It is to be noted that system operators are
regulated parties and have to follow specific procedures to enter into contracts
with service providers.
Real-time markets can also be used to solve transmission constraints that prevent
the market outcome from taking place [39]. Close to real time, bids providing
regulation volume are contracted and activated by the TSO to cover imbalances
on the transmission grid level. The balancing markets cover variations in
electricity needs not previously contracted in the day ahead or intraday markets.
Suppliers who are short of their predicted position need to buy the missing
energy from other suppliers who have long positions, and the same idea applies
to buyers with respect to their submitted consumption schedules. This is
necessary when the transactions on the forward markets have been financially
binding for all resources, including RES. It forces participants to try to submit
accurate bid schedules. As the real availability of resources, especially RES,
becomes less predictable the balancing market is expected to gain importance.
2.2.2 Market Clearing: Price Formation
The clearing dimension refers to the price setting mechanisms used by each
market. Centralized markets accept supply and demand bids and clear the
market at the intersection of both curves using an auction mechanism. A merit
order of generation units is created, starting with the cheapest available unit
up to more expensive units until the entire load amount is covered [40]. The
price at which electricity is traded can be determined in different ways, there
can be a single price for a market or several prices depending on the type of
mechanism selected. Two main approaches have been identified, pay-as-bid
pricing and pay-as-cleared pricing.
• Pay-as-bid: units submit a price-quantity bid and are paid at their
nominated price for the quantity cleared in the market [41]. This means
that each generating unit receives a different payment and there is not a
single price for electricity. This type of pricing is more commonly applied
to reserves, or ancillary, markets than to wholesale day-ahead markets.
• Pay-as-cleared or Marginal price: all units are remunerated at the marginal
price of the system given by the intersection of the supply and demand
bids. The price is given by the most expensive generator that has to be
dispatched in order to clear the market. In a single clearing area the entire
system is cleared at once based on economic principles without taking into
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account the physical network. Congestion and losses are then accounted
for and the costs for these are levied equally to all system users [42].
Taking into account the spatial dimension of markets during the clearing process
results in three particular approaches described below: nodal, zonal and uniform
pricing markets.
2.2.3 Spatial
The spatial dimension refers to the geographical area for which electricity is
contracted and prices are settled. Depending on the market design this dimension
may, or may not, be constrained by the transmission system. In transmission
constrained trading, users typically need to contract the necessary transmission
capacity for their transactions in advance under an explicit transmission rights
auction. In an implicit method, the network is taken into consideration at
the same time that bids and offers are matched and the resulting schedule is
already network compatible. In contrast, in a copper-plate approach to market
design, the market is defined solely by the offers and bids submitted by users
independently of their location within the market area and the network assets
needed to deliver that electricity. After the market has been cleared the TSO
performs load flow calculations to ensure that the schedule is feasible. In case
of congestion, units are re-dispatched and usually paid at either the marginal
cost or a previously agreed price of operation. Currently, in most markets only
the transmission system is taken into account. Distribution has been assumed
to be a copper plate connected to nodes of the transmission system.
Depending on the geographic locations taken into account during the market
clearing markets can be classified in three categories [38]:
• Nodal Pricing Markets: the object of nodal pricing is to adjust energy
prices in a pool to reflect their locational value [43]. The concept of nodal
pricing was first proposed by [44] [45] and [46].
• Zonal Pricing Markets: the market is divided into a number of zones that
aggregate locations expected to have little or no transmission congestion
or constraints zones internally [47].
• Uniform marginal pricing: the market is defined solely by the offers
and bids submitted by users independently of their location within the
market area and the network assets needed to deliver that electricity.
This approach allows electricity to be injected and withdrawn at any
location without capacity restrictions [48]. In case of congestion, units are
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re-dispatched by the TSO. To do so markets use bid- based, merit-order
systems for choosing capacity for countertrade [49].
2.2.4 Contractual
The contractual dimension of trading refers to the way in which buyers and
sellers come into contact and agree on trade. There are three main approaches:
bilateral, in an exchange, and in a pool.
• Pool market: a mandatory trading platform organized by a market
operator where both suppliers and consumers must bid for electricity.
Demand and supply offers are matched by a centralized platform and
complex bids are accepted. Complex bids are those where generating unit
specifications and grid network conditions can be taken into account by
an optimization algorithm [37]. A pool facilitates central control, but
limits the market participation only to parties who own generation assets.
• Power Exchange: similar to a pool market but participants can choose
to participate or not, it is not mandatory. Bids typically consist of basic
price-volume block products and exclude complex system and generator
characteristics, such as minimum on and off times, and ramping rates [50].
Although some exchanges can also include technical characteristics. An
exchange, less technically specific than a pool, encourages parties to form
their own generation schedules based on financial positions. This enables
traders who do not own assets to speculate in the market while adding
liquidity and encouraging competition.
• Bilateral or Over-the-Counter market: buyers and sellers contact each
other directly and agree on a price and terms of purchase and delivery
of electricity. Participants enter into contracts without involvement,
interference or facilitation from a third party [35]. A bilateral market allows
participants to make commercial arrangements with physical delivery or
with purely financial purposes [51]. As is the case of long-term reserve
contracts between market participants and the system operator. These
comprise up to 85% of the electricity trade in Europe, and thus are the
main trading means for electricity transactions [52]. These markets are
adequate for providing the bulk power supply, but real time adjustments
are always necessary when injections or off-takes deviate from contracted
volumes. Bilateral transactions remain adequate for long and short-term
markets, but the outcome of those trading platforms could be too slow
for real time transactions. Similarly, information of available resources is
important for system operator optimization.
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Dimension Description Wholesale Day-Ahead Market
Temporal Short-term market where actors trade during the day
previous to electricity delivery.
Market clearing Marginal pricing defined by the most expensive bids
cleared.
Spatial Uniform marginal pricing where the bidding area is
assumed to be a copper plate and interconnection
capacities are not taken into account.
Contractual Power exchange where participants submit bids and offers
for energy blocks without taking into account specific
characteristics of generation assets.
Table 2.1. Description of the wholesale day-ahead market reference scenario
2.2.5 Reference Day-Ahead Wholesale Market Design
This part of the thesis studies the integration of demand response into the
day-ahead wholesale market. Drawing upon the analysis above, the day-ahead
wholesale market that will be the reference for the rest of this study is described
in table 2.1. It is a short-term day ahead market, where bids are paid as cleared
and the grid is assumed to be a copper plate. Participants submit hourly bids
and offers that are not asset specific.
2.3 Demand Response Integration
Introducing demand response in an effective manner poses challenges for market
design. The demand response process must be compatible with the operation
of existing markets. This gives way to issues such as the time frame of demand
response within the market operation, contracting options, bidding options and
pricing schemes. Demand response propositions first started in the 1980s. The
term demand side management referred to the planning and implementation of
those electric utility activities designed to influence customer uses of electricity in
ways that produce desired changes in the utility’s load shape [53]. The concept
was then expanded to specify that demand side management encompasses
load reduction strategies as well as load growth strategies and flexible energy
options [54]. At this point, power systems were working as integrated vertical
utilities and electricity markets as known today did not exist. Demand side
management was seen as a strategy that utilities used to cope with the system’s
demands at a lower cost.
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The de-regulation of markets and the growth of RES energy in the past 15
years has renewed interest in demand response mechanisms. Demand response
programs motivate end consumers to change their use of electricity in response to
changes in price. Final consumers supply demand response through changes in
their consumption patterns, use of distributed generation or storage capabilities.
Reaping the potential of demand response means providing mechanisms that
allow all consumers to access the existing electricity markets.
The suppliers of demand response can be both household and industrial
consumers. Electricity consumers can be classified according to their main
activity as industrial consumers, commercial business consumers and household
consumers. Each segment presents different capabilities for demand response.
For example, energy intensive industrial consumers can switch their production
patterns to take advantage of low electricity prices in off peak hours. Similarly,
they often own generation sources or heat recycling facilities that enable them to
respond to high electricity prices. In contrast, aggregated household consumers
can offer flexibility through modulation of appliances such as electric heaters,
water boilers, refrigerators, and air conditioners.
DR can be activated pursuing different objectives:
• Congestion relief: during peak hours the system operator can call for
downward DR in order to alleviate congestion problems in the grid.
• Renewable energy potential exploitation: DR is used to take advantage of
variable renewable energy availability to reap the most out of the installed
wind or solar generating capacity as depicted in figure 2.1.
• Avoid use of peaking generating units: DR has been shown to replace
expensive peaking generators and decrease overall system costs [55]. These
units are no longer needed as much if demand is shifted from high price
hours to lower price ones.
• Costs savings: consumers can react to market prices reducing consumption
when prices are higher and shifting it to periods when prices are lower in
order to reduce their energy bill.
The contracting approach to demand response depends on the desired objective.
Different modalities of demand response programs have been developed over
the years to fufill different needs. In a survey of demand response initiatives
three different types of demand response programs have been identified. The
first classifies DR according to the control mechanism which can be centralized
or decentralized. The second one classifies it according to the incentives offered
to consumers be it explicit or implicit. The third one is DR based on a decision
variable - task scheduling or energy management based DR [56].
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In the wholesale market demand response is included mainly through explicit
mechanisms. The difference between implicit and explicit demand response is
outlined in [22]:
• Explicit demand response (also called incentive-based): consumers directly
receive incentive payments to respond to system conditions [57]. These
incentive instructions are received from the market, the system operator
or through an aggregator. It is assumed that under this scheme load is
directly controllable and will respond as expected or face a penalty.
• Implicit demand response (also called price-based): consumers receive
real-time, or block tariff, price signals and respond according to their
priorities [58]. These affect the market indirectly if there is a significant
mass of consumers responding to price signals. Price based programs are
better suited to fulfill cost saving objectives. They are not immediate
or reliable enough to serve as a tool for congestion management or RES
utilization.
Given that the focus of this thesis is the integration of demand response into the
wholesale market the following analysis will go in depth into explicit demand
response programs. Within explicit demand response programs demand bidding
programs are proposed, based on the customer’s bids that are realized in the
wholesale electricity market [59].
2.3.1 Timeline of Contracting and Operation of Demand
Response
Electricity market design must allow demand response to participate as a part
of the market operation. This means setting up a contracting process that
determines the price, the amount, and the form of participation of different
DR resources. There are three main stages of demand response contracting as
depicted in figure 2.2.
• Ex-ante: this is the contracting stage and the establishment of a baseline
consumption profile. The aggregator contracts with the final consumer who
provides demand response. They agree on the terms of service including
amount of activation, mode of activation, expected activation times and
amounts, and price agreements. A baseline is necessary for programs
where the consumer is remunerated based on a difference between their
forecasted consumption and a real lower (or higher) consumption during
certain hours [60]. Once the customer baseline is properly established,
26 DEMAND RESPONSE IN THE WHOLESALE MARKET
fig. 2.2. Stages of demand response within market operation
demand-response capacity is well defined and can be traded [61]. It is not
necessary to establish a baseline for implicit demand response programs,
since the benefit for the consumer lies in the savings in energy achieved
from modifying their behavior.
• Day-ahead and intraday markets: this is the moment during market
operation where demand response is traded and activated. Controllable
loads can bid into the market as a commodity, while non-controllable
loads respond to price signals.
• Ex-post: verification and measurement of the demand response activation
is necessary. This stage is particularly important for load providing DR
upon a baseline, there must be a verification procedure to ensure that
they complied when an event was called forth. It is especially important
for consumers who obtain reduced tariffs over a period of time for being
available to curtail on short notice. To avoid claims and billing issues it
is important to clarify a compliance methodology during the contracting
stage of demand response.
2.3.2 Benefit of Demand Response in the Wholesale Market
Figure 2.3 presents the intersection of supply and demand in the wholesale
market. The x-axis presents the quantity of electricity demanded in the wholesale
market, while the y-axis presents the price at which it is sold at a certain time
period t. Line D1 is a simplification of an inelastic demand curve for electricity, it
represents the initial demand before the actions of an aggregator. The step wise
supply curve is represented by S. Generation costs increase in steps according
to the technologies that are dispatched to cover demand at a certain hour. The
cheapest available technologies -usually nuclear, wind and solar generation-
are dispatched first, followed by coal, gas, and fuel oil. The market price of
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fig. 2.3. Merit order dispatch in wholesale markets.
electricity, P1 in the figure, is formed by the intersection of the demand and
supply curves, this is called market matching.
In the wholesale market the matching process is repeated for every time step that
the market clears. Thus, in every period the cheapest generation technologies
that can supply the load are chosen in the merit order and a price for energy is
formed. In marginal price, or pay-as-cleared, markets demand pays the cleared
price P1 and all generators receive the same price P1.
In a classical definition, economic surplus is present when a seller makes a sale
for a sum greater than the least sum for which he would have been willing to
make the sale, or whenever a buyer makes a purchase for a sum smaller than the
greatest sum for which he would have been willing to make the purchase [62]. In
the wholesale market this means that the net economic benefit of an increase in
demand response is the reduction in the total supply-side costs plus demand-side
costs of meeting consumers’ demand [63].
In figure 2.3 the supplier’s surplus is represented by the area above the supply
cost curve S, and below the price to consumers P1. The consumer’s surplus
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fig. 2.4. Impact of demand response in the wholesale market. Adapted from [65].
is the area above the market price P1. Social surplus is the addition of the
consumer’s and the supplier’s surplus, that is to say, the entire area above the
supply cost curve and under D1.
Figure 2.4 presents the impact of demand response in the wholesale market.
Demand shifts from Q1 to Q2 in a demand response reduction event. Line D2
represents modified demand after an aggregator makes a demand response offer
in the market. A new price, P2, is formed by the intersection of lines D2 and S.
A price reduction for consumers is observed, at the same time that generators
avoid variable supply costs [64].
It is argued that the price reduction to spot market buyers is a transfer of
wealth from generation to load. However, there is a benefit to society as a
whole, for generation and load, if the decrease in demand results in avoided
supply costs. Expensive units do not need to be used as much, generators avoid
the cost, and load pays less for energy.
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2.4 Remuneration of Demand Response in Whole-
sale Markets
Defining an adequate price for demand response integration in wholesale markets
has been a matter of debate during several years. The initial programs promoting
the integration of demand response into wholesale markets included demand
response products traded as capacity (availability), energy during the day-ahead
and real-time balancing, and reserves [65].
The Smart Grid task force of the European commision recommends that
consumers have a right to sell flexibility in the same terms as other suppliers,
the value of a MWh should be decided regardless of who is providing it [66].
The report argues that flexibility resources should receive comparable payment
as traditional generation. Furthermore, demand response should be accepted as
a flexibility resource in the full range of markets, including capacity, forward,
day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets.
However, not everyone agrees that demand response should be remunerated
at the same rate as other generators. There are different proposals regarding
the adequate remuneration of demand response in the wholesale markets. In
the following sections different approaches discussed in prominent wholesale
markets are presented.
2.4.1 The LMP - G Debate
It was first proposed that demand response should be remunerated at the
locational marginal price (LMP) in United States’ federal markets. A review of
demand response implementation in the USA shows the initiatives and pilot
programs issued to promote demand response participation [67]. In 2008 the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ruled that demand response should be
treated in a comparable way to generation sources and that it could bid into
electricity markets [68]. In 2011 FERC ruled, in Order No. 745, that demand
response should be remunerated at the full Locational Marginal Price when the
dispatch of that demand response resource is cost-effective [69]. It was ruled
that demand response should only be dispatched when the incremental payment
for it equals the incremental benefit of the reduction in load.
The critics to remunerating demand response at the full locational market
price argued that it gave an unfair double payment to the providers of the
service [70] [71] [72]. Consumers would earn both an incentive payment for their
demand reduction and savings from the energy they didn’t consume.
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A notion was proposed where consumers should only earn the difference between
the locational marginal price and their retail tariff. LMP-G is a proposed method
of remunerating demand response where LMP is the locational marginal price of
electricity and where G is the retail price per unit the consumer would pay if it
were to purchase the units it is willing to forego [71]. The reasoning behind this
proposal is that when a consumer does not consume one extra unit of energy he
saves the cost of that energy. These savings should be the market based signal
needed for consumers to decide whether it is worth it for them to buy electricity
or not. However, consumers are not exposed to market prices, it is assumed
that they face retail prices that are lower to market prices. The proposal of
LMP-G is thought to avoid a double reward for the same service. To illustrate
the concept with an example, imagine a consumer who pays 0.10 €\kWh at the
same time that the market experiences a price of 0.50 €\kWh. If he were to
reduce his consumption at that hour the consumer would save 0.10 €. If this
was remunerated at the LMP he would earn 0.10 € plus 0.50 € amounting a
total of 0.60 €. Under the proposal of LMP - G the consumer would earn a
savings of 0.10 € and be paid an incentive of 0.40 €. This way his total earnings
would equal the full LMP, 0.50 €, which is what he would have saved had he
been exposed to market prices instead of retail prices.
While the economic reasoning behind the LMP-G proposal is sound, it neglects
the costs of demand response intermediation and service provision. Another
analysis of the debate proposes that the supporters of ’LMP-G’ were wrong to
equate the opportunity cost of the customer with the lost value of electricity
consumption ignoring other costs and considerations. It is suggested that the
optimal price for demand response resources lies somewhere between LMP and
LMP-G. And, if there are substantial benefits to demand response, the best
solution may be to charge LMP and uplift the cost on a load-proportionate
basis [64].
The FERC counter-argued that demand response has a market value equivalent
to supply response, and therefore should be remunerated in similar terms as
supply at the LMP. In a letter to the FERC, a group of supporters stated
that ’since demand response is actually - and not merely metaphorically-
equivalent to supply response, economic efficiency requires that it be regarded
and rewarded, equivalently, as a resource proferred to system operators, and
be treated equivalently to generation in competitive power markets, that is, all
resources - energy saved equivalently to energy supplied- should receive the same
market-clearing LMP in remuneration [73]’.
The order was harshly criticized and eventually the ruling was overturned in
2014 [74]. The case was then taken to the supreme court who, in 2016, ruled
in favor of Order No. 745 reinstating FERC’s initial regulation that demand
response should be remunerated at the full LMP.
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In order 745, FERC rejected the LMP-G method of determining the per unit
payment a provider of demand response should receive. FERC ordered the
regional transmission organizations and independend service operators that
operate each of the regional transmission grids to design and implement a system
of compensation that has the potential to compensate a provider of demand
response at LMP. FERC added an important qualification to that requirement,
however. A provider of demand response is entitled to receive compensation
based on LMP only in circumstances in which payment of compensation based
on LMP would satisfy a net benefits test. FERC instructed RTOs and ISOs to
identify the hours in which payment of LMP provides net benefits to consumers
by determining ’when reductions in LMP from implementing demand response
results in a reduction in the total amount consumers pay for resources that is
gretar than the money spent acquiring those demand resources at LMP.’ The
benefit of demand response is seen as the decrease in LMP multiplied by the
remaining load [71]. The imbalances brought on by demand response cause costs
to the system operator. It was determined that the cost should be allocated to
all ’entities that purchase from the relevant energy market in the areas where
the demand response reduces the market price for energy at the time when the
demand response resource is committed or dispached.’
2.4.2 The NEBEF Mechanism
In 2014 France allowed demand curtailment to bid as energy directly into the
wholesale electricity market through the NEBEF mechanism. The first year
achieved a modest volume of 313 MWh [57], while more than 3000 MWh of
load were curtailed during 2015 [75].
The NEBEF mechanism adopts a modified version of the MP-G approach
proposed - and later rejected- in PJM. When a demand reduction is valorized
in a market, the aggregator must pay the retailer of the affected load sites. The
payment is a price per MWh defined for each 30 minute period. It is applied to
the volume of energy corresponding each accepted load reduction program. If
the application of the flat rate leads to a negative value, the aggregator pays
zero euros to the retailer of the affected load sites. This payment is fiscally
equal to a payment for energy delivery.
Demand response reductions bid into the day ahead market and are remunerated
at the marginal price minus a seasonal average market price previously defined
[76]. The regulated price ’G’ varies depending on several factors:
• The price for directly measured or profiled consumers is calculated
differently.
32 DEMAND RESPONSE IN THE WHOLESALE MARKET
Amount Payable Off-peak Peak
Flat rate €\MWh 46.2 €\MWh
Off-peak, Peak rate €\MWh 38.19 47.29 €\MWh
Table 2.2. Transfer payment value for profiled demand response entities
Amount
Payable
€\MWh
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Off-
peak
Peak Off-
peak
Peak Off-
peak
Peak Off-
peak
Peak
Rate
€\MWh
45.67 64.8 28.49 42.18 28.86 42.25 43.61 60.86
Table 2.3. Transfer payment value for remotely monitored demand response entities
• Peak and off-peak hours are calculated differently for each consumer type.
For remotely measured consumers offering demand reductions the price is
calculated as the difference between the reference market price and a value
accounting for the price paid by energy sold outside of the market under
regulated provisions for the purchase of nuclear energy.
Profiled consumers are those whose load curve is estimated according to regulated
load profiles. The price G for demand reduction coming from profiled consumers
is calculated based on the fixed flat tariffs that consumers pay for both peak
and off-peak consumption.
During 2016 the price paid by the agggregator for demand reduction to the
supplier of a final consumer are shown in table 2.2 and were obtained from [77].
2.5 Conclusions
The discussion above illustrates that there are several different valid points
of view regarding the remuneration of demand response in wholesale markets.
Some argue that demand response should be remunerated at an equal price
as other generation resources. Others argue that it should be remunerated
at a market price minus the value of the sourced energy. This value, they
argue, should be transferred to the supplier of the consumer affected by demand
response actions of an aggregator. The definition of transfer payment arises
from this discussion, based on the value of ’G’ described above:
CONCLUSIONS 33
Transfer payment: the cost of provision of demand reductions representing
the value of the sourced energy that the consumers curtailed as a service to the
market, in €\MWh.
The exact value of the transfer payment is also a source of debate. It was first
argued that it should be equal to ’G’, the retail price of the energy sourced.
It was later debated that accounting for only the retail price of the energy
sourced does not cover all the costs of provision of demand reductions to the
market since it is an intermediated service. Costs of aggregation which include
telecommunication infrastructure, information management, and contracting
are not taken into account in the value ’G’ as it was first strictly defined. The
aggregation of demand response enables users to participate in the market when
otherwise they would have not met the entry criteria. As such, it becomes a
service similar to generation.
Summarizing the main positions presented in the discussion flexibility from
demand response in the wholesale market can be remunerated at:
• The same price as other generation in the market, namely the marginal
price (MP), or
• The marginal market price (MP) minus the retail price of sourcing that
energy (MP - G).
Who pays the transfer payment, is also up for debate. When a third party
aggregator takes action upon the consumers of a retailer, assumed to be the BRP
in this thesis, the retailer suffers an imbalance in it’s portfolio. It is assumed
that if the retailer then receives the transfer payment from the aggregator the
imbalance is compensated. However, most of the discussions so far talk only
about demand response reduction only, ignoring a possible rebound effect. It is
safe to assume that a consumer who has suffered a demand reduction is likely
to consume all or part of that energy at a later hour. An action called the
rebound effect. It is worth it to study the full effect of demand response, both
reduction and rebound, on the profits of the BRP. In the analysis that follows
demand response remuneration is studied at either MP or MP-G taking into
account the rebound effect that has until now been neglected in the literature.
Through the ’Avis no. 13-A-25’ in December 2013, the competition authority
in France recognized a premium to aggregators (demand response operators)
per MWh of downward demand response offered each year [78]. The premium
is financed by a fee imposed on consumers based on their volume of use. The
objective of the premium is to help aggregators reach an acceptable return on
investment so that they will be motivated to participate in the market.

Chapter 3
Effects of Aggregation in the
Wholesale Market
The introduction of the aggregator as a new market participant poses challenges
to the existing market design. The main issue is that the aggregator offers
flexibility based on demand response contracts with consumers that already
have retail contracts with another party. The BRP must procure enough energy
to meet the needs of the consumers in its portfolio. It will do so by participating
in the long and short term markets for electricity supply. It is recognized that
any load adjustment resulting from a demand response action by an aggregator
will result in an imbalance in the retailer’s, or balancing responsible party’s,
position [29]. According to the Smart Grid’s taks force there are two impacts
when a demand response dispatch occurs in real time and it wasn’t initiated
by the BRP. The first is that the BRP cannot charge or receive payment for
the electricity it sourced on the market. The second one is that the BRP is
imbalanced due to the third party aggregation role [66].
Section 3.1 recognizes and defines the rebound phenomenon of demand response.
Demand response has two direct effects on the BRP’s portfolio, a market effect
and a retail effect as explained in 3.2. Proposed mechanisms in literature to
deal with these effects are explained in section 3.3. Chapter conclusions are
presented in 3.4.
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3.1 Definition of the Rebound
Aggregated demand response has several effects on the portfolio of the BRP.
As a participant in the market on behalf of a generation and load portfolio
the BRP is impacted on several levels due to the rebound effect. The rebound
occurs when consumers who have participated in a demand response activation,
resume their usual activities at a later time. The rebound has a ripple on the
market and the retail profits of the BRP. At the same time, the BRP incurs
a penalty if it is imbalanced, which might happen if a third party aggregator
takes action upon its portfolio.
In order to do a complete analysis of the effect of demand response on the BRP’s
portfolio it is necessary to define the rebound effect. It has been recognized
in literature but has not been taken into account in the discussions regarding
demand response remuneration and balancing responsibility allocation.
The rebound effect corresponds to the additional energy necessary after a
requested load reduction [79]. A rebound or payback effect is recognized during
dynamic demand side management assuming that if a process is interrputed it
might have to ’catch up’ later [80]. Deliberate ’load shifting’, where consumption
is moved from high price hours to low price ones, was proposed in one of the first
demand side managements initiatives [53] [81]. A rebound effect is identified
when more efficient technologies are at least partly compensated, and sometimes
overcompensated, by an increase in energy demand [82]. In demand response
modeling it has been found that the consumer’s response to an incentive at a
certain time period, shifts this energy to later time periods [83]. It was also
found that when each indivicual household optimizes its demand to reduce costs
the resulting aggregate demand may be affected by an even higher rebound peak
shifted toward the off-peak period [84]. It has been shown that simple time-
varying electricity price stuctures coupled with automated energy management
systems might create pronounced rebound peaks in the aggregate residential
demand [85].
In this context the rebound effect is defined as follows:
Rebound effect: the shifting of load from a high price hour to a lower priced
hour due to actions of demand response initiated by a consumer or by an
aggregator at the consumer’s site.
The rebound effect, when optimally achieved, means that the consumer shifts
their load to maximize savings from price differences. An example in the
commercial segment is the food cold storage facilities that could provide demand
response flexibility. The temperature in deep freeze facilities can be modulated
within an accepted range taking advantage of low prices to drive temperatures
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down so that electricity is not needed during high price peak hours. The demand
reduction at high priced hours would need to be compensated during low priced
hours.
Defining the rebound effect is crucial to creating the whole picture of how the
BRP is affected by the demand response actions of the aggregator. The BRP
has an impact on it’s portfolio due to both, the direct demand response action,
and the rebound that comes later.
3.2 Effects of Demand Response in the BRPs’
Portfolio
There are two main effects that can be observed for the BRP when a third
party aggregator activates demand response on its consumers. An imbalance is
created in the wholesale market and the profits of the BRP in the retail market
are affected.
• Market Effect: if the BRP has sent a schedule of supply and demand that
will be affected by third-party aggregator actions, an imbalance in the
DA-market is expected for the BRP. The BRP’s profits are affected in
different ways depending on whether the BRP has information about the
aggregator’s actions in advance or not as follows:
– BRP observes aggregator’s actions prior to the market: in this case
the BRP can solve its long or short positions in the market itself.
– BRP doesn’t observe the aggregator’s actions: if an imbalance is
created, and not solved through market actions at day-ahead or
intraday level, there will be an imbalance price for not complying
with the proposed production and consumption schedules.
• Retail Effect: the BRP’s profits depend partly on the retail contracts in
place. If actions by the aggregator will change consumer’s behavior this
will also have an impact on the expected retail profit. This effect will
occur in both scenarios of information on the market effect for the BRP.
To illustrate the expected effects of demand response an example is drafted in
figure 3.1. In the left half of the figure a demand response reduction is activated
during a peak hour. At this moment the BRP had initially forseen to buy 100
MWh to cover the load of its consumers. Due to the unobserved actions of
the aggregator upon its consumer’s load, the BRP now has a long position, a
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fig. 3.1. Rebound effect illustrative example
positive imbalance, of 20 MWh. In the right half of the picture the rebound
effect is illustrated. At a later off-peak hour, consumers compensate for their
previously reduced consumption and increase their load by 20 MWh. The BRP
had initally foreseen to buy 40 MWh to cover the load of its consumers, but
now the consumers are demanding 60 MWh instead. The BRP is short by 20
MWh, it has a negative imbalance of 20 MWh.
3.2.1 Market Effect
The market effect of demand response caused by the rebound is the open
position that the BRP experiences due to a third party aggregator action upon
it’s load portfolio. As mentioned before there are two different ways in which
this imbalance affects the BRP depending on whether the BRP has information
regarding the actions of the aggregator or not. Figure 3.2 summarizes the
imbalance effect on the BRP’s portfolio. If the BRP observes the aggregator’s
actions it can either avoid the imbalance altogether by submitting a modified
nomination to the system operator, or it can solve the imbalance in the market
itself by buying or selling energy. If the BRP doesn’t observe the aggregator’s
actions the schedule that the BRP submits to the system operator is flawed
and the BRP remains imbalanced. Both cases are explained in detail below.
BRP Observes Aggregator’s Actions
The BRP has foreseen an amount of load consumption and buys energy at the
market price in order to cover it. Figure 3.3 illustrates an example of the market
effect for the BRP and the Aggregator. Prices are added to the example in
figure 3.1 to illustrate what happens to the BRP’s and the Aggregator’s profits
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fig. 3.2. Market effect of demand response (DR) on BRP
due to a demand response activation. It is assumed that the aggregator does not
have the balancing responsibility. This means that the BRP incurs in market
transactions to balance its portfolio in the market. It is assumed that the BRP
does not know what the actions of the aggregator are in the DA market, but is
settled ex-post at the marginal market price.
A peak hour marginal price of 90 e\MWh and an off-peak hour price of
30 e\MWh are proposed. In the initial scenario without demand response
the BRP would have had to procure the energy at 90 e\MWh to cover its
entire demand of 100 MWh incurring a procurement cost of 9000 e. After
demand response the BRP does not have to procure those 20 MWh, and can
save 1,800 e. Later, when consumers rebound, the BRP needs to source that
energy at a lower price of 30 e\MWh. The BRP faces an unexpected cost
increase of 600 e at the rebound hour. Overall, the market effect is positive,
since the BRP sold energy at a high price hour and bought it at a low price
hour for a total savings of 1,200 e on the market price.
Generalizing the market effect for the BRP ends up as described in equation
(3.1). The market effect, MKTeff , of one demand response event for the BRP
is equal to the difference between the marginal price at a peak hour, MPPh and
the marginal price at an off peak hour, MPOPh times the amount of demand
reduction down.
MKTeff = (MPPh − MPOPh) ∗ down (3.1)
where
MKTeff market effect of demand response for the BRP [e]
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fig. 3.3. Market effect example of demand response for the BRP and aggregator
MPPh marginal price of the market at a peak hour [e\MWh]
MPOPh marginal price of the market at an off peak hour [e\MWh]
down amount of demand reduction [MWh]
BRP doesn’t Observe Aggregator’s Actions
If the BRP is unaware of the actions of the aggregator, its position in the market
remains open with respect to its real load and generation profiles. The BRP’s
nomination, meaning the schedule it submits to the system operator, is faulty
by an amount equal to the demand response actions caused by the aggregator.
In this case the system operator has to activate reserves to cover the imbalances
caused. The BRP then has to face the imbalance pricing according to system
rules as explained below.
The imbalance is caused by the activation of upward and downward demand
response. Since upward and downward demand response are activated at
different hours, the imbalance caused depends on the direction of the activation
of this flexibility. The imbalance can be either positive or negative for the BRP
as follows:
• Positive imbalance means that injection exceeds off-take. A downward
demand response activation leads to positive imbalance, as the planned
injection of the BRP will be higher than the actual offtake at that hour.
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fig. 3.4. Imbalance effect of demand response if BRP’s position is left open
• Negative imbalance means that off-take exceeds injection. An upward
demand response activation leads to a negative imbalance, as the planned
off-take of the BRP will be higher than the injection at that hour.
Continuing with the example presented in figure 3.1, the imbalance effect is
illustrated in figure 3.4. In this example, it is assumed that positive and negative
imbalance have the same value. A peak price is proposed at 120 e\MWh, which
means that the positive imbalance of the long position left by the downward
demand response receives 2400 e. This is the product of the imbalance amount
20 MWh and the imbalance price at the peak hour, 120 e\MWh. Conversely,
during the off-peak hour when the rebound occurs the imbalance price is set
at 90 e\MWh. Which means that the BRP has to pay -1800 e for its short
position, the product of -20 MWh corresponding to the rebound effect, and
90 e\MWh.
This is only an illustrative example, the results may vary significantly according
to system conditions. Traditionally, a reduction of demand during peak hours
would help the system and earn an income. Changing system conditions due
to RES growth might change that scenario. A generalization of this effect is
therefore not possible, as the system conditions might change.
3.2.2 Retail Effect
The retail effect of demand response in the BRP’s profits has two parts. First,
the loss of profit for the curtailed energy during the initial demand reduction.
Second, the increase in profit when the consumer decides to make up for the lost
demand at a later hour during the rebound period. Two cases are presented,
one where the consumer faces flat tariffs, and one where the consumer faces
peak/off-peak tariffs. Figure 3.5 depicts the effect that the aggregator has on
the BRP’s retail portfolio. Downward demand response means that consumers
decrease their load, while the rebound means that consumers increase it. The
BRP’s retail income is affected differently depending on the tariff plans that
consumers are facing. If they face flat tariffs, the BRP’s income is not affected.
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fig. 3.5. Effect of demand response on the retail market
If they face peak and off-peak tariffs the BRP presumably sells less at hours of
high prices and more at hours of low prices. Therefore the BRP’s income could
be negatively affected.
Flat Tariffs
Continuing with the example in figure 3.1, we examine the case where the final
consumers providing demand response reduction are facing flat tariffs. The
BRP initially foresees 100 MWh load consumption for the appointed period.
At a rate of 40 e\MWh the BRP would have earned 4000 e for that energy.
Instead, after a demand response reduction of 20 MWh the BRP earns 3200 e,
facing a loss of profit of 800 e.
At a later hour, a rebound will take place and the consumers will use the 20
MWh. Since the consumer is facing flat tariffs the cost of the energy is still
40 e\MWh. Therefore at off-peak hour the BRP has an income gain equal to the
demand response reduction amount, 20 MWh, times the flat tariff, 40 e\MWh,
totalling 800 e. The net effect for of this transaction, for the BRP is neutral,
since in the first hour it loses 800 e and in the second it he gains 800 e. This
example for the retail effect of demand response is illustrated in figure 3.6.
Peak / Off-peak Tariffs
In this case the aggregated consumers are facing peak / off-peak tariffs of
50 e\MWh for peak hours, and 35 e\MWh for off-peak hours as illustrated
in the bottom half of figure 3.6. When the demand reduction occurs in the
peak hour the BRP receives 4,000 e instead of the expected 5,000 e before the
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fig. 3.6. Retail effect example of demand response for the BRP and aggregator
demand response event. The expected retail income of the BRP decreases by
20 MW times 50 e\MWh, for a total expected loss of -1,000 e.
Later, during the off-peak period the BRP is expecting an income of 1,400 e for
the initially foreseen 40 MWh consumption. After the rebound occurs due to
the previously activated demand reduction, the BRP would earn 2,100 e. The
retail income gain is 700 e, equal to the demand rebound amount of 20 MWh
times the retail tariff of 35 e\MWh at that moment.
The overall retail effect of a consumer facing peak/ off-peak tariffs ends up as
the difference between the expected loss of -1000 e during the first period and
the expected income of 700 e during the second period. The net retail effect is
negative at -300 e.
Generalizing the retail effect for the BRP for a demand reduction event is
described in (3.2). The retail effect, RETeff , of one demand response event
for the BRP is equal to the difference between the tariff the consumer whose
load was reduced faces at an off-peak hour, TOPh and the tariff at a peak hour,
TPh times the amount of demand reduction down.
RETeff = (TOPh − TPh) ∗ down (3.2)
where
RETeff retail effect of demand response for the BRP [e]
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TOPh Off-peak tariff that the consumer affected by demand response
faces [e\MWh]
TPh Peak tariff that the consumer affected by demand response faces
[e\MWh]
down amount of demand reduction [MWh]
3.3 Proposed BRP-Aggregator Adjustment Mech-
anisms
It has been established in the previous sections that the actions of a third party
aggregator cause open positions for the BRP as demonstrated in figure 3.1.
The BRP has a long position, meaning a positive imbalance, when there is an
unforeseen demand reduction. In contrast, it has a short position, meaning a
negative imbalance, when there is an unforeseen demand rebound.
While in this thesis, the focus is the integration of demand response into
wholesale markets the effects described above also apply for cases when demand
response is sold into the balancing markets. The current discussions arise from
the first implementations of DR in balancing markets, but they are nonetheless
relevant within the context of this thesis.
In the three effects described above, it was assumed that the BRP would bear
the consequences of demand response. However, there are several different
proposals on the table at the moment. The options for allocating the imbalance,
and dealing with the imbalance responsibility are discussed next.
The Smart Grid Task Force (SGTF) suggests a financial adjusment mechanism
to ensure that all electricity sourced on the market and consumed by end-
consumes is paid to the actor who sourced it [66]. The BRP shouldn’t face
costs incurred through the fulfillment of balancing requirements. Mechanisms
should be symmetric for downward and upward demand response. The TSO
(or DSO) is placed as a neutral market facilitator between aggregators, BRPs
and suppliers, providing communication and settlement services.
In a follow-up document the recommendations further explain specifications of
compensation mechanisms relating to demand response activation [86]:
• Demand response activation initiated by a third party should not result
in imbalances for the BRP of the involved consumers.
• There should be payments corresponding to sourcing costs:
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– In case of demand reduction: the aggregator should pay the BRP
for the sourced energy.
– In case of demand increase: the BRP should pay the aggregator for
the sourced energy.
• The consumer should be billed only what he has actually consumed (unless
it is contractually agreed otherwise between consumer and aggregator).
• The sourcing price could be:
– Bilaterally negotiated between the supplier and a third party
aggregator.
– Set through price formulas to neutrally and accurately reflect sourcing
costs.
EURELECTRIC proposes two main market design options to deal with the
imbalanced positions of the BRP [5]:
• A bilateral contractual model, by which the BRP and the aggregator
agree on compensation.
• A centralized regulated model, where the BRP is compensated by the
aggregator at a regulated price.
In a nutshell, the positions of EURELECTRIC and the Smart Grid Task Force,
are in the same line as the MP-G debate presented in section 2.4.1. The amount
of the compensation, and the specifics of the transactions are not described in
detail.
NordREG, the Nordic Energy Regulators analyse four different models for
aggregation of demand response [87]:
1. One BRP integrated: supplier and aggregator are one entity.
2. Two BRPs without adjustment: independent aggregator and supplier with
balance responsibility on the same connection point without adjustment.
3. Two BRPs with adjustment: Independent aggregator and a supplier BRP
act on the same connection point, with adjustment of imbalances and
reimbursement of sourcing costs.
4. One BRP and Independent aggregator without balance responsibility.
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The report by NordREG assumes that all demand response is sold in the
balancing market. They address only upward regulating bids to the TSO
(downward demand response). Imbalances are settled on single pricing: the
settlement for both positive and negative imbalances is equal to the clearing
price of the balancing market.
NordREG supports an option where the BRP and aggregator are integrated,
as the most efficient way to enable demand response because it keeps to the
principle of one BRP per connection point. They argue that in a competitive
retail market customers would have the option of switching to a retailer that
offers demand response services. Option 2, where the aggregator and the BRP
both have balancing responsibility but are not adjusted, is not viable as the
aggregator would not earn a profit since it only sells to cover its imbalanced
position. Option 3, where a settlement is made between the aggregator and the
BRP, presents practical issues to properly determine the imbalance of every
BRP and the correct sourcing costs of the energy. Option 4 creates additional
costs for the system because the aggregator is not liable for the imbalances it is
causing and therefore is not a recommended option.
France and Switzerland have opted for regulated contracts between the
aggregator and BRP, where the aggregator pays a regulated fee to the BRP for
demand response reductions [57]. France determines a fee that is equivalent to
the retail cost of the sourced energy as explained in section 2.4.2. In Switzerland
the aggregator is obliged to compensate the BRP for the difference in consumed
energy through a regulated payment that is set by the quarter-hourly day-ahead
spot prices of the Swiss electricity index.
In the federal markets of the United States, remunerating demand response
reductions at the full wholesale locational market price was chosen as the best
option. However, ERCOT, a state non-federal market, still choses to remunerate
it at the LMP-G [64]. Several methods for dealing with the cost allocation of
demand response reductions were discussed by the FERC [88]:
• Allocating it to the retailer associated to the demand response provider.
• Socializing the costs to all purchasing consumers.
• Assigning part of the costs to the retailer and part to all consumers.
• Allocating the costs to retail consumers who bid demand response into
the wholesale market.
• Through a settlement method that incorporates the cost of DR into the
dispatch algorithm.
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3.4 Conclusions
It is evident in the academic literature that the rebound is a reality, consumers
are likely to shift their consumption to another time when they have gone
through a demand reduction event. Consumers would shift consumption to a
moment when the price of electricity is lower. Current discussions on demand
remuneration at a regulatory level, however, do not take into account the
rebound effect. It has an effect on the balancing perimeter of the BRP if
nothing is done to correct it.
It is necessary to take into account that demand response is an intermediated
market. During explicit demand response it is the aggregator who decides when
to sell demand response. The aggregator must take the consumer’s flexibility
availability into account when making decisions about demand reduction. The
activation of demand response curtailment causes open positions on the BRP’s
portfolio. The first open position occurs when the demand response is first
activated, the BRP has a long position corresponding to the amount of the
activation. The second open position is caused by the rebound when the
consumer makes up for the lost energy. In this case, the BRP has a short
position corresponding to the amount of the activation.
In the examples presented the way the imbalance is settled depends on whether
the BRP observes the actions of the aggregator prior to the day-ahead wholesale
market or not. If the BRP observes the actions of the aggregator it can
adjust its schedule before making nominations of load and generation to the
system operator. If the BRP does not observe the actions of the aggregator
its nominations are incorrect and it has an imbalanced position towards the
system operator.
In the wholesale market, demand response causes a price arbitraging effect
as there is a need to sell when prices are high and buy when when prices are
low. There is still a debate as to who should be attributed this effect. If
in fact a settlement is suggested it is also possible that the market effect be
assigned to the aggregator. Perfect arbitraging might not always be possible
if consumers are assumed to rebound between a determined time period. A
dynamic modeling approach would shed light on what happens when this is the
case.
When the BRP does not observe the actions of the aggregator, the position
of the BRP is not corrected and thus left open. In this case the BRP incurs
the imbalance fee or penalty depending on the case. Under current imbalance
prices, which more or less follow the direction of the market prices, it would
appear that the BRP earns a profit through the open position. The imbalance
caused by downward DR leaves the BRP with a long position that corresponds
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to a positive imbalance and is remunerated as upward regulation when sold to
the system operator. The imbalance prices themselves depend on the situation
of the system and may vary unexpectedly if there is a lot of RES generation at
a certain hour. Too much RES generation at a given moment can mean that
the system might need downward regulation, or an increase in demand, in order
to avoid RES curtailment. Therefore, while under current scenarios it might
appear that this imbalance effect is positive for the BRP, the situation might
change in the future.
Demand response also has an effect on the retail market. When facing flat
tariffs the final consumer would not be motivated to engage in demand response.
He might only be motivated to do it if he were receiving an incentive directly
from the market, or a profit sharing scheme from the aggregator. When facing
peak/off-peak tariffs the final consumer would reap a savings from engaging in
demand response. Likewise this has an impact in the total profits of the BRP.
The intuitive examples presented in section 3.2.2 imply that the BRP would be
at a loss on the retail side if this were the case. Nevertheless, it is important to
take into account that the two-tiered peak/off-peak tariffs that consumers face
do not directly represent the highest and lowest marginal prices observed in the
market. Similarly, the rebound may or may not occur all at the same time, it is
possible that the rebound takes place over a different amount of hours than the
initial demand reduction took. A dynamic analysis through time is needed to
determine the true retail effect of demand response in the BRP’s profits.
In chapter 4 the effect on the BRP’s and aggregator’s profits of the following
demand response remuneration proposals are analyzed:
• Day-Ahead market effect: if the BRP has sent a schedule of supply
and demand that will be affected by third-party aggregator actions, an
imbalance in the DA-market is expected for the BRP. The BRP’s profits are
affected in different ways depending on whether the BRP has information
about the aggregator’s actions in advance or not as follows:
– The BRP observes the actions of the aggregator before the day-ahead
wholesale market under the following settlement mechanisms:
∗ Full MP: The BRP has balancing responsibility and covers
the imbalanced position at the market Marginal Price. The
aggregator receives the full MP.
∗ MP-G: The Aggregator has balancing responsibility and covers
the imbalanced position at a regulated price G representative of
the sourcing costs of the energy sold as demand response.
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– The BRP does not observe the actions of the aggregator and the
BRP’s imbalanced position is left open. The attribution of this
imbalance is studied in chapter 4 as follows:
∗ The imbalance is attributed to the BRP.
∗ The imbalance is attributed to the Aggregator.
∗ The imbalance is neutralized by the system operator and its
costs are socialized.
• Retail Effect: the BRP’s profits depend partly on the retail contracts in
place. If actions by the aggregator will change consumer’s behavior this
will also have an impact on the expected retail profit. This effect will
occur in both scenarios of information on the market effect for the BRP.
The options presented are not exhaustive, but they are the most popular
ones being discussed and implemented. The current discussions about these
alternatives are mostly argumentative in nature. The rebound effect must
be taken into account to get the full picture of the consequences of demand
response. In chapter 4, a model to analyze each effect more in depth is proposed.
The model sheds light on what the rebound effect means for each actor, and
how the balancing responsibility proposed in each option affects the profits of
the aggregtor and the BRP.

Chapter 4
Modelling the Effects of
Demand Response in the
Wholesale Market
This chapter is an empirical analysis of the effects of demand response in the
wholesale market. Demand Response has been placed within market design in
chapter 2 and its effects have been analyzed in chapter 3. It was concluded
in chapter 3 that a dynamic analysis of the effects of demand response in the
wholesale market is needed. The rebound effect has not been taken into account
into the remuneration discussions in place. In order to analyze it, a simulation
model is proposed. The model accounts for the rebound in the market costs and
profits of each party. This chapter proposes an extension of the unit commitment
model in order to present the optimal merit order of generation in the presence
of demand response. The traditional model is modified to include participants
as portfolio owners. The BRPs are represented as owners of generation and
holders of retail obligations. The aggregator is introduced as the supplier of all
demand reductions offered in the market. Continuing in the framework of the
previous two chapters, only demand reductions are studied as a service in order
to keep the analysis simple.
The aggregator is qualitatively placed within a modelling framework in
section 4.1. A decision making model including demand response, and a
portfolio balancing BRP is introduced in section 4.2. A wholesale market case
study is setup and analyzed in section 4.3. The effect of demand response in
BRP and Aggregator Profits is explored in section 4.4. Chapter conclusions are
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presented in 4.5.
4.1 Aggregator and Demand Response Modelling
A survey of electricity market modelling classifies models as simulation models,
equilibrium models considering different firms, and one firm optimization models
[41]. A survey of agent based market models that take into account the objectives
of different participants can be found in [89].
Demand response has been integrated into electricity market models in numerous
articles in the literature. A comprehensive study of demand response models
based on control mechanism, time-based motivations, and incentive-based
demand response can be found in [67]. Demand elasticity is introduced into
account in a pool market to model strategic behavior of electricity producers [90].
Demand response considering curtailable loads is introduced in [91]. Demand
response in the unit commitment is modedelled in [92] and [81].
In [93] the aggregator is modeled as a retailer and flexibility service provider. In
the day-ahead spot market the aggregator buys electrical energy for its clients.
The aggregation provides flexibility from different types of residential loads such
as air conditioning units, electric vehicles (EVs), water heaters and refrigerators.
The model takes into account thermal environmental criteria and consumer
comfort. The TSO and DSO then validate the aggregator’s bids and correct
them in case of congestions. The model considers only the day-ahead spot
market. Their results show that flexible bidding reduces the average cost and
the energy purchased by the aggregator in the market.
In [94] it is stated that when consumers modify their consumption behavior
incentivized by DR programs they incur a cost. It could be either the cost of
running a local generator for an industrial consumer, or the loss of comfort for
a household consumer. A mechanism that takes into account this cost from
a centralized system perspective is proposed considering hidden information
and agent rationality. The model proposed fixes system demand for flexibility
and proposes pricing and quantity setting structures in a reserves-type market
organized by a centralized decision maker. The current analysis, in contrast,
places the aggregator as a profit maximizing entity in the day-ahead and intraday
wholesale electricity markets and determines what the outcome would be given
different costs of providing flexibility. In the case of the aggregator the cost of
providing flexibility is the contracting and transactional cost of the energy plus
any fees added by the regulators.
In [79] the authors calculate the bidding price that optimizes the total income
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of the aggregator taking into account three rebound scenarios of 0, 50, and
100 percent of the total demand reduction using price data of the French day-
ahead and intraday markets. Aggregator profits are calculated on a marginal
price basis in the day ahead market and a pay-as-bid basis in the balancing
market. The profits are then the offer price minus a compensation that must
be paid to the supplier of the consumer times the amount of energy decreased
minus the rebound energy. In their model, the aggregator is also responsible
for paying the energy increase of the rebound effect at a regulated imbalance
price. It is concluded that participation in energy-only markets is not enough
to cover investment costs for aggregation. Arbitrage between the day-ahead
and balancing markets is taken into account. However, the authors assume that
the aggregator holds perfect knowledge over the prices of both markets, and
that demand response will not have an effect on price. These two assumptions
lead to an overvaluation of estimated aggregator profits, as demand response
has a price lowering effect on markets.
The authors maximize aggregator profits through simultaneous bidding of V2G
energy and ancillary services in [95]. Aggregator revenues are obtained from a
fixed rate on energy delivered to the EV, the revenues from selling regulation
and spinning reserves, and revenues from selling energy. Aggregator costs from
performing V2G are the wholesale cost of energy delivered to the vehicle and
the battery degradation associated from discharging. Consumer preferences
regarding the state of charge of the EV are taken into account. In [96] the
aggregator provides reserve capacity through unidirectional V2G. Aggregator
profits come from a fixed markup over market price on energy which is passed
on to the consumers plus a fixed percentage of the revenue obtained from
providing regulation services. These two models do not consider the effect of
demand response on the market or reserves prices, nor its effect on other market
participants.
The effect of vehicle aggregation for reserves provision on the day-ahead an
intraday schedules is modeled in [97]. The authors show that the system
can absorb higher levels of EV penetration without expansion when there is
coordination between the charging schedule and the system operator. The
revenue of the aggregator is a sensitive parameter in the optimization. The
aggregator sells energy or capacity to the system operator at a fixed price per
MWh or MW respectively. The financial implications and interactions with
other market participants are not taken into account. Market based control of
electric vehicles by an aggregator is studied to identify when it conflicts with
the operational constraints of the distribution grid [98].
Several approaches consider the aggregation of demand for system purposes
without a financial objective function for the aggregator. An approach that
considers aggregated loads for reserves provision can be found in [99] where
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price considerations are left out in preference for loads that track a signal of
the current state of the system. In [100] a control strategy for aggregated
air conditioning loads is designed in order to provide system services such as
frequency regulation and peak load reduction. Other examples of direct load
control strategic modeling can be found in [101] and [102].
Demand response has been successfully modelled though many different
mechanisms in the literature. The aggregator as a market participant, has not
been widely studied. The main literature on aggregator modelling refers to
optimizing the aggregator-end customer relationship, and not to the aggregator-
market relationship. A lack of analysis of the effects of aggregation on the
market, and the financial transactions of the other market participants is
evident. Therefore this thesis extends existing integrations of demand response
into market models to simulate the effects of aggregation on other market
participants under different demand response pricing regimes.
4.2 Model Description
A centralized decision making algorithm is chosen to represent the perfect
scenario of demand response integration into the market merit order. Demand
response is modelled as a demand reduction that is remunerated and a demand
rebound that must pay the market price. Demand reduction is allocated to
an aggregator actor. BRPs are introduced as owners of generation assets and
load portfolios that must be satisfied. The traditional unit commitment model
including demand response [55] is extended to include financial transactions
of the BRPs who either produce with own resources or buy energy from other
BRPs or the aggregator to satisfy their load commitments.
For every time step t a decision is taken first on the wholesale market regarding
the generation schedule of each BRP and the demand response activation per
aggregator. BRPs have a portfolio of conventional generation units, and RES
availability. They are in charge of covering a specific portion of demand. A BRP
must either generate, or buy, the energy needed to cover the load pertaining to
a portfolio of consumers.
The day ahead formulation describes the selection of generation units satisfying
the entire demand. At the same time the portfolio of each BRP is balanced in
such a way that its own generation plus any purchases minus any sales satisfy
its demand. The actors defined in the problem are the BRPs denoted by f, and
the aggregator ag.
The day-ahead market is defined by a cost minimization in (4.1). Each BRP f
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is defined for a portfolio of generation units and must satisfy a certain demand
as a supplier. The amount of energy generated gf,t [MWh] is an output variable
of the model. Each BRP must pay marginal costs of generation defined byMCf .
In addition BRPs incur startup costs scostst,f for firing up their generation
units. Curtailment, in case of excess availability for both wind curtwf,t and
PV curtpvf,t not needed, carries a fixed fee CC. Downward demand response
has a transfer payment cost for the aggregator of G. The problem is subject to
the constraints defined by (4.2) to (4.11) pertaining to generation constraints,
demand response constraints, and BRP constraints.
min
∑
t,f
{(gt,f ∗MCf + scostst,f + CC ∗ (curtwt,f + curtpvt,f )
+
∑
ag,t,f
(downag,t,f ∗G)} (4.1)
where
gt,f energy produced in time t generator f [MWh]
MCf marginal costs per generator f [e\MWh]
scostst,f start up costs decision variable in time t per generator f [e]
CC cost of RES curtailment [e\MWh]
curtwt,f curtailment of excess wind energy at time t owned by BRP f
[MWh]
curtpvt,f curtailment of excess PV energy at time t owned by BRP f
[MWh]
downag,t,f downward demand response [MWh]
G transfer payment cost for aggregator for providing downward
demand response [e\MWh]
4.2.1 System Balance
The system balance equation that sets generation equal to demand is given by
(4.2). Demand D1t,f is defined per BRP f and per time period t. Conventional
plant output gt,f is added to wind production WINDt,f and PV production
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PV fdat,f . PV and wind profiles are input data. Wind and PV curtailment
are decision variables curtwt,f , and curtpvt,f respectively. Curtailment is
subtracted from the input wind and PV profiles when there is excess production
that is not needed, and it can occur simultaneously for both PV and wind.
In addition to conventional generation RES output the equation includes a
component of demand response, adding downward demand response downag,t,f
and subtracting upward demand response dupag,t,f . In a single period of time
there will be either downward or upward demand response, but not both. Thus,
the system balance equation is defined as:
∑
f
(gt,f +WINDt,f − curtwt,f + PV fdat,f − curtpvt,f )
+
∑
ag,f
(downag,t,f − dupag,t,f ) =
∑
f
D1t,f ∀t (4.2)
where
gt,f amount of energy produced in hour t per BRP f [MWh]
WINDt,f input wind generation in hour t per BRP f [MWh]
PV fdat,f input PV generation in hour t per BRP f [MWh]
dupag,t,f upward demand response per aggregator ag in hour t affecting
BRP f [MWh]
D1t,f input load profile in hour t per BRP f [MWh]
4.2.2 Generation Constraints
Equations (4.3) and (4.4) set the value of generation output within each unit’s
limits PMINf and PMAXf when each unit is on as given by the binary
variable zt,f . Start-up costs scostst,f are given by (4.5) whenever the binary
variable zt,f changes from 0 to 1.
zt,f ∗ PMINf + g1t,f = gt,f ∀t, f (4.3)
(PMAXf − PMINf ) ∗ zt,f ≥ g1t,f ∀t, f (4.4)
SCf ∗ (zt,f − zt−1,f ) ≤ scostst,f ∀t, f (4.5)
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where
g1t,f amount of energy produced per generator above minimum output
for hour t per BRP f [MWh]
PMAXf maximum output per generator per BRP f [MWh]
PMINf minimum output per generator per BRP f [MWh]
zt,f binary variable of unit commitment in time t for BRP f
scostst,f start up costs decision variable in time t per BRP f [MWh]
4.2.3 Demand Response Constraints
Up and downward limits PMAXagag for demand response are given by (4.6)
and (4.7). Similar to generation they are subject to an on or off state defined
by a binary variable vag,t for downward and uag,t for upward demand response.
Equation (4.8) ensures that up and downward demand response are not activated
during the same hour. Equation (4.9) ensures that demand will be shifted during
a subset st of the entire time evaluation period t, such that upward demand
response is equal to downward during that period.
downag,t,f ≤ PMAXagag ∗ vag,t ∀ag, t, f (4.6)
dupag,t,f ≤ PMAXagag ∗ uag,t ∀ag, t, f (4.7)
vag,t + uag,t ≤ 1 ∀ag, t, f (4.8)∑
st
{dupag,t,f − downag,t,f} = 0 ∀ag, f (4.9)
where
PMAXagag maximum output of demand response for aggregator ag [MWh]
uag,t binary decision variable for upward demand response per
aggregator ag in time t
vag,t binary decision variable for downward demand response per
aggregator ag in time t
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4.2.4 BRP Constraints
Finally, (4.10) and (4.11) pertain to the BRP. These constraints form the
contribution of this thesis to current modelling. They are purely financial
constraints representing operations between BRPs to buy and sell energy at the
best price possible.
In (4.10) the BRP ensures that it’s demand D1t,f is covered by either of
generation gt,f , wind availability minus curtailment, as well as PV availability
minus pv curtailment, plus the variable purchases purt,f from other BRPs.
Alternatively if a BRP has an excess of cheap generation it can sell (variable
salest,f ). Equation (4.11) ensures that sales and purchases for each period of
time t add up to zero as they are purely financial transactions.
gt,f +WINDt,f + PV fdat,f − curtwt,f − curtpvt,f
− salest,f + purt,f −D1t,f
+
∑
ag
(downag,t,f − dupag,t,f ) = 0 ∀t, f (4.10)
∑
f
{salest,f − purt,f} = 0 ∀t (4.11)
where
salest,f sales in time t per BRP f [MWh]
purt,f purchases in time t per BRP f [MWh]
4.2.5 Profits Calculation
The profits of each participant are calculated taking into account their income
and expenses. The actions of the aggregator upon the portfolio of the BRP
cause an imbalance in the BRP’s portfolio. The assignment of this imbalance to
either the Aggregator or the BRP will affect the profits of each one respectively.
In the sections below the aggregator and BRP profits are discussed with and
without the need to pay for the imbalance effect.
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Aggregator Profits
The Aggregator profits are calculated following (4.12). The aggregator makes
an income at the market price for downward demand response. This value is
decreased by the transfer payment G for downward demand response downag,t,f ,
and its own cost of aggregating demand response cag. In the analysis that follows,
this value is assumed to be a constant scalar, and therefore set at value zero for
simplicity. This is the profit expected when the aggregator is not responsible
for covering imbalance costs.
Profitag =
∑
t,f
{lambdat ∗ downag,t,f −G ∗ downag,t,f − cag ∗ downag,t,f}
(4.12)
where
λt market price in time t [e\MWh]
downag,f,t amount of downward demand response per aggregator ag
belonging to BRP f in time t [MWh]
G transfer pricing G of providing demand response for the
aggregator [e\MWh]
c aggregator’s own cost of providing demand response [e\MWh]
BRP Profits
The imbalance caused by the aggregator is covered in the day ahead market
through purchases and sales of energy that compensate for demand response
upward and downward actions. This case assumes perfect information ex-ante
by the BRP on the actions of the aggregator.
Case where BRP assumes balancing Responsibility:
Total BRP profits comprise the addition of two different concepts:
• DA Market Profits: composed by sales and profits in the day ahead market
multiplied by the market price λt minus the costs of providing energy with
a portfolio of generation represented by gent,f as seen in equation (4.13)
below.
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MKTf =
∑
t
{λt ∗ (salest,f − purt,f )
−MCf ∗ gt,f − scostst,f +
∑
ag
(G ∗ downag,t,f )} (4.13)
where
λt market price in time t [e\MWh]
salest,f sales in time t per BRP f [MWh]
purt,f purchases in time t per BRP f [MWh]
MCf marginal costs per generator f [e\MWh]
gt,f energy produced in time t generator f [MWh]
scostst,f start up costs decision variable in time t per generator f
[e]
• Retail Market Profits: composed by demand portfolio sold to consumers
by the BRP multiplied times the price of energy to consumers RETCf .
The imbalance effect caused by the aggregator is then taken into account
by the second part of the equation, where a loss of profit is considered
when there is downward demand response downag,t,f and an increase
when there is upward demand response dupag,t,f . Equation (4.14) defines
the BRP’s retail market profits.
RETf =
∑
t
{D1f,t ∗RETCf
−
∑
ag
((downag,t,f ∗RETCf + dupag,t,f ∗RETCf ) (4.14)
where
D1t,f input load profile in hour t per BRP f [MWh]
RETCf retail price of energy to final consumers per BRP f [e\MWh]
The effect of the aggregator is neutralized, adds up to zero, under perfect
shifting conditions and if the BRP charges a flat tariff to consumers. It is not
the case if the BRP would charge dynamic prices to consumers, be it in the
form of peak/off-peak tariffs or direct exposure to market prices. It is assumed
that the BRP is selling either directly to a portfolio of consumers and acting as
a retailer, or to a retailer. Either way the same analysis applies for the point of
view of the BRP.
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4.3 Wholesale Market Case Study
The model described above is tested in a study case inspired on data for Belgium.
One year, 2015, is chosen for the simulations, and input load, wind and PV
profiles are used. Four BRPs are proposed, owning different generation resources
and a portfolio of load that they need to cover. BRP1 and BRP2 are baseload
owners, BRP3 owns both wind and PV generation, and BRP4 owns peaking
generation. BRP3 is designated as the owner of all WIND and PV resources in
order to be able to study variations separately. One aggregator is modelled as a
seller of demand response that affects the supply profile of BRP3.
In order to simplify the study the following assumptions are made:
• Perfect competition and perfect information is assumed, therefore the
market clearing price will equal the cost of the most expensive unit
producing at a certain time period. Thus, a study based on an economic
dispatch model represents the market outcome accurately.
• A rebound of 100% is expected within a 24 hour horizon.
• Each BRP represents both retail and supply.
• The rebound occurs at the best possible moment.
• All of the wind and PV generation is traded in the DA market.
• Only downward demand response is remunerated as a service, upward
demand response must pay the cost of the energy used.
• The aggregator is an intermediary assumed to have contracts set in place
with final consumers who can provide flexibility, such as households and
small businesses.
4.3.1 Input Data
The input data for one year is used. Data for 2015 is represented in figure 4.1.
The top chart represents the volume of energy traded in the DA market on
Belpex. The center and bottom charts represent the Wind and PV profiles for
the same period respectively.
BRP characteristics
BRPs have a portfolio of generation technology and demand that each must
satisfy. The model calculates the dispatch for each generation technology,
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fig. 4.1. Input data for 2015: energy traded in DA Belpex market (top), wind profile
in Belgium (center), PV profile in Belgium (bottom)
BRP1 has two, BRP2 has two, and BRP3 and BRP4 have only one generation
technology. Fuel prices form the basis for marginal costs [103]. Table 4.1 shows
generation fuel costs per technology, prices were converted to euros, at an
exchange rate of 0.75 eper $, following the convention used by [103]. Start-up
costs and minimum power criteria, the last two columns of table 4.1 were
inspired by [104].
Each BRP has certain generation technologies installed, as seen in table 4.2.
The prices used in table 4.1 are rounded for simplicity and used to represent
different generation technologies that the BRPs own. In order to isolate the
effect of RES in the BRP profits, BRP3 owns all wind and PV resources.
The BRP price to consumers, meaning the retail price collected from retail
sales, is assumed to be 40 e\MWh, based on an tariff calculator for the Belgian
market [105]. This price is debatable as other data assume a retail tariff of
22 €/MWh (rounded from value= 22.1) based on [1]. The chosen value better
reflects the current situation that consumers are facing since it is based on an
WHOLESALE MARKET CASE STUDY 63
Technology type Fuel,
waste
and
carbon
costs
$\MWh
Fuel,
waste
and
carbon
costs in
e\MWh
Start-
up
Cost
[€\∆
MWh]
Mini-
mum
Power
[% of
Installed
Capac-
ity]
Combined cycle gas turbines 84.70 63.5 22 35%
Open cycle gas turbines 114.92 86.19 6 30%
Coal ultra-supercritical 48.72 36.5 13 35%
Nuclear 14.15 10.61 10 45%
Table 4.1. Levelised costs of electricity for generating plants
BRP Genera-
tion
Resource
Marginal
Cost
e\MWh
Start-
up
Costs
[€]
Minimum
Power
[MW]
Installed
Capacity
[MW]
BRP1 BRP1g1 10 5400 540 1200
BRP1g2 37 4550 350 1000
BRP2 BRP2g1 37 3185 245 700
BRP2g2 63 5390 245 700
BRP3 BRP3g1 86 5390 207 690
BRP3W 0 0 0 1950
BRP3PV 0 0 0 2280
BPR4 BRP4g1 86 720 120 400
Table 4.2. Cost and installed capacity of generation per BRP
average of company per company data.
Aggregator characteristics
The aggregator can provide demand response flexibility of 200 MW, which is
equivalent to about 5% peak load. The aggregator is subject to paying the
transfer payment ’G’ to the BRP. The value of ’G’ is analyzed based on different
scenarios.
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Scenario Transfer Payment Value [e\MWh]
No Transfer Payment 0
Transfer Payment 1 30
Transfer Payment 2 45
Table 4.3. Transfer payment scenarios analyzed in detail
Scenario Creation
A sensitivity analysis is conducted to test for different values of the transfer
payment ’G’ from the aggregator to the BRP. Three main prices are proposed
based on the reference values used in the french market initiative NEBEF during
2016 [77]. The analysis is done for a flat transfer payment rate as described in
table 4.3. The model is run different times changing the transfer payment value
represented by DR in the objective function (4.1). The sensitivity analysis is
extended to values ranging from 0 to 100 e\MWh in 5 e increments in order
to see its full effects on the decisions of stakeholders.
4.3.2 Results of Demand Response in the Wholesale Market
Generation Profile and BRP Transactions
Figure 4.2 presents the generation profile per BRP, for the evaluation period.
The results show, predictably, that the cheapest generation units belonging to
BRP1 and BRP2 generate as baseload, and the most expensive ones belonging
to BRP3 and BRP4 generate only during the peaking periods. BRP3 as the
owner of PV and wind generates when the resources are available. Following
this same trend, figure 4.3 presents the financial exchanges of energy between
the BRPs for purchased energy, while figure 4.4 represents the sales of energy
from one BRP to the other. Each BRP must cover a portion of demand, and
therefore seeks to buy the output from the cheapest generation units or generate
with its own units when necessary. The baseload owners, BRP1 and BRP2 are
mostly selling to the peak unit owners BRP3 and BRP4. This last one, BRP4,
doesn’t sell energy to other BRPs at any time, it either buys energy from other
BRPs or uses its own generation to cover its load portfolio. It can also be
observed that high amounts of renewable generation displace the conventional
technologies at certain time periods.
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fig. 4.2. Generation profile per BRP for the evaluation period
Demand Response Profile
Demand response is activated downwards when it would be less expensive than
the marginal generator. Nevertheless, the shifting constraint has a horizon of 24
hours, which means that the same amount of downward demand response must
be activated downward and upwards during a period of 24 hours. Therefore
downward demand response is activated at high price hours and upward demand
response is activated at lower priced hours. This trend is evident in figure 4.5
where the downward and upward activation of demand response are observed
in the upper graph and the market price in the bottom one. It can be observed
that downward demand response, equivalent to an increase in generation, is
activated at the same hours as the peaks in price during that day, meaning
hours 0, 3, 10, 20 and 23. Inversely, upward demand response is activated
at hours of lower prices, such as hours 11-13. Upward demand response is
also activated during hours 18-19 due to the shifting constraint that forces all
downward response to be equal to upward response during one day.
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fig. 4.3. Purchases per BRP for the evaluation period
fig. 4.4. Sales per BRP for the evaluation period
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fig. 4.5. Demand response (top) and market price (bottom) activated during one day:
August 13th
Market Price
The top graph in figure 4.6 shows the resulting market price λt, the dual variable
of the balance equation (4.2), for the entire evaluation period. The results follow
the marginal costs of generation profile, where the highest cost unit sets the
marginal price for the market. A price histogram is presented in bottom graph
of figure 4.6. The most common price is 0 e\MWh which means that renewable
energy, PV or wind, is the marginal technology setting the price. The second
most common price is 36 e\MWh, which is the cost of the coal generators.
Negative prices at -30 e\MWh appear when renewable energy would have to
be curtailed at the set curtailment cost. This happens because it is cheaper for
another BRP to pay to produce than to shut down a unit and have to start it
up again at the given start up costs.
68 MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF DEMAND RESPONSE IN THE WHOLESALE MARKET
fig. 4.6. Market price per period (top) and price histogram (bottom)
RES Curtailment
Figure 4.7 presents the wind and PV curtailment for the evaluation period.
As RES participates at zero marginal cost, and its curtailment is penalized in
the objective function, curtailment is not a likely outcome. RES displaces the
other types of generation, and is only curtailed in hours when there is very low
demand.
4.3.3 Week Studies
In order to take a better look at the different interactions, four case study
weeks have been chosen. The weeks were chosen to explain more in detail the
interactions between BRPs when there is high or low demand and high or low
RES availability. The case studies exemplifies the use of demand response, and
the effect of renewable energy on the market transactions.
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fig. 4.7. Wind and PV curtailment for the evaluation period
• A week with high load in August, containing the day with the highest
demand, August 14th 2015.
• A week with low load in January, containing the day with the lowest
demand, January 3rd 2015.
• A week with high RES availability, containing the day with the highest
RES generation, August 23rd 2015.
• A week with low RES availability, containing the day with the lowest RES
generation, April 8th 2015.
High Load Week Results
Figure 4.8 presents the load and results for a high load week. The top graph
presents the input load profile. It can be noted that there is a peak in load
during Friday August 14th at 8:00 in the morning. At 4668 MWh it is the
highest amount of energy demanded in the market during the year.
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fig. 4.8. High load week generation and load profile
fig. 4.9. High load week demand response and market price
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The three bottom graphs in figure 4.8 represent the production profile for BRPs
1, 2 and 3 respectively. BRP4 is not producing during this week as it is not
needed, load is covered by the other units, RES and demand response. BRP3 is
the owner of the RES resources, wind and PV, their combined profile can be
observed in the bottom graph.
Demand Response can be observed in figure 4.9. Upward demand response
is activated in periods of high renewable energy availability, especially over
the weekend days, Saturday and Sunday. Saturday is a day of lower demand
and high RES availability, which leads to negative prices, and therefore the
activation of upward demand response since the increase in demand pays the
market price. In this case load gets paid to consume. The rest of the week it
can be observed that downward demand response is activated at peak price
hours and upward demand response corresponds to hours of low prices and
high RES availability. However, the demand shifting constraint determines that
upward and downward demand must be equal during each period of 24 hours.
This causes upward demand response activation at times when there is a price
greater than zero.
During high consumption hours, for example the peak observed on friday, the
price takes the cost of the second most expensive generation technology owned
by a BRP, which is 63 e\MWh. The most expensive, peaking technology is not
activated in this case because of the high RES production.
Low Load Week Results
Figure 4.10 presents the results for a low load week. In the same way as the
results presented above, the first graph represents the load profile and the
remaining three graphs represent the generation profiles of BRPs 1, 2 and
3 respectively. The load reaches its lowest point of demand at 1063 MWh
during Saturday January 3rd at 3:00 am. It can be observed that during low
consumption hours this day, only the base load producer and Wind are active.
This means that wind has displaced a part of the base load production as well
as the second least expensive technology. Demand response can be observed in
figure 4.11. Upward demand response is activated during the hours of highest
RES availability on Friday. Downward demand response is activated on the
same Friday, in order to fulfill the demand response shifting constraint.
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fig. 4.10. Low load week generation and load profile
fig. 4.11. Low load week demand response and market price
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High RES Week Results
The load profile during the August week is rather constant. Figure 4.12 shows
that the high amount of RES generation available from BRP3 is displacing
BRP2’s generation during lower load hours. BRP4 is not producing at all during
this week.
Demand Response can be observed in figure 4.13. Upward demand response
is activated to match the hours of highest RES availability, namely PV peaks
that occur during the middle of the day. This activation matches low market
prices caused by RES. Downward demand response is activated mainly during
peak price hours, and at times when there is less RES availability in order to
fulfill the 24 hour shifting constraint.
Low RES Week Results
Figure 4.14 shows that BRP1 and BRP2 are generating more energy than in
the previous case of high RES availability. BRP4 remains outside of the market
results, and therefore buys energy from other BRPs in order to cover its load
portfolio. Demand response and market price are seen in figure 4.15 following
the same trend as in the earlier study cases. Downward DR is activated at
times of higher priced hours and vice-versa.
4.4 Demand Response Effect in BRP and Aggrega-
tor Profits
As mentioned in chapter 2, demand response has two effects on the BRP’s
portfolio. In sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 the results of the model are analyzed based
on the identified effects of demand response. For reference, the two effects are
described below once more:
• Market Effect: if the BRP has sent a schedule of supply and demand that
will be affected by third-party aggregator actions, an imbalance in the
DA-market is expected for the BRP. The BRP’s profits are affected in
different ways depending on whether the BRP has information about the
aggregator’s actions in advance or not.
• Retail Effect: the BRP’s profits depend partly on the retail contracts in
place. If actions by the aggregator will change consumer’s behavior this
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fig. 4.12. Generation and load profile with High RES availability
fig. 4.13. Demand response and market price with High RES availability
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fig. 4.14. Generation and load profile with low RES availability
fig. 4.15. Demand response and market price with low RES availability
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fig. 4.16. Profits of the aggregator (left) and the BRP (right) when the aggregator
receives the Full MP for downward demand response
will also have an impact on the expected retail profit. This effect will
occur in both scenarios of information on the market effect for the BRP.
4.4.1 Market Effect
The market effect of demand response was identified in section 3.2.1 of chapter 2.
It is caused when the aggregator’s activation of downward demand response
cause a long position for the BRP, and later the rebound causes a short position.
The different proposals for analyzing the effect of demand response depend on
whether the BRP observes the actions of the aggregator or not.
The BRP Observes the Actions of the Aggregator
In this case it is assumed that the BRP and the aggregator have active
communication. The BRP’s nomination schedule is adapted to the expected
actions of the aggregator upon its portfolio. The settlement for demand response
could be done, as described in chapter 2, at the ’Full MP’ or at ’MP-G’.
The Aggregator Receives Full MP for Demand Response Reductions
Under the full MP proposal the BRP has balancing responsibility and covers
the imbalanced position at the market marginal price. The aggregator receives
the full MP for the activation of downward DR and does not have to pay the
rebound price of energy at a later hour. Figure 4.16 represents the profits
of the Aggregator, on the left, and the BRP on the right. The aggregator’s
profit is calculated according to (4.12). In this scenario G is zero, therefore the
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aggregator does not pay a transfer to the BRP. As c, the aggregator’s cost of
providing the service is assumed to be zero, the aggregator’s revenue is equal to
the profit. The aggregator obtains revenue from selling DR at the market price,
as represented by the white bar in the figure.
In the lefthand side of figure 4.16 a breakdown of the effect of the aggregator on
the BRP’s profits is seen. As explained earlier, demand response has two effects
on the market profits of the BRP. The first is a savings on sourced energy, since
the BRP no longer has to buy that energy to cover its load. The second one
is a loss at a later time when consumers rebound and make up for the earlier
decrease in load. Equation(4.13) describes the BRP’s profits due to demand
response. In the figure, the black bar represents savings on energy sourced. The
light gray bar represents the costs of covering the rebound from DR shifting
at a later hour. The white bar represents the profit for the BRP, meaning
the difference between the income from savings minus any rebound costs. It
can be observed that the savings that the BRP obtains from avoiding energy
purchases offsets the cost it has to cover for the rebound at a later hour. This is
because downward demand response is activated during high price hours while
the rebound occurs during low price hours. The profit observed for the BRP is,
therefore, gains from arbitrage in energy sourcing costs due to the actions of
the aggregator.
The Aggregator Receives MP-G for Demand Response Reduction
Figure 4.17 presents a second scenario of demand response remuneration, where
the aggregator receives the marginal price minus G for downward demand
response. The left part of the figure compares the aggregator’s revenue for
DR sales, black bars, versus the G payment it must make to the BRP for the
energy. The white bar represents the revenue minus the G payment. In both of
the proposed scenarios, the aggregator incurs a loss. In reality, at this point
the aggregator would not participate in the market any longer. The algorithm
optimizes total system costs so flexibility is dispatched as long as it is cheaper
than the marginal generator. However, a profit maximizing aggregator would
not be willing to participate in the market under these conditions.
The graph on the left hand side of figure 4.17 represents the income and costs
breakdown for the BRP under the same scheme. The black bars again represent
the savings on sourced energy. The dark gray bar is the G income, which
corresponds exactly to the G payment made by the aggregator. The light gray
bar represeents the cost of the rebound demand. The white bar represents the
profits for the BRP. The transfer value G is set at 30 e\MWh and 45 e\MWh
respectively. Now, for downward demand response, in addition to the savings in
sourced energy, the BRP is also receiving a transfer payment value. However,
much less demand response is dispatched in these two cases because flexibility
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fig. 4.17. Profits for the aggregator (left) and the BRP (right) when the aggregator
receives MP-G for downward demand response
is more expensive than the base generators competing in the market. Upward
response occurs almost only at hours when the market price is negative due
to high RES availability and low demand. Therefore the value of the rebound
is also an income for the BRP in these two cases. When the aggregator also
pays a transfer value to the BRP, the BRP’s income increases event though the
amount of demand response decreases.
The BRP Does not Observe the Actions of the Aggregator
The actions of the aggregator cause and imbalance in the BRP’s position. The
BRP is not aware of the actions of the aggregator, as in the previous cases. This
means that the BRP procures enough energy to serve the initially forecasted
load ending up with a long position when the aggregator activates a demand
reduction. At a rebound moment, the BRP will not have bought enough energy
to cover the expected demand plus the rebound and will have a short position.
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The effects of demand response on the imbalance market are isolated in
figure 4.18. These results are calculated using the imbalance prices in Belgium
2015. Demand response creates both positive and negative imbalances for the
BRP, leading to a net imbalance value over the entire evaluation period, as
follows:
• Positive imbalance: created when injection exceeds off-take. Demand
response reduction causes a long position in the BRP’s portfolio. The
BRP sourced more energy than its clients actually consumed. This excess
of energy is sold at the imbalance price when it is helping the system.
Demand response tends to help the system, as it is likely to be activated
at a time of high load, although there might be exceptions. The imbalance
income for each scenario of G is represented by the black bars in figure 4.18.
• Negative imbalance: created when off-take exceeds injection. A few
hours after a demand response reduction event consumers are expected to
consume the energy previously reduced. This is the rebound effect that
causes a short position in the BRP’s portfolio. The BRP needs to buy
energy to cover this short position at the imbalance price. This value is
represented by the gray bars in figure 4.18.
• Net Imbalance value: over the entire evaluation period, for each value of G,
the net imbalance value is the difference between the positive imbalance
income and the rebound imbalance payment. This value is represented by
the white bars in figure 4.18. Given the input imbalance values the net
imbalance ends up being positive.
Three scenarios of transfer payment costs of the aggregator are presented.
Similar to the retail effect the transfer payment is not directly added to the
imbalance value. It does affect the amount of demand response dispatched and
therefore it affects the final imbalance value.
The attribution of the imbalance position is under debate, but as can be
concluded, under the current imbalance pricing scheme the imbalance created
by demand response is actually creating profits for the party bearing the
balance responsibility. There are three main positions on the attribution of this
imbalance:
• The imbalance is attributed to the BRP.
• The imbalance is attributed to the Aggregator.
• The imbalance is neutralized by the system operator and its costs are
socialized.
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fig. 4.18. Imbalance effect of demand response if BRP position is left open
Imbalance Absorbed by the BRP
The open positions caused by the aggregator are attributed to the BRP in
figure 4.19. The same three scenarios presented before are grouped in one
figure: where the transfer payment is 0, 30 and 45 e\MWh respectively. In
this case the transfer payment G is not directly applied, rather it affects the
amount of demand response dispatched and therefore the total imbalance. The
net imbalance is represented by the light gray bars in the figure. The profit is
calculated by adding the BRP’s income for savings on energy, G income where
applicable, subtracting or adding rebound costs, and adding the net imbalance.
It can be observed that as the net imbalance is positive it increases the BRP’s
profits.
Imbalance Absorbed by the Aggregator
In this case the open positions caused by the aggregator are attributed to the
aggregator instead of the BRP. This case assumes that there is exact information
about the nature of the BRP’s imbalance. Other causes for imbalance, such
as errors in forecasting, are clearly identified. Only the imbalance caused by
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fig. 4.19. BRP’s income and costs when it absorbs the net imbalance value
demand response is attributed to the aggregator. Figure 4.20 presents the
income and costs that the aggregator faces, as presented earlier, plus the net
imbalance. The same three scenarios examined before are grouped in one figure,
the transfer payment is 0, 30 and 45 e\MWh respectively. It can be observed
that the net imbalance adds to the income of the generator since it is positive.
In the first case, where G is equal to 0 e\MWh, the net imbalance creates
additional income for the aggregator, increasing the already existing profits by
45 %. In the second case, where the transfer payment G is equal to 30 e\MWh,
the net imbalance income helps to recover part of the transfer payment G, and
the aggregator earns a small profit. In the third case where the transfer payment
G is equal to 45 e\MWh, the net imbalance decreases the total loss incurred
by the aggregator, but the revenues remain negative.
Imbalance Absorbed by the System Operator
In this case, the open positions caused by the aggregator’s demand response
actions on the BRP’s portfolio are absorbed, or neutralized, by the imbalance
market operator. This means that the costs of sourcing the energy to cover
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fig. 4.20. Aggregator’s income and costs when it absorbs the net imbalance value
the imbalance through reserves are covered by the system operator. The cost
is reflected by the first figure where the positive and negative imbalances are
shown, figure 4.18. In this scenario, the net imbalance is positive, representing
an income for the imbalance market operator. If it were negative, the costs
would have to be allocated to consumers through tariffs.
4.4.2 Retail Effect
The retail effect of demand response was identified in section 3.2.2 of chapter 2.
It is caused by the loss of profit coming from retail tariffs at the time of a
demand response reduction, and an increase at the time of a demand rebound.
Figure 4.21 presents the retail effect of demand response on the retail profits of
the BRP. The black bars represent the rebound income at different scenarios for
the cost of the transfer payment from the aggregator. The transfer payment was
added to the market effect, therefore it doesn’t have a direct effect on the retail
income. However, the transfer payment affects the total amount of demand
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response dispatched, impacting as well the retail effect for the BRP. The gray
bar represents the loss of profit expected by the BRP due to the downward
demand response activation. The white bar is the difference of the previous two
representing the a small net retail profit for the BRP in all three cases.
In the intuitive example presented in 3.2.2 it was expected that the retail
effect would be negative for the BRP. Meaning that as consumers shifted their
consumption from high price hours to low peak hours, the BRP would incur a
retail loss. However, in the dynamic simulation the result is different. There
are two main reasons for this:
• There is a shifting horizon of 24 hours applied to demand response.
Due to this, the shifting cannot always occur at the least price hours.
Depending on the difference in the peak price and the low price, it can
still be profitable to dispatch demand reductions even when shifting has
to happen at a higher rebound price.
• The peak/ off-peak tariff regime assumed does not reflect directly the
market prices. Peak hours have been assumed to range from 8 am - 7 pm,
and the rest are off peak hours. While, for the market at 10 am there
might be a valley, for a consumer 10 am remains a peak hour. When
shifting is done by a third party aggregator who makes decisions based
on the market price, and not on the tariff of the consumer, it might not
reflect what is in the best interest of the final consumers.
4.4.3 Total Avoided Costs
The benefit of demand response is analyzed by running the algorithm once more
without any demand response. The benefit, in this context, is the change in the
objective function, equal to the actual costs of generation and demand response.
Figure 4.22 represents the total system costs and zooms in on the savings
achieved through demand response. The top graph represents the market costs
given by the objective function (4.1). The total costs without demand response
are shown for the scenario without demand response at 344.2 million e, with
the introduction of 5% of peak load demand response capacity the total cost
decreases to 326.13 million e, as evidenced by the first and second bars of the
top graph. The third and fourth graphs represent the system costs when the
aggregator must pay transfer costs of 30e\MWh and 40e\MWh respectively.
Market costs, at 335 million eand 337.9 million e, are still lower than in the
case without demand response but not as much as in the case where there is no
transfer payment.
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fig. 4.21. Retail effect of demand response on BRP’s profits
The bottom part of figure 4.22 zooms in on the avoided costs achieved through
demand response. The avoided costs are calculated as the total market cost
without demand response minus the total cost in each respective scenario. It can
be observed that when a transfer payment of 30 e\MWh the expected savings
are decreased by more than half going from 18.1 million e to 7.9 million e.
This can be observed in the first and second bars of the graph. The third bar, at
5.7 million e represents the savings achieved at a transfer cost of 45 e\MWh.
4.5 Conclusions on the Effect of Demand Response
on the Wholesale Market
Demand response in the wholesale market acts as a price arbitrator creating
profits for the aggregator role. As load becomes responsive to price, peaks are
shaved and valleys are filled in the load curve. As RES increasingly comes in
CONCLUSIONS ON THE EFFECT OF DEMAND RESPONSE ON THE WHOLESALE MARKET 85
fig. 4.22. Total supply costs with and without demand response [top] and avoided
costs due to demand response [bottom] under three scenarios of transfer payment
costs
the market, DR use and profit value increase. This is because RES variability
needs to be quickly compensated through other means.
The presence of an extra resource that eliminates the need for peaking generation
also benefits BRPs who have to cover their portion of demand. DR availability
means that BRPs have the opportunity to buy cheaper energy than they can
generate. This is especially true for peaking generators.
For the BRP there is a certain ’windfall’ profit effect on the retail profit when
there are peak/off-peak tariffs, as the aggregator shifts energy consumption in
favor of the BRP. The BRP procures energy less costly energy for its consumers
due to the actions of the aggregator. This is because demand is shifted from
expensive peaking hours to valley hours.
It was shown that demand response reduces total costs of operation. A case
where the market is run with and without demand response is shown. In the
presence of a transfer payment at 30 e\MWh total avoided costs decrease by
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50%. The transfer payment also reduces the total amount of demand response
present in the market. In the model, the aggregator would not have a positive
business case if transfer payments are introduced given the input market prices.
Introducing a transfer payment hinders active participation in the market by
consumers.
Part II

Chapter 5
Local Flexibility Markets
This chapter is partially based on: [106]
Ramos Gutierrez, A.; De Jonghe, C.; Belmans, R., ’Realizing the Smart Grid’s
Potential: Defining Local Markets for Flexibility’, Utilities Policy, volume 40,
June 2016, pages 26-35, ISSN 0957-1787
During the late 1990s and early 2000s it became apparent that the increase in
local DER needed to be managed in a different way than conventional power
plants (CPPs). The latter were already known to the system operator in terms
of connection, power output characteristics, and grid service possibilities. In
contrast, system operators lacked a view on the availability and functioning
characteristics of small DER connected to the distribution grids. The concepts
of microgrids and virtual power plants started emerging in literature as a way
to group the characteristics of DERs. The purpose was to offer a unified profile
to a system operator in order to enable better grid control, additional reserves,
and eventually market participation for small generators. Over the years it
became evident that more than a single characterization of profiles was needed.
Enabling these new roles, needed by the system operator, made small generators
enter into contracts with intermediaries instead of big suppliers. Soon it became
apparent that there was an economic value in the offer of aggregated DERs,
and not only system operators could take advantage of it. Commercial actors
such as retailers and balancing responsible parties could also use the flexibility
that became available. It became apparent over the years that there is a need
for structures and markets to allow the interaction between the involved buyers
and sellers of location specific flexibility.
There are different views on what shape the local market for flexibility should
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fig. 5.1. Power system description.
take. The current discussion in literature has yet to formally define what a
local market is, what is expected from it and what the market design should be
based on such expectations. In order to arrive at a definition and purpose of a
local market first the concept of locality is examined. A generalization of the
definition of locality is presented in section 5.1. The need for a local market
is described in section 5.2. Section 5.3 presents the evolution in literature of
the concept of a local market. Based on the literature a definition and purpose
for a local market are abstracted in section 5.3.3. The variants of current local
market design proposals are evidenced in section 5.4. Main trends in local
market design are abstracted in section 5.5. Flexibility as a reserve contracted
by either the DSO or the TSO is proposed in section 5.6. Local competition for
flexibility is proposed in section 5.7. Chapter conclusions are presented in 5.8.
5.1 Definition of Locality
Locality is described by three main characteristics influencing the decision
making process of a stakeholder:
• Geographic area: political borders affect the regulation in place for a
specific resource. Regulation can affect the willingness of consumers to
install renewable energy systems, batteries, or home efficiency systems.
Similarly, regulation affects the tariff schemes that consumers are exposed
to in terms of grid-use as well as taxes and levies.
• Network operator: Depending on voltage level and geographic area a TSO
or a DSO might be the manager of a specific resource. In certain countries
there is only one TSO (eg. Spain, France, Belgium, Italy); while in others
there is more than one (eg. Germany). Depending on the jusrisdiction of
a system operator and the regulation in place, connection procedures and
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possibilities to sell system services on an aggregated level may vary. The
number of DSOs in a country also varies widely, from one or two main
DSOs to even hundreds of small ones defined per locality in certain cases.
Portugal for example has thirteen DSOs, out of which only three manage
more than 100,000 consumers. Germany on the other hand has more than
800 DSOs out of which 75 manage more than 100,000 consumers [107].
Given that DSOs and TSOs might purchase and use flexibility resources,
the network operator that a customer is connected to makes a difference.
• Network connection: users can be connected to either high, medium or low
voltage (HV, MV, LV respectively). From a topological perspective, users
located in rural areas, might face a lower power quality. The transmission
and distribution networks are described in figure 5.1 [108]:
– The transmission network transports energy to the sub-transmission
or distribution networks.
– The medium voltage network accommodates medium power plants
from tens of kW to 10-20 MW.
– The local distribution network supplies households, small businesses,
buildings and small power producers.
Conventional power plants and large industrial consumers are connected to the
high voltage network, and directly visible by the Transmission System Operator
(TSO). The TSO manages the HV network and depending on the jurisdiction
the TSO also manages part of the MV network down to 66 or even 36 kV. As
the entity in charge of maintaining system balance, the TSO usually has good
visibility and measuring capabilities of the transmission lines and substations
connected to its network.
The Distribution System Operator (DSO) is in charge of the low voltage network.
DSOs evaluate connection requests, from consumers and small producers, using
worst case scenarios. If the connection capacity is deemed adequate, the requester
is granted permission to connect to the network. Otherwise reinforcements need
to be made before the connection can take place. This means that network
capacity can be over-dimensioned as a worst-case-scenario is only likely to take
place during a few hours a year, if at all. DSOs have very low visibility over the
resources in the distribution network. Thus, the introduction of DERs causes a
stir in network management as variable generation in the distribution network
grows and users gain capabilities to respond to prices. In addition, traditional
consumers can also generate electricity therefore becoming ’prosumers’.
The concept of locality is depicted in fig. 5.2. A producer or consumer can belong
to a certain geographic area, a specific DSO and a voltage level. Therefore,
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fig. 5.2. Visualization of geographic and voltage aspects of locality
contracting local resources is a complex task that requires coordination among
different actors in order to take into account physical, contractual, managerial
and regulatory aspects.
Smart contracts are proposed in [109] and defined as customer-specific contracts
that reflect the situation of the network and use the specific characteristics of
customers. Contracts that emerge naturally from the market could provide
enough flexibility to more efficiently plan network investments in the distribution
grid.
5.2 The Need for a Local Market
Given the complexities of flexibility outlined above, the specifications of locality,
and the diverse nature of the stakeholders involved in the flexibility value chain
it is advisable to set up structures that allow the use of flexibility resources in
an optimal way. This view is supported by literature but opinions vary on what
the best way is to set up these structures.
In [110] it is stated that the Guideline on System Operation and the Network
Code on Emergency and Restoration place DSOs and TSOs as enablers of
demand response for system reserves. Congestion management and voltage
control are needed by both TSOs and DSOs. The location of resources in this
case is important in order to solve a specific congestion problem.
In [111] the need for aggregation of local energy resources is encouraged in order
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to reduce the risk faced by market participants, decrease costs and increase
the possibility of participating in the markets for system services. The authors
recognize the need for a market that allows local balancing actions to take place
at the DSO level. The need for regulation that encourages DSOs to start new
marketplaces to procure system services is examined in [112].
In a position paper, EURELECTRIC claims that the aggregated flexibility
services required for constraint management and balancing could be delivered
by the same resources [4]. In addition, they state that a common place to pool
flexibility should be explored as an option for coordinating actions.
According to EDSO network operators will have to balance supply and demand,
exploiting market mechanisms in the reserve market (e.g., existing mechanisms in
some countries like automatic and manual frequency restoration reserves as well
as to-be-designed mechanisms like ancillary services markets) [113]. Depending
on different network conditions, such active management and dispatching
functionality will be implemented directly by the TSO, in cooperation between
TSO and DSO, or by the DSO itself.
CEDEC states that there is a need for clear rules to purchase system services at
distribution level while avoiding inherent conflicts with other market actors such
as aggregators [114]. Under the current set up these local aggregators provide
balancing services to either the TSO or the wholesale intra-day markets.
In the United States, the U.S. Department of Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Energy (EERE), states that the system must have sufficient capability in flexible
generation or demand response to make up variable generation [115]. At the
same time, they indicate that the institutional framework, including market
and operational practices, must allow access to physical flexibility.
It is still unclear which market role should be expected to initiate the
development of decentralized flexibility resources [116]. Aggregation is proposed
as a choice that should be born out of economic motivations, and not due to
market regulation requirements. The author recommends that in order to avoid
the risk of new barriers and additional transaction costs initially existing roles
should handle the aggregation task for demand flexibility. The authors propose
that the flexibility aggregation role should be integrated in the retailer activities
in order to avoid settlement issues with the BRP.
In [20] it is argued that DG could positively contribute to the operation of
networks. DSOs could make an optimal choice between reinforcing the network
and implementing active network management. It should be compensated
through commercial agreements such as bilateral contracts, regulated payments,
acknowledgment in use of service charges, or network related markets.
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Decentralized resources are valuable to the system. Mechanisms that allow
actors to interact and trade these resources could enable their integration in
a sustainable way. Although the need for a local market has been identified,
opinions in literature and ongoing projects vary as to what the is best way to
set up a local market.
5.3 Definition of a local market
As has been described above, there is a need for an institutional framework
that allows the purchase of flexibility at a distribution system level. Since the
distribution grid is local, contracting flexibility services in this context can be
referred to as a ’local market’. In order to arrive at a complete definition of
local market it is necessary to take a step back and see the evolution of concepts
in local flexibility management and contracting.
Management of DER was first proposed in literature through the concepts of
microgrids and virtual power plants. Both are closely related, the main difference
is that in a microgrid the value is determined from an internal optimization
while in a virtual power plant it is given by sales volume coming from external
processes [117]. Their first applications were directed towards technical grid
management: voltage and reactive power control. Once the economic value
of the resources became evident, it was clear that structures that support
trading commodities were necessary. The evolution of microgrids is explored
in subsection 5.3.1, virtual power plants in subsection 5.3.2, and the extension
towards local market proposals that followed in subsection 5.3.3. Finally the
complete definition of a ’local market’ is presented in subsection 5.3.3.
5.3.1 Microgrids
A microgrid is defined as a cluster of DR units and loads, serviced by a
distribution system, that can operate in the grid-connected mode, the islanded
(autonomous) mode, and ride-through between both modes [118]. It is assumed
that multiple generators and aggregated loads are reliable and economically
sound as an operational electric system. In a similar approach [119] also
studies microgrid voltage control through peer-to-peer communication between
system components. The concept of microgrid control is studied from a multi-
agent system perspective [120]. Several other studies have been done on the
autonomous operation and voltage/var control of microgrids [121], [122]. In [123]
a review of the trends in microgrid control is presented. The main control
principles studied are droop control, model predictive control, and multi-agent
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systems. The concept of microgrid is extended toward the multi-microgird when
most of the low voltage networks turn into active microgrids [124].
From a commercial point of view microgrids are studied as a problem of
demand allocation of available RES to either one or several utilities representing
demand [125]. Utilities have a regulatory commitment to supply a certain part
of demand from RES. It is shown through a multiple utility market model
that the allocation to one single utility is more profitable. Commercializing
microgrid services gave rise to the concept of virtual power plants.
5.3.2 Virtual Power Plants
A virtual power plant is defined as a cluster of dispersed generator units,
controllable loads and storage systems, aggregated in order to operate as a
unique power plant [126]. An energy management system coordinates power
flows at the point of common coupling of generators, controllable loads and
storage. In another view, a virtual power plant is defined as an information and
communication system that aggregates controllable distributed energy units or
active customer networks by direct centralised control [127].
A distinction is made in the literature between technical virtual power plants
(tVPP) and commercial virtual power plants (cVPP) [128], [129]. The concept
of aggregating location specific resources is introduced in the tVPP. It is
formed by groups of controllable DERs in the same geographic location, and
is pertinent to local grid management. A cVPP, in contrast, is not necessarily
geographically constrained, it may contain resources from different geographical
areas, aggregated into supply curves that can participate in a market.
It is recognized that through the VPP concept individual DER are able to
gain access and visibility across all energy markets and system operation will
benefit from optimal use of all available capacity and increased efficiency of
operation [129]. Therefore a VPP is a flexible representation of a portfolio of
DER.
A review of VPP literature expands the definition of VPP to: a portfolio of
DERs, which are connected by a control system based on information and
communication technology (ICT). The VPP acts as a single visible entity in the
power system, it is always grid-tied, and can be either static or dynamic [130].
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5.3.3 Local Market Definition
In general terms, a market can be roughly defined as an environment that allows
potential buyers, sellers, and retailers of a given economic product to engage in
trade [35]. The definition of market entails two principles, the entire market
and its composing sub-markets [37]. An entire market typically consists of a set
of closely related end-products and the intermediate-product markets that feed
into them; the sub-markets of an electricity market include the wholesale spot
market, wholesale forward markets, and markets for ancillary services. Besides
the obvious need to agree on the quality, quantity and price of the goods, three
other important matters must be decided when a buyer and a seller arrange
a trade: date of delivery of the goods, mode of settlement, and transaction
conditions [35]. A local market is defined by its spatial specifications and can
be thought of as a new sub-market for flexibility.
ENTSO-E defines a ’local market area’ as a type of market area where there
are no transmission capacity restrictions between the market balance areas.
A market area is defined as an area made up of several Market Balance
Areas interconnected through AC or DC links. Trade is allowed between
different market balance areas with common market rules for trading across the
interconnection [131]. ENTSO-E is concerned with large areas of trading, the
local needs of DSOs are not taken into account in this definition.
A local electricity market is defined as a geographic area where consumption
and generation can be metered, there are no transmission capacity restrictions
and for which there is one BRP, and thus, one price for the imbalance [132].
The goals of this market are voltage support, frequency control and provision
of reserve active power as an ancillary service. The authors seek to use a local
market to trade electricity among the participants in the distribution network
in order to achieve market efficiency. The restriction of the market to one BRP
is a defining characteristic of this definition. If only one party has balancing
responsibility, the issue of determining the source of imbalances is skipped.
Market-based control is defined as the implementation of price-signals by the
macroplayers in order to optimize global system performance through the
coordination of the resources of the microplayers towards predefined network
and market goals [133]. A distinction is made between macro and microplayers.
Macroplayers are decision makers such as regulators, retailers, DSOs and
TSOs. They provide price signals and technical constraints to the microplayers.
Microplayers are prosumers who act on the distribution grid. An auction design
for local reserve energy markets is proposed in [134]. The local market is
designed for private households, and limited to a single balance group.
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Definition
Joining together elements from the definition of a market, aspects of locality
and proposed literature, the following definition of local markets takes shape:
Local Market: Long- or short- term trading actions for flexibility in a specific
geographical location, voltage level, and system operator (DSO and TSO), given
by grid conditions or balancing needs, where participants in a relevant market
can be aggregated to provide flexibility services.
Purpose
The purpose of a local market can be abstracted from the purpose of using
flexibility [4]: system balancing, constraints management, and portfolio
optimization.
The distinctive component is that resources are differentiated by location and
the DSO is directly involved. Thus, it can be said that the purposes of flexibility
can be transferred to a local market:
• Balancing a locality to match demand to the varying renewable supply in
case of congestion.
• Constraints management in transmission and distribution networks.
• Portfolio optimization for market agents, taking into account network
needs at specific times and places in the grid.
• Grid investment deferral if flexibility can be effectively used as part of the
grid planning of a DSO.
Flexibility for the purpose of system balancing is contracted by the system
operator. Balancing refers to the procurement of balancing services (capacity)
and activation of balancing energy by the TSO to balance demand and supply
through the balancing market [4]. Balancing the system has been a traditional
role of the TSO. Conflicts can arise when resources participating in balancing
actions are connected to the distribution network. The TSO does not have
a complete view on the state of the network of the DSO, nor on the access
contracts of the parties connected to it. Communication between the DSO
and TSO can be done ex-ante or close to real time for balancing purposes. In
an ex-ante scheme the DSO performs preventive worst case checks before a
customer connected to its network can offer services to the TSO. The downside
being that flexibility is limited to a worst case scenario not very likely to occur.
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It leads to a loss of potential flexibility for the system. On a real-time basis, the
DSO would have the faculty to approve or deny a flexibility transaction based
on the state of the network. Although more accurate, this method requires
investments in advanced measurement and communication systems. Given the
high amount of components in the distribution system, this investment might
not be feasible at every location. Communication between system operators
is essential to outline rights and responsibilities of all the actors involved in
maintaining system balance.
Flexibility used for constraints management can be activated on the generation
side, on the demand side, or through system reconfiguration directly by the
DSO. Beyond corrective actions that the DSO can take in its own network,
such as system reconfigurations, there must be a fair way in which flexibility
can be contracted. On the generation side it refers to re-dispatching of units
in order to comply with the thermal limits of the lines and equipment in the
distribution network. On the demand side it refers to requesting demand to
adapt its consumption up or downward at a given moment depending on network
conditions.
Portfolio optimization refers to commercial actions of market participants in
order to decrease their costs of imbalances and hedge risk. The day-ahead and
real-time needs of a market player depend on its remaining open positions as
given by long term contracts. They need to cover a long or a short position
through selling and buying in the short term markets. These differences
between the long term contract and the real time demand can be due to
errors in forecasting, unscheduled plant maintenance, or plant failures. Market
actors have traditionally hedged through contracts mainly with supply side
flexibility. Demand side flexibility, contracted directly with large consumers or
through aggregators, is a new tool that they can use to improve their real time
positions. The market design must allow such transactions to take place fairly
and transparently.
Grid investment deferral can be achieved through the use of flexibility when
the extra capacity is only needed for a few hours a year. If the DSO actively
contracts flexibility as part of grid planning activities, it can be said that
investment deferral is a purpose of using local contracting. Flexibility contracts
would also need to be mid- to long-term to ensure that flexibility is available
when needed. The cost of investment in new lines marks the cap of the cost for
flexibility. If flexibility is more expensive than the cost of grid expansion, it is
simply better to invest in grid expansion than to contract flexibility.
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5.4 Current Local Market Design Proposals
Local market design proposals in literature vary in shape and form. They range
from a centrally coordinated approach to a completely decentralized system
with many decision makers. In the paragraphs that follow, the main approaches
in literature and ongoing research projects will be presented.
It is argued that electricity systems are now experiencing a transition from a
’top-down’ toward a ’distributed local’ system [135]. The authors raise the open
question about whether a fragmentation of the internal EU market at national
and sub-national levels is desirable.
Different approaches of handling congestion in the distribution grid from a
market perspective are defined in [136]. The first is an integrated approach as a
stepwise process that finds first the system balance and then solves congestion,
and the second is a process that solves congestion and then finds system balance.
The author proposes that congestion can be solved as either a sub-market
of the wholesale electricity market, a spatial market defined by geographic
location, or a hierarchical market aligned with grid topology. A sub-market of
the wholesale market trade is made through the existing platforms with the
addition of a locational component to the usual price-quantity bids and offers.
A spatial market is separate from the existing wholesale market created for a
specific location. Finally, a hierarchical market is a restriction made to trade
all resources first locally on a geographical market; in the absence of congestion
they can be made available to the wider wholesale markets.
A system with locational granularity is supported by [137] due to the fact
that the best locations for wind farms are located far from load centers. It is
impossible to clearly define zones that would reflect physical realities at all times.
The above mentioned authors believe that nodal pricing at transmission level is
recommended as the best option to reflect the variability of flows. Furthermore,
price boundaries reflect the value of flexibility and negative prices should be
implemented.
Locational prices are simulated on a test network to promote loss and line loading
reductions [138]. The authors propose that it makes sense to consider nodal
pricing in distribution. A similar study is carried out by [139] in a distribution
test network in order to optimally locate DG resources. These studies, however,
propose an optimal analysis of the networks and do not take into account the
complexities of a market design that would allow the achievement of the optimal
network.
Under an integrated approach the network is taken into account during the
market clearing process. As a part of the wholesale market, the issue has been
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studied and implemented mainly in the United States, the market then becomes
a nodal market. Participants submit bids consisting of place, quantity and price.
A centralized market platform calculates the balance of supply and demand
alongside the state of the grid. The resulting nodal price consists of three
components: energy, congestion and losses. This approach, however, has been
criticized for lack of transparency, as specific prices are often hard to explain. It
has only been applied at a transmission level. Cascading a nodal price approach
to the distribution level poses computational challenges, and would lead to even
more transparency issues.
In a market based approach the literature suggests the use of distribution
locational marginal prices (D-LMP) that signal to users when it is optimal to
consume and or produce. Congestion management in a distribution grid via
shadow prices is proposed in [140].
The complexity of distributed energy resources is modelled in an iterative
architecture that sets transmission and distribution locational marginal prices
[141]. An optimal scheduling of centralized and decentralized generation, flexible
loads and distributed energy resources is proposed. Resources in distribution
are used to manage congestion at the transmission distribution interface. The
algorithm is solved for 24 hours successfully, the development of real size software
implementations is cited as future work.
A distribution locational marginal pricing method is proposed to alleviate
congestion through the use of flexible demand [142]. The authors assume that
the DSO calculates the dynamic tariffs and publishes them to aggregators who
make optimal plans for flexible demand.
Nodal pricing for distribution networks are shown to show significant price
differences between buses reflecting high marginal losses, and resources located
at the end of a network are more valuable [143]. The paper assumes that there
is no congestion on the distribution network and takes losses into account. A
modification of marginal prices at the transmission interface using marginal
loss coefficients arrives at locational marginal prices in distribution in [139]. A
distribution locational marginal price is calculated and used by individual loads
and generators to submit bids and offers that are checked against an optimal
power flow [144]. Another optimal power flow approach to locational pricing
in distribution to manage congestion is proposed in [145]. Other methods to
calculate the locational marginal price in distribution are proposed in [146], [147],
and [148].
The main variants observed refer to whether the network is taken into account
or not. The second attribute is whether the distribution network is taken into
account or only the transmission network. Most designs proposed so far, fail to
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take into account the interests of the involved stakeholders. They refer mostly
to spatial aspects of trading, while neglecting the contractual, time frame and
price-clearing aspects of market design. Over the past years there have been
a number of research and demonstration projects related to contracting local
flexibility. A few of the most relevant projects are described in the sections that
follow.
5.4.1 Project Fenix
The project proposes the management of Distributed Energy Resources through
a virtual power plant that aggregates units into a portfolio [149] [128]. The
provision of ancillary services by DERs is explored technically, and economic
trading commercially. Among the systems analyzed are:
• Wind turbines.
• Photovoltaic systems.
• Hydroelectric power stations.
• Cooling and heating systems.
• Storage systems.
Through the virtual power plant proposed in FENIX individual DERs can
gain access and visibility across energy markets, and benefit from VPP market
intelligence to optimize their position and maximize revenue opportunities.
The VPP also gives visibility of available resources to the system operator. A
distinction is made between technical and commercial VPP (TVPP, and CVPP).
A TVPP takes into account network characteristics where a specific DER is
located, while a CVPP only considers economic characteristics.
The TVPP groups resources from the same geographic location. An aggregated
profile includes the influence of the local network on the portfolio output and
also represents the DER costs and characteristics. The operator of a TVPP
requires technical information. FENIX states that typically this should be the
DSO due to the network visibility required to run a TVPP. The aggregation
of resources also allows generation and demand to contribute to transmission
system management. At the distribution-transmission network interfaces the
TVPP presents a single profile representing the whole local network. Information
of each DER is submitted to the TVPP by the CVPP over the resources located
in the area covered by the TVPP. The project quantifies benefits of using a
CVPP in terms of the costs and benefits of the DG resource, the CVPP, the
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suplier and a central producer. This arrives at a quantification of the system
net benefits in e /kWh/year.
Benefits for the TVPP are not quantified in the project as they are deemed to
be too variable depending on the grid characteristics. A qualitative analysis
estimates that TVPP operations can reduce network costs through the reduction
of energy losses, deferral of network investments, reduction of penalties for both
non-supplied energy and quality of service; and enlarged scope of options for
distribution and transmission services.
The project proposes regulatory recommendations in terms of incentivizing
DSOs towards a more active system management. Metering and communication,
network and market access for DER resources are stressed. DER should have
access to ancillary services and technology support to encourage the use of
flexibility.
The economic exchanges as well as roles and responsibilities of each actor in the
Fenix model are outlined in [150]. While the project is not specific on contract
criteria, it proposes marginal bid prices for DER operators and large power
producers offering balancing services. It sets the TSO as the single buyer paying
this marginal bid price. In other cases it leaves the scenario open to specific
country regulation on remuneration for system services.
5.4.2 ADDRESS
The ADDRESS project aimed to integrate active demand in the form of domestic
and small conmmercial consumers in the electricity markets and in the provision
of services to other electricity system participants [151].
In the project, three levels of DSO control are taken into account [152]:
• The DSO central control level for network operation and active demand
(AD) management.
• HV/MV substation level to enhance MV network monitoring and to enable
strategies for voltage regulation and power flow control.
• The MV/LV substation level to enable functionalities needed for LV
network monitoring.
To allow the inclusion of active demand, the DSO needs to do an ex-ante
verification of the technical feasibility of the service. This information needs to
be transmitted to the TSO.
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An active demand management system (ADMS) publishes a flexibility table to
inform aggregators about the allowed active demand flexibility in the network.
The system receives bids from aggregators, arranges the requests according to
load area information, and then calls validation tools to check the feasibility of
the AD products. Both ex-ante and real-time validation of offers is carried out
by the DSO.
ADDRESS develops functionalities to enable the DSO to interface with the TSO
in order to ensure a coordinated validation process, load area and flexibility
table publication, and active demand validation management. The DSO should
only keep close control of nodes and lines that could suffer insecure operation.
The identification of these areas has been managed in the ADDRESS project
through a distribution system model based on Load Areas (LAs).
Three main services for regulated players are envisioned:
• Voltage regulation and load flow control;
• Tertiary reserve power;
• Smart load reduction instead of blind load shedding.
For deregulated players the main services are:
• Optimization of energy purchase/sale;
• Minimization of unbalance costs;
• Optimization of investment scheduling for energy generation;
• Reserve capacity for risk reduction in terms of costs and volume;
• Tertiary reserve for fulfilling the obligations related to the requirements
of the TSO.
In terms of market design, a local bilateral market is proposed for local markets
at distribution level [153], because of their limited size. If liquidity increases, calls
for tenders may be possible. Flexibility markets could pool flexibility capacities
in order to make offers in other markets, only necessary if the individual actors
cannot participate directly in the other markets. This flexibility market can
be organized as bilateral contracts or as an organized platform. A Conditional
Re-Profiling Products (CRP) market is also proposed through the exchange
of standardized volumes, but it is not recommended due to possible liquidity
limitations. A possible local market could be set up using a market splitting
mechanism method from the TSO level market when there are congestions. In
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terms of technical validation of flexibility resources, it is proposed that the DSO
should be allowed to curtail the local resources without taking into account
economic data, which puts the cost of operation on the resource operators.
Alternatively, in a market based approach the DSO would be responsible for
re-dispatching curtailed services and bear the costs of the re-dispatch.
Actors who could participate in a local market are identified as:
• The DSO managing a local area;
• DSO managing a neighbouring area;
• Local controllable DG owner, in order to improve his income;
• Local uncontrollable DG, in order to avoid operational limitations due to
local constraints;
• Aggregators could buy to provide services locally or to the rest of the
grid.
In terms of the balancing responsibility of the active demand, the report states
that an aggregator should be a BRP himself, or should pass this responsibility
to another party by having a contractual agreement on the costs of this
responsibility. The project bypasses the baseline establishment by comparing
the price/volume signal sent by the aggregator to the initial forecast or program
set by the BRP; no baseline of metered consumer behaviour is established. This
might be ambiguous as deviations from the profile could be caused by reasons
other than actions of the aggregator. Therefore, the project states that this
problem can be avoided if the aggregator is also the consumer’s retailer.
Three possible solutions are proposed:
• Deviations are settled by the BRP;
• Deviations are settled by the aggregator;
• Shared responsibility of sharing between aggregator and BRP.
In terms of technical validation of active demand by the DSO, ADDRESS
proposes evaluation of services on a first come first serve basis. If AD requests
arrive together, the project proposes equal percentual curtailment, without
the need to receive information on the price of services. The DSO does not
compensate the aggregator nor the curtailment of resources.
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5.4.3 EcoGrid
The purpose of EcoGrid is to develop and demonstrate a generalized real-time
market concept for smart electricity distribution networks with high penetration
of renewable resources and consumer participation [154].
The project proposes a bidless market where small-scale DERs and small
end-consumers can actively participate in a real-time electricity market by
responding to 5-min price signals [155]. A real-time price is set depending
on the system operation status and needs for balancing or congestion in
the transmission/distribution systems. Automatic controllers make optimal
solutions at consumer premises every 5 minutes in response to the price signal.
The EcoGrid real-time market complements the existing Regulating Power
(RP) market. The RP market provides up and down regulation necessary for
the TSOs in the Nordic countries for maintaining system balance. The new
proposed market complements the RP market by aggregating response from
numerous DERs and flexible demand. The real-time signal is sent directly
by the TSO to the market participants. The real-time price signals should
be closely coordinated with the activated bids in the RP market. In order to
prevent arbitrage, participants can only act in one of the markets, perhaps
reserving the RP market only for large consumers.
In order to make a decision the TSO as the sole-buyer in this market, needs
information about cleared market quantities in the spot market, up and down
regulation bids and prices, technical constraints of generation units, power
production of RES, and aggregated response of prosumers to the real-time price
signal. With this information the TSO decides: first the deployment of up and
down regulating power, and second the real-time price and forecast to be sent
to market players.
5.4.4 EvolvDSO
EvolvDSO proposes a new role for DSOs as a ’distribution constraints market
officer’ [156] [157] [158]. The DSO uses flexibility for the following purposes [159]:
• Enhance hosting capacity of the distribution grid;
• Solve congestion to maintain normal operation and respect security
constraints;
• Optimize network planning;
• Maintain voltage levels.
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The DSO would have the capability to contract and activate flexibility on
different time frames. The project proposes the need to contract flexibility in
the long term to achieve grid reinforcement deferral, non-firm grid connection and
access contracts allowing temporary limitations on feed-in or power consumption,
and real time flexibility contracting for operational management. Tendering is
recommended for the long-term procurement of flexibility. Participation in a
flexibility market alongside with other market participants is proposed to cover
short term flexibility needs.
An expansion of an existing role as ’neutral market facilitator’ is also proposed
[159]. This role supports market participation of resources connected to the
distribution grid by issuing signals to participants of the status of the grid. These
signals take the form of traffic lights as a mechanism for information exchange
with market participants. Three network states would be communicated: green
for normal network conditions, yellow for limiting certain consumer behavior,
and a red light where the DSO would take control of market actions. Under
this scope the DSO should be involved in pre-qualification, validation of bid
activation and settlement procedures of market operations.
The operational market would need to have strong coordination with the TSO
and other existing markets. In terms of communication with TSOs the report
stresses the need for exchange of structural and operational information. DSOs
will need to manage TSO requests at different timeframes including network
development, forecasting, operational planning and real-time operations. It is
also estimated that the DSO can provide regulated services to the TSO through
a cascading communication process. In [159] it is recommended to establish a
hierarchy between TSOs and DSOs regarding flexibility contracting, as well as
cascading processes for system support and operation.
5.4.5 Bid-ladder
The Bid Ladder, a project proposed by the Belgian TSO, is a platform where
market players can bid their available flexibility. It allows bids from load
and RES flexibility, as well as resources connected to the distribution grid.
The platform would be oriented towards manual frequency restoration reserves.
Within the manual frequency restoration reserves the TSO defines two categories:
pre-contracted reserves or ancillary services that receive a capacity payment,
and non-contracted reserves or bids. The latter are the focus of the bid ladder,
reserves that don’t receive a capacity fee and only the residual remaining
flexibility is offered in the balancing market and remunerated when activated.
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• Products: Three types of balancing energy products are allowed in the
bid ladder platform:
– A fast standard product: has a 15’ duration of delivery time and is
activated at the moment of request without delay.
– Slow standard product: has different activation duration of delivery
times -15’, 30’, 45’ minutes- and a 15’ minute activation delay.
– Emergency products: the remaining flexibility of power units with
installed capacity above 75 MW is offered to Elia. This flexibility
is to be used in case where reserves cannot be offered through the
standard products and under exceptional circumstances.
• Remuneration:
– Activation fee: in case of a positive price the provider receives money
for an upwards activation and pays money for a downwards activation,
and vice-versa for a negative price.
– Prolongation fee: when the TSO requests the activation of a bid that
was already activated in the current time frame, a prolongation price
can be paid.
• Congestion management: locational information of each resource must be
provided for units larger than 25 MW in the first stage of the project. In
case of smaller units, the required information needs to be discussed with
the DSO.
• Flexibility type: a bid for flexibility can be provided by generation, load
or both.
• Technical pre-qualification: units above 25 MW are pre-qualified
individually, while smaller units may be aggregated. In order to qualify,
bids should be based on physical regulation, the requested delivery should
be maintained at a stable power level. Once the delivery of the bid is
finished the physical regulation used should be able to go back to its
normal level within 15’.
The bid ladder is a TSO-led model where the TSO takes the decision of what
flexibility is contracted. The DSO has the role of pre-qualifying resources
through a worst case scenario check, but is not active during operation and
does not decide what flexibility resources could or should be deployed.
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5.4.6 I-power/Flech
The FLECHmarket is a flexibility clearing house proposed to accommodate small
scale distributed resources [160] [161]. Its purpose is congestion management in
the distribution grid via feeder overload and feeder voltage management. Two
main setups are proposed.
• Single-side aggregator auctions where the DSO proposes a request for
flexibility and aggregators submit orders to satisfy the DSO needs. In
this setup the DSO decides whether it is best to buy flexibility services or
invest in new grid reinforcements.
• Super market: the aggregators have the initiative, they propose various
services and the DSO as a buyer chooses according to its needs. The
aggregator optimizes a portfolio of flexibility resources seeking to maximize
its benefits.
• Products for load management:
– Planned powercut: based on forecast of available network capacity.
– Urgent powercut: based on events instead of forecasting.
– Power reserve: through this product DSOs can allow the loading of
feeders to exceed beyond 70% capacity limit but still below 100%
capacity limit.
– Powercap: ensure that a capacity limit specified by the DSO is not
violated.
– Powermax: similar to powercap, but it ensures that the aggregator’s
local portfolio does not exceed a certain amount of power during the
activation periods.
• Products for voltage management:
– Voltage Support: the DSO sends a signal to the aggregator specifying
the current voltage deviation in the network. The aggregator modifies
settings of the load to comply with the DSO’s requirement.
– Var Support: distributed generation units with the capability to
modify their reactive power output can offer Var support to the
DSO.
• Pricing: depending on the type of product, the pricing can have either of
an availability payment, an energy activation payment or both. Penalties
also apply in case of defaults.
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• Congestion Management: products are requested for specific geographic
areas and connection points according to specifications of the DSO.
• Flexibility type: both load and distributed generation qualify. Load must
participate through an aggregator.
The FLECH market is a DSO-led market that serves to optimally operate the
distribution grid and enable the integration of DRES. The effect of the DSO
actions on the TSO network is not directly taken into account.
5.4.7 USEF
USEF proposes a market design for trading flexible energy use [162]. It is
designed to fit on top of most existing energy market models.
Six flexibility services for the DSO are proposed: congestion management to
avoid/delay grid reinforcement, voltage control, grid capacity management (to
reduce grid losses and optimize grid use), controlled islanding, redundancy (N-1)
support, power quality support.
The aggregator offers four main services for the BRP: day-ahead optimization to
shift loads from a high-price time interval to a low-price time interval, intraday
optimization after the closing of the day ahead market, self or passive balancing
of the BRP, and generation optimization. In passive balancing the BRP is
remunerated by the TSO when its deviation supports the reduction of the
overall system imbalance. In this scheme the BRP uses its available flexibility
to balance its own portfolio instead of bidding in the market. Generation
optimization means optimizing the behavior of central production units to
reduce costs and avoid imbalance.
A distinguishing factor of this model is that the aggregator only offers services
to the TSO through the BRP, and not directly. Services for the DSO, and for
BRPs, in contrast, are offered directly by the aggregator role.
In terms of the market design, USEF, recognizes four different operation regimes
depending on the availability of reserves in the system.
• Normal operation: refers to operation without grid limitations, it is an
optimization on commodity value and active grid monitoring by the DSO.
• Capacity management peak load reduction and power balancing: the DSO
is active on the flexibility market, and reduces peak loads on congestion
points in the grid by activating flexibility at both demand and supply
sides.
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• Graceful degradation, load shedding: the DSO makes autonomous
decisions to lower loads and generation in the grid by limiting connections
when market-based coordination mechanisms cannot resolve congestion.
• Power outage grid protection: primary grid protection systems are
activated (fuses, switches) to prevent damage to assets.
The recommended pricing model is ’pay-as-bid’, where all suppliers of flexibility
receive the price included in their individual bids when called to supply flexibility
to the DSO (discriminatory pricing).
In the model the DSO identifies possible grid problems in advance and informs
the aggregators about congestion points. USEF defines a role called the ’common
reference operator’ set up for the exchange of information about connections,
associated aggregators and congestion points. The market has five phases:
contract, plan, validate, operate and settle. In [163] the framework specifications
are outlined. All phases are handled in a bilateral way among the stakeholders,
no centralized market clearing is proposed.
5.5 Main Characteristics of Local Market Design
There are differing opinions in literature about how actors should interact
among each other. A key point of the market design is who should be the local
market operator. Table 5.1 presents a summary of the differing opinions on this
topic. Different points of view argue that either the TSO, the DSO, the BRP
or another impartial party should be the local market operator. The choice of
market operator dictates the type of market interactions that would be possible.
So far, most of the literature points towards a local market for reserves operated
by either the DSO or the TSO. A less seen alternative is a competitive local
market, where all actors buy and sell flexibility for their own use. Figure 5.3
summarizes the main proposals regarding local market design:
• Local competitive market: a market open to competition on supply and
demand.
• Local Reserves market: single buyer market, open to competition only on
the supply side.
The differences between a local exchange and a reserves market are explored in
the following sections. In a reserves market for flexibility, a relevant discussion
arises regarding the interaction of the system operators. One trend places the
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fig. 5.3. Local market design
DSO as an active system manager who has first priority over the resources
connected to its grid. The other trend gives priority to the TSO in contracting
all flexibility resources on both TSO and DSO grid since the TSO has the
responsibility to maintain the integrity of the entire system. A local exchange
allows competition on both demand and supply. It can be a bilateral agreements
market, or it can be run by an independent market operator that is impartial
to the transactions held within it.
5.6 Flexibility as Reserve
This section is based on: [165]
Ramos Gutierrez, A.; Belmans, R., ’DSO-TSO Interactions in Flexibility
Contracting’, CIGRE General Meeting, Paris 2016
TSOs have traditionally performed the procurement of grid support services in
order to ensure a reliable and secure operation of the system. Load frequency
control services are usually provided in three time frames after a frequency
deviation occurs ranging from 10 seconds to 15 minutes. Flexibility could be
thought of as a requirement in emergency situations. A band of ’technical
flexibility’, both upward and downward, can be defined by the DSO. In this way,
a certain amount of the available flexibility is readily accessible when needed.
Similarly, flexibility can be procured through limited connection contracts,
where the capacity of connection is not guaranteed during a certain amount
of hours per period. These two options are not considered market solutions,
but rather arbitrary decisions of the system operator at hand, and are only
appropriate for emergency situations. Until now, the DSO has not been involved
in grid support procurement.
A semi-competitive market is one that is open to competition only on one side
of the market. In this case it would be open on the supply side, but limited
to a single buyer in the demand side. In a regulated market the TSO is the
sole buyer who procures resources in the best interests of the network. In the
local market for reserves demand for services is allowed only to the system
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Reference Flexibility Market Operator
Ruester,
2014 [112]
DSO
SEDC,
2016 [110]
Two alternatives: Extension of the TSO reserves market. Or,
independent market operator: coordinated with established
markets.
Fenix
Project
[149] [128]
TSO as a single buyer for flexibility
Ecogrid
Project
[154] [155]
TSO as a single buyer for flexibility
Rosen,
2015 [117]
BRP as market operator (towards individual consumers) and
the TSO as single buyer of flexibility.
i-Power
Project [160]
DSO as a single buyer of flexibility.
Bid-ladder
Belgium
TSO
EDSO,
2015 [164]
DSO
ENSTO-E,
2015 [131]
TSO
Botsis,
2015 [125]
Multiple power utilities
EvolvDSO
Project [159]
DSO role as distribution constraints market operator
through long-term flexibility tendering
Table 5.1. Proposed flexibility market operator
operators. These entities become the only ones entitled to procure system
reserves. Therefore competition is not allowed on the demand side. Flexibility
could be contracted either by the DSO directly for resources in its grid, or by
the TSO even when resources are in the DSO grid. In the latter case the DSO
should have a view over the schedules of controllable resources connected to its
network. Organizing a regulated market becomes an issue of hidden information,
since -as of now- shifting costs for demand response are mostly undefined. For
industrial consumers, the cost depends on their industrial processes and the
opportunity cost of shifting. For household consumers the cost lies in the
potential loss of comfort. Because of this, it is difficult to assign a monetary
value to the flexibility provided by aggregated households.
As in all regulated markets the buyer has the option of regulating either price
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fig. 5.4. Interaction between buyers and sellers in a reserves market
or quantity. Under a price mechanism the buyer offers the market a price for
reserves on the mid to long term and hopes to obtain the necessary resources.
Determining this price is a challenge, but in any case it must be lower than
the cost of network reinforcements. If the price is too high the buyer risks
overpaying for resources. If it is too low the buyer risks not attracting enough
resources to cover the needs of the network. A flat price for all reserves is
not realistic given that the flexibility market in the distribution network has
at least two distinct types of consumers: industrial consumers and residential
consumers. Under a quantity mechanism the buyer sets a desired amount of
flexibility and asks bids from qualifying market players to provide the capacity.
A revelation mechanism in which two different quantity-dependent prices are
offered for flexibility is proposed in [94]. The buyer would offer a higher price
for a limited amount of flexibility to be able to procure flexibility from small
consumers; and a lower price for a bigger amount of flexibility to procure from
the rest of the market.
The question remains as to whether the resources should be centrally contracted
by the TSO, or the DSO who is directly responsible for the grid where the
resource is located. Figure 5.4 depicts the direct contracting interaction between
the possible buyers and the holders of resources in a reserves market approach.
Reserves contracting is negotiated without intermediation, directly by either
system operator. In the option where the TSO is the main contractor, he
contracts resources both in transmission and distribution. The TSO has a
panoramic view on the state of the transmission grid overall, and the trouble
areas in distribution. This is an advantage if the contracting is performed
directly by the TSO, since he can use resources more widely. The disadvantage
is that the TSO has no visibility on the DSO’s grid, where the resource is
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located. This could cause problems for the DSO if the grid is overloaded. In
this case the DSO needs to do a preemptive checking to see if the grid has
enough capacity to cope with the flexibility being sold to the TSO. This check
could be done once before the contract is signed, or dynamically in response
to operating conditions. On an ex-ante basis the capacity check is carried out
under a worst case scenario assumption. Possible potential for flexibility can be
lost as the grid is not expected to be in the worst case scenario most of the time.
On a dynamic basis, in response to operating conditions, the DSO can signal
that the resource or the network area is available or not available for flexibility
dispatching. The signal needs to be communicated to several parties: the TSO,
the aggregator or owner of the flexibility and the balancing responsible party for
that perimeter. This dynamic signaling requires availability of measuring and
communication technologies across the DSO grid and the other parties involved.
Currently, that is not the case in most of the low voltage grids.
In the case where the DSO would contract flexibility directly, it could be used to
optimize the distribution grid operation. It is a bottom up approach in contrast
to the top down TSO contracting. In this case, if the TSO were to require
balancing from assets in the distribution grid, these would have to be contracted
through the DSO. This is again, a semi-commercial operation not clearly defined
as part of the role of either system operator. Under this method, responsibility
for each individual grid remains within the domain of each system operator.
Flexibility feasibility checks are still necessary, but lie within the domain of the
DSO entirely for resources connected to his grid. Communication is necessary
between all the involved parties. In countries where there are many DSOs,
coordination between the DSO, the TSO and the wholesale market becomes
critical.
The time frame of a reserves market is defined by the contracting procedure.
Resources are tendered one year to six months in advance so that the system
operator can be sure that they will be available when needed. The activation of
resources can be notified up to one day in advance, according to grid conditions.
The buyer will then decide the best moment to activate those resources according
to the needs of the system at a specific moment. As such, a reserves market
can be classified as a bilateral long-term market with activation in real time.
Figure 5.5 presents a simplification of the proposed approaches for flexibility
contracting and the interaction of the DSO and TSO in each one. In the
lefthand side of the figure the TSO approach is presented. In this scheme the
TSO contracts resources directly from the flexibility provider located in the
distribution or transmission network. When the flexibility provider is located
in the distribution network the DSO’s role is to pre-qualify the service by
checking whether congestion and power quality constraints could be violated
by the flexibility activation. In the right hand side of the figure the DSO
FLEXIBILITY AS RESERVE 115
fig. 5.5. Proposed Approaches in Flexibility Contracting
approach is presented. The DSO contracts services directly from the flexibility
provider in order to manage congestion. The DSO then communicates the
services contracted to the TSO, and if there is no congestion the TSO can use
the flexibility resource as well. This scheme implies that the DSO is actively
informing the TSO about the use of the resource in the distribution grid, and
that the TSO requests flexibility services through the DSO. DSO and TSO
priority contracting are explained in the following subsections.
DSO Priority in Flexibility Contracting
The DSO acts as an active system manager and contracts flexibility services to
manage congestion in the network. In these type of proposals the DSO directly
contracts flexibility resources and has priority over their use.
The authors in [136] introduce the notion of a hierarchical market where a
restriction is made to trade resources first at a local and second at a wider grid
level in the absence of congestion. The European Distribution System Operators’
Association for Smart Grids (EDSO) highlights the need for increased DSO-TSO
cooperation [164]. They state that DSOs are responsible for the security and
quality of supply of their own networks. As such, DSOs collect the data of
the customers connected to their networks. Other system operators, such as
the TSO, do not interact with customers connected to DSO networks. EDSO
supports a model based on the concept of ’cascading responsibilities’ where each
system operator is responsible for its own grid and grid users. Data needs for
each system operator should be defined. System planning should be coordinated
between the TSO and DSO. Connection requirements for grid users should be
defined by both DSOs and TSOs together. To facilitate the integration of RES,
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TSOs and DSOs should regularly exchange and publish information regarding
their available network capacity at the TSO/DSO interface. DSOs need to
procure system flexibility services and oversee their effects on the grid. The
report also states that electricity markets have to evolve to take into account
distribution networks and the location of generators and service providers. DSOs
have to validate the technical availability of flexible resources connected to their
networks in three stages: pre-qualification of the flexible resource (in terms of
potential constraints on the distribution network), activation of the resource,
control of energy effectively consumed or produced.
The European FP7 project EvolvDSO proposes a new role for DSOs as a
’distribution constraints market officer’ [156] [157] [158]. The scheme was
described in section 5.4.4. In this scheme the DSO contracts flexibility directly
in order to avoid grid investment. The project recommends the establishment
of a hierarchy in communication and resrouce activation between the DSO and
the TSO.
The DSO-TSO interaction has been studied in Portugal in [15]. The paper
studies the impact of DG on distribution networks regarding losses, voltage
profile, system stability, network capacity and congestion, system balancing
and reserve, short-circuit level, protection selectivity, network robustness and
power quality. The authors state that DG connection might lead to change
or distortion of the voltage profiles at transmission nodes. In [166] it is stated
that as interaction with the TSO increases, real time information capabilities
allow the DSO to perform real-time analysis of the power flow and state of
the distribution grid. The information retrieved would include active power,
reactive power, voltage measurement and remote automation device states.
This enables the increase of distributed generation penetration. The authors
in [166] study the case of a DSO in the Netherlands with a large amount of
CHP plant connection. Due to the regulation, the DSO must connect CHP
plants faster than they can reinforce the network. The introduction of DG also
causes congestion in the local transmission grid, with a need to reinforce it. The
authors propose a coordinated DSO-TSO proactive planning approach. One of
the possible solutions presented is the elimination or deferral of the construction
of a TSO-substation by connecting DG to the local MV-grid and accepting
bi-directional power flows. This option requires investments in connection rather
than in substations. These solutions are restricted by fault level, protection
issues and power quality.
The European research project ADDRESS proposes a flexibility architecture
where the aggregation function is provided by the retailer. The project describes
the TSO and DSO as flexibility buyers and technical verifiers of flexibility
services [167], [168]. They propose two options to do the technical verification:
’ex-ante’ before the activation of consumers by aggregators, or in ’real time’
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after the market closure. Consumers providing flexibility are grouped into load
areas defined by the DSO and TSO. Flexibility programmes are submitted to
the system operators. A flexibility table is calculated and published before the
market opening to allow participant bid creation. In a follow up publication of
the same project the DSO functional architecture is divided into three control
levels: a central control, an HV/MV substation level for MV network monitoring
and an MV/LV substation level for LV monitoring [169]. The DSO and TSO are
asked to provide information on the location of consumers providing flexibility
and on whether flexibility actions comply with network constraints. In order to
achieve this, the project proposes an active demand management system.
TSO Priority in Flexibility Contracting
In this scheme the TSO is in charge of contracting flexibility resources directly,
even when resources are located in the distribution network. The DSO has a
passive role in ex-ante pre-qualification of flexibility resources. The DSO could
determine a one-time worst-case scenario and set a threshhold accordingly, or
do periodic checks of the effect of flexibility resources located in the distribution
network.
ENTSO-E identifies needed changes in the TSO-DSO interface in order to unlock
consumers’ potential as electricity generators and balancing actors [170]. The
report highlights the need for DSOs and TSOs to support a market framework
that unlocks the flexibility potential of consumers, and consumers should have
access to participate in all markets. Also, TSOs and DSOs should work together
to determine requirements for observability and active power management of DG
and DSR. They state that the fragmentation of markets should be avoided, and
it is preferable to have a unique marketplace for both flexibility and balancing.
The report also recommends that DSOs cannot be on both sides of the market as
market facilitator and service provider; if they need a system service they cannot
be buyer and provider at the same time. Balancing markets should evolve to
take into account and deal with operational constraints of TSOs and DSOs.
In terms of operational interaction, the report states that TSOs will continue
to have the leading responsibility for balancing, frequency control and system
restoration, whereas DSOs will maintain their responsibility for managing their
network, with an increasing need to manage distribution congestion and voltage.
The report emphasizes operation and control by the TSO, even for resources
connected to the distribution network:
• All active power management actions with an impact on system balancing
and/or the transmission system should be overseen by the TSO and
implemented either directly by the TSO, through the DSO or aggregators.
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• TSOs and DSOs should cooperate on the definition of controllability
procedures on DG and DSR resources and especially to find the solution
to allow TSOs to curtail DG or activate DSR, wherever its connection
point, in alert and emergency system states.
• It is necessary to define an efficient operational procedure when: (i)
both networks are affected by congestions (i.e. who acts first, who pays,
etc.), (ii) TSO balancing actions have an impact on DSOs, and (iii) DSO
congestion management actions have the potential to affect the TSO
network.
The Florence School of Regulation [171] recognizes that in a scenario of high
decarbonization more decentralized resources are expected to develop, and it
becomes necessary for the DSO and TSO to cooperate. The report identifies
balancing decisions in one network that could affect the other network. They
propose that congestion management decisions at distribution level should
be neutral for the transmission system or should include an imbalance fee.
Similarly, decentralized resources used for managing the transmission system
should consider their declared price in the balancing market as well as their
shadow cost for the distribution system. The report envisages three solutions:
• DSOs operate their system according to the format of their respective
TSOs.
• The transmission system operator expands its operation to the distribution
system.
• TSOs and DSOs share a security cooperation initiative.
Market rules should adapt to the new resources while allowing aggregator
participation. The authors in the report expect new transmission tariffs for
generators related to locational incentives. Consumer tariffs would need to be
updated to reflect this change.
In [172] the need for transmission grid interfaces with distributed resources is
described through the use of smart substations that incorporate microgrids and
can operate in islanding mode.
5.7 Local Competition for Flexibility
As a separate platform, the market could be operated only on the local level
and unrelated to the wholesale market. Competition is allowed on both the
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fig. 5.6. Interaction between buyers and sellers through a local market exchange
supply and demand sides of the market, making this a competitive market. The
market could either be bilateral or run as an exchange.
The design of the local market mirrors the wholesale market in temporal,
contractual, and price clearing dimensions, but it has a specific spatial
component. Figure 5.6 depicts the interactions between the system operators,
the market and the flexibility service providers. The DSO and TSO must
coordinate the grid operation and use of resources between each other. They
could issue requests for flexibility services to the markets when needed by the
grids. These requests must contain information about the required time, amount
and location of the services. Similarly, market participants can place requests
for flexibility when they have balancing needs in a specific area. The market
matches the requests for services with available resources, and an efficient
communication between markets ensures that resources are only booked once.
Flexibility providers offer flexibility services to the markets, either directly or
through an aggregator. There is the risk that the local exchange will compete
for resources with the wholesale market. To avoid this, it should be designed as
a hierarchical market in case of congestion. This means that the same resource
should not be contracted, and paid for, twice. This is a similar design to
the relationship between long-term and short-term markets, where results are
transferred from one market to the next or directly to the system operator. In
this manner, a local flexibility market will always be linked to the wholesale
market, and indeed can be a participant of it. In unconstrained conditions, the
local market would not be necessary, and the energy price across all regions
would be the wholesale market price. Only during congestion would an area
exhibit a price difference from the wholesale market.
There is a debate as to who should operate this platform. The system operators,
both the TSO and DSO, hold the information about the needs of the grid. As
regulated businesses they have limitations on the type of commercial activities
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they can engage in, and so would require regulatory changes to be allowed to run
a competitive exchange. TSOs are currently able to purchase balancing power
through market mechanisms while DSOs are not. The discussion is similar to
the one presented in subsection 5.6. The TSO holds visibility over the wider
network, but not over the network of the DSO. While the DSO cannot foresee
how the deployment of resources in his network will affect the TSO or other
DSOs. An independent operator would be a purely commercial third party who
would need to rely on requests for services provided by the system operators.
Furthermore, the system operators need to be able to see each others’ requests
so as to take into account the impact of these activations on their networks.
An exchange platform in electricity markets is used to balance portfolio positions
in the day-ahead and real-time horizons. Available flexibility is needed to cover
differences between forecasts and actual generation and consumption. Therefore
the time horizon of a flexibility platform itself is in the short term. Flexibility
service providers, however, need to arrange contracts in advance so that the
flexibility will be available in real time. For example, an aggregator can set up
contracts for a pre-defined number of demand response load reductions per year.
The aggregator will then need to optimize available resources and decide which
ones will be offered in the short-term markets.
5.8 Conclusion
Locality in this context refers to a specific geographic location, grid connection,
and system operator pertaining to a set of load and generation. Local flexibility
contracting is a growing need in face of the fast integration of DER resources.
On the one hand, stakeholder groups have issued opinions regarding the need
for organized local flexibility contracting. On the other hand, the study of
local flexibility has taken a mix of technical trajectories, such as microgrids,
and commercial ones such as virtual power plants. Most studies do not bring
together both technical aspects and the commercial interactions and purposes
of the involved stakeholders. This thesis contributes a unified definition of
local market: ’long- or short- term trading actions for flexibility in a specific
geographical location, voltage level, and system operator (DSO and TSO), given
by grid conditions or balancing needs, where participants in a relevant market
can be aggregated to provide flexibility services.’
Current local market design proposals in literature and ongoing projects are
presented. It can be concluded that there is no unified market design, and no
agreement on who should undertake the key roles. The main trends observed
place either the TSO, the DSO or an independent market operator as a buyer
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of flexibility. It can be concluded that the first two points of view call for a
regulated reserves type market design, given that both the TSO and DSO are
regulated parties. It would be a reserves market open for competition only on
the supply side, with a single buyer. Similarly, there are differing points of
view on which of the two system operators should have priority for the use of
flexibility.
In the DSO-priority approach the DSO contracts flexibility to be used for grid
purposes directly from the flexibility service providers (FSPs). This flexibility
can later be used for the DSO’s own grid needs, re-sold to the TSO or to a
third party that may need it. The main benefits of a DSO-priority model are:
avoiding double booking of resources, enabling visibility of flexibility to the
DSO at all times, and promoting local grid management. The downside of this
model is that it creates transaction costs for the DSO in case that it doesn’t
need to use the pre-contracted flexibility resources. Also, this model implies
that a priority is given to the DSO in the use of flexibility, which might not
always be necessary.
In the TSO-priority approach, the TSO is the first one to have the one access to
all flexibility resources, including those in the distribution grid. It can be argued
that this is a fair approach since the TSO holds the responsibility for balancing
the system as a whole and has a more thorough vision. In an opposite view, it
implies that the TSO is contracting and then activating flexibility resources in
the distribution network, without having visibility of that particular network.
A clear division of responsibilities and communication protocols is necessary for
this model to work.
The optimal solution depends on the topology of the system, the amount of
DRES connected to a distribution grid, and the available flexibility resources.
The introduction of more DRES, storage and electric vehicles in the future may
cause or need an increase in DSO-TSO cooperation in terms of contracting,
information sharing, and operation.
The topic of the TSO-priority in flexibility contracting, while relevant, has
already been more studied and implemented than the DSO-priority. Therefore
this thesis contributes to the state of the art by focusing on the two cases
presented above under a scenario of DSO-priority. Table 5.2 presents the main
characteristics of market design for each of the main trends for each local
market design under study. In both instances, the local market is initiated by a
location specific need determined by the DSO. In the rest of this thesis, two
main alternatives will be analyzed from the point of view of an active DSO:
• Chapter 6 presents a DSO market for flexibility as reserves in order to
solve congestion issues.
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• Chapter 7 presents a case of competition for flexibility where the DSO
competes with the BRP in order to buy flexibility from a profit maximizing
aggregator.
Both markets start from a local need dictated by grid congestion. A study of
when this congestion occurs and what its value is for the DSO is presented next
in chapter 6. Flexibility contracting directly by the DSO through a reserves
type market is studied in chapter 6. A profit maximizing aggregator and a BRP
are introduced in a competitive scenario in chapter 7.
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Dimen-
sion
Local Reserves Market Competition for
Flexibility
Temporal The DSO decides whether to
buy flexibility or invest in
grid expansion at the
beginning of a period of time.
Long-term contracts are used
for assuring availability of
reserves coming from
aggregators.
Flexibility is activated in real
time.
The DSO has a long-term
demand for flexibility and the
BRP has a short term one.
Spatial The DSO issues a request for
flexibility to the aggregator
managing resources that can
solve a network need.
The specific location of the
aggregator’s resources will
determine the available
flexibility supply.
Bids are specific to a
predefined area given by grid
constraints.
Communication with the
DSO is used to identify
network needs.
The DSO and BRP place
requests to a profit
maximizing aggregator based
on local needs.
Contrac-
tual
Flexibility availability is
procured through tenders for
quantity issued by the DSO.
Contracts are bilateral.
Contracts are bilateral
between the aggregator-DSO
or aggregator-BRP.
The aggregator must decide
in advance whether to
contract with the DSO or the
BRP.
Price
Clearing
The DSO remunerates
flexibility using a pay-as-bid
method.
The DSO and BRP submit
bids for flexibility to a profit
maximizing aggregator.
The highest bids are accepted
first and allocated according
to availability of flexibility.
Table 5.2. Dimensions of the proposed local market designs

Chapter 6
DSO Market for Reserves
Distribution grid management is challenged by the introduction of new
technologies. Load profiles are expected to change with the growth of electric
vehicles, small-scale storage, and solar panels at users’ homes. For example,
figure 6.1 shows expected global scenarios for the deployment of electric cars
up to 2030 according to the International Energy Agency [173]. As electric
vehicles are integrated into the distribution grid the need for local congestion
management will be more evident [174]. Electric vehicles need to be charged
so that they are ready for use when drivers leave their homes or jobs. Home
users will be able to change their expected load patterns through the use of
battery storage to take advantage of either price signals from the market or
their own production from solar panels. In addition the grid needs to handle
the growth of distributed generation such as small combined heat and power
and wind generation.
fig. 6.1. Deployment scenarios for the stock of electric cars to 2030.
125
126 DSO MARKET FOR RESERVES
It was determined in chapter 5 that the specific need for a local market stems
from grid conditions. These conditions need to be recognized by the DSO
and communicated to other parties so that action can be taken. In this case,
expected congestion in the DSO grid is analyzed as the cause of a need for
either flexibility contracting in the form of demand response or grid expansion.
This chapter has three main purposes:
• Analyze and quantify the DSO’s demand for flexibility;
• Study the value of flexibility for the DSO;
• Propose a decision making model where the DSO decides to either invest
in grid reinforcements or buy flexibility.
The results from the wholesale market as given in chapter 4 are passed on to a
test network in order to determine possible local flexibility needs.
The DSO’s demand for flexibility, that gives the location specific component
that creates a local market, is examined in section 6.1. Once the quantity
demanded is determined, its value to the DSO is explored in section 6.2 in
terms of either purchasing flexibility at cost value or investing in grid expansion.
A methodology to take this decision is proposed in 6.3. In order to test the
model data needs to be created as explained in section 6.4. Input data for
the network and decision model is described in 6.5. Illustrative results for the
DSO’s demand for flexibility are presented in 6.6.2, and results for the decision
model are explained in 6.7. Chapter conclusions are given in 6.8.
6.1 The DSO’s Demand for Flexibility
Usually when a new connection is requested to a distribution network, an
analysis is done to see if the expected flows with the added connection would
violate network constraints. If limits would be violated network reinforcements
are proposed. Distribution grids are planned to have enough transfer capacity
to cover the expected peaks plus safety factors for reliability. Therefore they
tend to have a relatively low utilization factor. In the examples that follow it is
assumed that the grid capacity limit presented has already deducted reliability
margins, and is the actual capacity that load and generation can use.
Figure 6.2 exemplifies a load duration curve where load is organized ranging
from highest to lowest throughout an entire year. Grid capacity is represented
by the solid grey horizontal line. Hours of expected peak loads during a year are
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fig. 6.2. Load duration curve and grid capacity limit
limited, in this example to 400h. Reinforcing the network to satisfy the peak load
might be too expensive taking this limited need into account. As the network is
more than strong enough to satisfy periods of low to mid demand, reorganizing
load, through demand response programs, would be a better solution. Figure 6.3
exemplifies average consumption throughout a day with respect to the grid
capacity limit. The dashed line represents the current load profile, and the
shaded area represents the potential for strategic load growth. It is necessary to
avoid more demand at peaking hours and encourage consumption during valley
hours. In this way, the existing grid capacity can be used to it’s full potential.
Continuing with the current approach, investing to accommodate all peaks,
might prove too expensive to society. Active grid management is a way to help
the system accommodate new technologies while managing grid investment
costs.
The DSO’s demand for flexibility is derived from moments when the network
experiences congestion that could be solved through either demand or distributed
generation modifications at a given time. The DSO needs to have tools to foresee
in advance when this congestion would occur and decide whether flexibility
contracting is the optimal solution as opposed to network reinforcements. The
DSO needs to make this decision in the long term time frame in order to
have enough time to reinforce the grid in case flexibility is not available. The
proposed demand for flexibility and the decision analysis that follows takes
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fig. 6.3. Grid potential to accommodate load growth
place at the beginning of an evaluation period, in this case one year.
Congestion in a distribution grid refers to when the demand for active power
transfer exceeds the transfer capability of the grid [175]. The transfer capability
of the grid is related to voltage limits, thermal limits of cables and transformer
and protection settings. This thesis deals with the active power capability of
the grid.
Congestion issues in distribution have been traditionally solved either through
reactive and voltage control or load and distributed generation curtailment [176].
Other options include grid reconfiguration strategies to avoid overload of feeders
and transformers [177]. This chapter deals with solving congestion through
market based flexibility of the users connected to a particular grid.
6.1.1 Demand for Downward Flexibility
Continuing with the example above, the DSO would need downward flexibility
when the expected load profile exceeds the grid capacity limit. Figure 6.4
represents a case when the expected load at a certain feeder in the distribution
grid exceeds the grid capacity. The dashed line represents the expected load
profile. It can be observed that the expected peak load is higher than the
capacity allocated for user transactions. The striped area represents the amount
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fig. 6.4. Expected congestion due to peak load conditions creates a Need for Downward
Flexibility.
of energy out of bounds of the set grid capacity limit. This amount of energy
would need to be shifted to a non-peak period. This means, that during those
hours the DSO has a need for downward flexibility. If consumers would decrease
their demand, shifting it to valley hours, the grid’s capacity limit would be
maintained.
6.1.2 Demand for Upward Flexibility
In this case renewable energy generation, or any other DER, covers the entire
local load demand. The residual load curve is created by subtracting local
generation to the expected load. The situation is depicted in figure 6.5. The
dotted line represents the residual load curve after subtracting RES generation
to the expected load represented by the dashed line. Energy above zero is
the traditional expected load consumption in the feeder. There also ’negative’
energy, meaning that the feeder is exporting energy to the larger grid instead
of importing. In this example, the striped area represents a case where the
expected RES exports exceed the grid capacity limit. Which means that, during
those hours, the DSO has a need for upward demand flexibility. If consumers
would increase their demand they would use the excess RES being produced
and the grid’s capacity limit would be maintained.
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fig. 6.5. Expected Congestion due to Excess Distributed RES Generation Causes a
Need for Upward Flexibility.
6.1.3 Quantifying the DSO’s Need for Flexibility
The need for flexibility of the DSO is determined by assessing when the power
at the slack pst at the substation would be higher than the transformer capacity
defined by (6.1). The DSO faces a need for downward flexibility, meaning a
decrease in demand across the feeders or an increase in generation as given by
the DSOdownt in (6.2). In the opposite case the need for upward flexibility
DSOupt is defined in a similar way by (6.3) and (6.4). It happens when there
are backflows, meaning energy flowing from the DSO secondary side of the
transformer to the TSO primary side would be higher than the transformer
limit.
for pst > trafolim (6.1)
DSOdownt = pst − trafolim (6.2)
for pst < −trafolim (6.3)
DSOupt = pst + trafolim (6.4)
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where
pst power at the DSO slack node at time t [MW]
trafolim power limit of transformer [MW]
DSOdownt DSO need for downward flexibility at time t [MW]
DSOupt DSO need for upward flexibility at time t [MW]
6.2 Cost and Value of Flexibility for the DSO
6.2.1 Ideal Payment for Flexibility
The ideal payment for flexibility should be based on the marginal costs for the
final flexibility service providers of supplying that flexibility. These costs are
largely unknown since they depend on the type of consumer as described in
section 2.3. When consumers modify their consumption behavior they incur
a cost. This might be the cost of running a local generator for an industrial
consumer, or the inconvenience caused to domestic consumers. These costs
vary for each consumer segment, along with the availability to respond to
market conditions. They will not participate in a program where they incur in
losses. The cost incurred by consumers due to participation in DR programs is
assummed to be unknown to the market designers or demand aggregators [178].
6.2.2 DSO Incentives to Consumers for Flexibility Services
This sub-section is based on: [179]
Spiliotis, K.; Ramos, A.; Belmans, R., ’Demand flexibility versus physical
network expansions in distribution grids’, Applied Energy, Volume 182, 15
November 2016, Pages 613-624, ISSN 0306-2619
It was shown in section 6.1 how the DSO could use flexibility in order to avoid
grid reinforcements. The DSO would be motivated to use demand response if
doing so is cheaper than the avoided costs of reinforcing the network. Thus for
the DSO the benefit of using flexibility is the savings in grid reinforcements
achieved. These savings, SAVDSO, can be defined by (6.5) where Cexp is the
cost of grid expansion, and Cflex is the cost that the DSO pays for flexibility.
Figure 6.6 represents the relationship between the expected costs for the DSO on
the y-axis and the expected growth in residual peak-demand in the x-axis [179].
132 DSO MARKET FOR RESERVES
fig. 6.6. Investment deferral savings due to the use of demand flexibility.
The difference between the costs of expansion minus the costs of flexibility
represent the benefit that the DSO incurs through the use of flexibility.
SAVDSO = Cexp − Cflex (6.5)
A mechanism to distribute the rents BENDSO from the expected savings of
flexibility to the final flexibility service providers is proposed [179]. It is stated
that the benefit, bn, of supplying flexibility for the final consumer n is the price
benefit of optimally shifting demand. The price benefit for the consumer is
observed in (6.6). In the study, it is assumed that consumers pay wholesale
market prices, MPt, as their energy tariff. Consumers optimize shifting to
save money by decreasing consumption at high price hours, flexdownt, and
increasing it during low price hours flexupt.
bn =
∑
t
(λt ∗ (flexdownt − flexupt)) (6.6)
The profit sharing mechanism in the study assumes that the price benefit might
not be incentive enough for consumers to modify their demand. An additional
compensation from the DSO to the consumer is proposed as explained in (6.7).
This compensation is meant to cover the costs the consumer would incur in
flexibility provision assuming a certain investment cost of flexibility Cflex and
an expectation of a return on investment ROI minus the price benefit bn of
shifting flexibility.
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Compensationn = Cflex ∗ (1 +ROI)− bn (6.7)
A grid investment model for a radial network is proposed where the DSO
minimizes costs. The DSO decides whether to invest in line reinforcements
or to procure flexibility, taking into account that the DSO pays for the cost
of expansion, a cost of flexibility and for any RES that is curtailed due to
congestion in the network at the given market price.
It was found that at the proposed market prices, during the three year evaluation
period, the price benefit bn of shifting demand was lower than the costs the
consumer incurred in investing in flexibility provision, estimated at $380 per
household averaged from data found in [24]. It was concluded in the study that
through the use of flexibility the DSO needs to perform up to 89% less grid
expansions than without using flexibility depending on the feeder topology.
6.2.3 Value of Flexibility for the DSO
The study examined in section 6.2.2 states the value of flexibility based on
an investment cost for the final flexibility service provider needed to supply
flexibility. This assumption was made because the marginal costs of supplying
demand response flexibility present large variations in literature. A study places
the intrinsic variable cost of providing demand response in a range between 50
and 300 e\MWh [180]. Costs vary depending on the nature of the provider
of demand response, eg. a household would have a different cost than an
industrial consumer. In addition, the costs of aggregation need to be taken
into account. The aggregator itself incurs costs in contracting, communication,
decision making and information management.
Equation (6.8) expands and generalizes the rationale used in [179]. For
a flexibility provider n the cost of providing flexibility can be defined as
the amount of downward flexibility flexdownt times the cost of decreasing
consumption costdownt, plus upward flexibility flexupt times the cost of
increasing consumption costupt minus the price benefit of providing flexibility
as defined in (6.6).
Costflexn =
∑
t
(flexdownt ∗ costdownt + flexupt ∗ costupt)− bn (6.8)
Note that the internal costs of providing flexibility costdownt and costupt
are different from the market price and include costs of communication and
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aggregation. These cost concepts are treated as unknown information, since
the specifics of final demand response providers is not the scope of this work.
They are included in this section for completeness, but will not be used in the
analysis that follows. Rather, it is assumed that the DSO procures flexibility
according to its valuation of it.
A simple methodology to calculate the cost of distribution grid investment is
used based on [181]. A more detailed calculation of the cost of distribution grid
investment is out of the scope of this thesis. The methodology used in [179] is
expanded to convert a cost of e\MW to a e\MWh cost of flexibility that is
used later in this thesis. The cost of grid expansion is shown in (6.9). Thus the
cost of grid expansion in €\MWh, Cexp, is equal to the cost of grid investment,
Cinv, divided by the expected useful life of the asset life in years, times an
average of full load hours avgload.
Cexp =
Cinv
life ∗ avgload (6.9)
6.3 DSO’s Investment Versus Flexibility Decision
The DSO’s decision lies in whether to invest in grid expansion exp or contract
flexibility qaggupt and qaggdownt in order to manage local congestion. In this
formulation of the problem, the DSO minimizes total costs in the scenario that
aggregated consumers provide flexibility directly to the DSO. The objective
function is represented by equation (6.10). The aggregator in this case is passive
and does not make decisions. The DSO buys downward flexibility qaggdownt
at cost value DRCOST minus the price benefit that consumers get from using
flexibility. The price benefit is defined by the peak/off-peak tariff that consumers
pay for the rebound demand qaggupt plus the savings from decreasing demand
qaggdownt. If the expected congestion is not covered through demand response
then the DSO must invest in grid expansion exp at a given investment cost
per MW INV COST . It is assumed that INV COST represents the annualized
cost of grid investment, as the decision to buy flexibility defers investment for
one year.
∑
t
{qaggdownt ∗DRCOST
− POPt ∗ (qaggupt + qaggdownt)}
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+ exp ∗ INV COST (6.10)
where
qaggdownt total downward demand response offered by aggregated
consumers at time t [MWh]]
DRCOST cost of downward demand response offered by aggregated
consumers [€\MWh]
POPt Peak and off-peak tariff faced by the consumer at time period t
[€\MWh]
aggupt total upward demand response offered by aggregated consumers
at time t [MWh]
exp total grid expansion needed to relieve congestion [MW]
INV COST annualized grid investment cost per MW [e\MW]
Subject to:
qdsodownt + qdsoupt ≤ exp ∀t (6.11)
qdsodownt + qaggdownt ≥ DSOdownt ∀t (6.12)
qdsoupt + qaggupt ≥ DSOupt ∀t (6.13)
qaggdownt ≤ AGGMAX ∗ ut ∀t (6.14)
qaggupt ≤ AGGMAX ∗ vt ∀t (6.15)
ut + vt ≤ 1 ∀t (6.16)∑
t24
{qaggupt − qaggdownt = 0} ∀t24 (6.17)
where
qdsodownt total downward congestion covered by the DSO through grid
expansion at time t [MWh]]
qdsoupt total upward demand congestion covered by the DSO through
grid expansion at time t [MWh]]
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DSOdownt total requested downward demand response by the DSO at time
t [MW]
DSOupt total requested upward demand response by the DSO at time t
[MW]
AGGMAX total available demand response by aggregator [MW]
ut binary variable for downward demand response activation [0 1]
vt binary variable for upward demand response activation [0 1]
t24 a subset of t representing 24 hours
The total amount of grid expansion required is set by constraint (6.11), where
the DSO covers an amount of upward plus downward congestion qdsodownt,
and qdsoupt limited by the total amount of grid reinforcement exp decided by
the model. In (6.12) the DSO’s need for downward flexibility, DSOdownt, to
solve congestion must be met by either grid expansion as mentioned before,
or flexibility provided by aggregated consumers qaggdown. Equation (6.13)
represents the same concept for upward flexibility. Equations (6.14) and (6.15)
limit the allocation of flexibility qaggupt and qaggdownt to the total available
capacity of demand response that the aggregated consumers can provide. These
capacities are multiplied by auxiliary binary variables ut and vt that ensure that
upward and downward demand response are not activated at the same time as
defined by (6.16). Finally (6.17) defines the rebound effect, all downward and
upward demand response must equal to zero within a horizon of 24 hours.
Note that it is assumed that grid connections that are expected to violate
network limits have been allowed, under the premise that the excess can be
managed through the use of flexibility. Traditionally, if a new connection
is expected to violate network limits reinforcements have to be made. This
evaluation process for the DSO is on a long term time frame, as network
reinforcements need to be planned in advance.
6.4 Dataset Creation Methodology
A feeder configuration is chosen to represent MV-LV grid connections with the
purpose of evaluating the state of the DSO network in view of changing RES
scenarios. Congestion is calculated at the connecting TSO-DSO substation.
Thus, the need for local flexibility of the DSO is defined through the use of this
methodology.
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fig. 6.7. Dataset creation methodology.
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fig. 6.8. Representation of the test network used for the study.
In order to obtain a power profile related to the day-ahead wholesale market
presented in chapter 4, the results are passed on to a simple three node network.
One node is chosen for further study based on the results of a transmission
power flow. The goal of this optimization is to find out an optimal power flow
in the transmission system based on the wholesale market results, as given
by the variable pn,nn,t. A complete derivation of the DC power flow can be
found in [182]. The TSO’s optimization is set up so that the power flow in
the lines is minimized and a unique solution exists in the problem. Figure 6.7
depicts the process that was used to create the dataset for the DSO’s demand
for flexibility to arrive at an optimal decision between flexibility procurement
and grid investment.
In order to study the DSO-TSO interaction a two node test network is set up.
One node represents a distribution system MV connection and the other node
groups three chosen LV nodes. Node 1 is an abstraction of a portion of the
power coming from the TSO, and node 2 has grouped three LV nodes based
on [183]. Figure 6.8 shows a representation of the network used for the study.
A backward forward sweep based on [184] is used to carry out the load flow
analysis given the input load and RES availability at each node. The analysis
defines the power profile at each node as well as the slack value that is assumed
to be provided by the transmission grid pst. The analysis is done for 15 minute
time periods in order to account for intraday variations in RES power profiles.
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node Generation
Resource
Marginal
Cost
Installed Capacity
[MW]
n1 BRP1g1 10 1200
BRP3g1 86 690
BRP3W 0 650
BRP3PV 0 760
n2 BRP1g2 37 1000
BRP2g1 37 700
BRP3W 0 650
BRP3PV 0 760
n3 BRP2g2 63 700
BRP4g1 86 400
BRP3W 0 650
BRP3PV 0 760
AGG1 15 200
Table 6.1. Available resources per node
The highest power value for each hour is chosen as the value that is requested
in the energy market. Power, rather than energy values, are used to take into
account the expected peaks in demand that the network will face. Power values
are used for distribution network planning in [185]. Energy values, meaning
the average of the power data for each hour, are not used since intra-hourly
peak variation would be lost. Since the purpose of the methodology is to
accommodate renewable energy, it was estimated important to observe peaks
even if the final results might lead to over dimensioning of the network.
6.5 Input Data
The results of the wholesale market are split into three equal parts and passed on
to a TSO DC load flow consisting of three nodes. The resulting generation and
resource schedule takes into account the energy scheduled for each generation
unit, the decided wind and PV curtailment, and the changes in demand caused
by demand response. Generation availability is defined per node in table 6.1.
6.5.1 Transmission Grid Data
Grid characteristics have been extracted from [186]. The three cables connecting
each node are assumed to be equal (table 6.2).
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line r [pu] x [pu] Line Limit [MW]
L1-2 0.029 0.32 1350
L2-3 0.029 0.32 1350
L3-1 0.029 0.32 1350
Table 6.2. Transmission line characteristics
Transformer V1 V2 PNOM
T1 70 kV 15 kV 30 MVA
T2 15 kV 420 V 400 kVA
Table 6.3. HV-MV transformer characteristics
6.5.2 Distribution Grid Data
The distribution grid used in the analysis consists is a medium voltage grid of
15 kV. The transformer data used is taken from [186] and shown in table 6.3.
Two levels are considered in order to include residential profiles containing solar
power connected to the network. However, for purposes of the analysis all
data is aggregated into the MV layer at the transformer T1 that connects the
distribution to the transmission grid.
In order to study the interaction between the TSO and the DSO an MV-LV
network is set up based on the results of node 3 in the transmission network.
The MV feeder includes 10% of the load and RES data coming from the previous
TSO DC load flow in addition to the data from the three load voltage feeders.
It is assumed that the rest of the energy is going towards other MV feeders, and
that all thermal production in node three is located at the transmission level.
Load after the demand response actions in the wholesale market is included in
the scaled analysis as this is the value that the DSO would need to manage.
Figure 6.9 shows the load data for the evaluation period scaled from the results
for node 3 in the TSO load flow (top), and the input wind and solar profiles
(center and bottom) respectively for the evaluation period. All data is hourly
for one year.
The MV feeder is then connected to three LV feeders, representing urban,
semi-urban, and rural grid scenarios that contain PV production as well. The
feeders have been chosen based on [183], where typical feeders in Flanders have
been simulated.
Figure 6.10 represents the input power profile of the three LV feeders for the
entire evaluation period. The figure represents the results of the three 400V
feeder load flows. Positive values represent power flowing towards the feeders,
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fig. 6.9. Input load data at the MV feeder coming from the transmission system load
flow (top), and the wind and solar profiles (center and bottom) respectively for the
evaluation period.
and negative values represent backflows from the LV feeders toward the MV
network. This happens because there is solar power production connected to
the houses in the feeders. Predictably, the urban feeder is the largest one,
amounting to around 1 MW of power at peak hours. For simplicity in the
analysis, the three nodes have been grouped into a single value of consumption
for every period of time. The time period resolution for the distribution system
analysis is hourly.
6.5.3 Cost of Grid Expansion
Based on available literature and conversations with industry experts it is
estimated that the cost of investment in distribution lies somewhere in between
6,000 e\kW and 10,000 e\kW [187], [188]. In a whitepaper by the International
Electrotechnical Commission several studies about the lifetime of components
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fig. 6.10. Input power profile of LV feeders.
in power systems are summarized. Most components are estimated to have a
service life between 25 and 50 years [189].
In the analysis that follows, an average cost of grid expansion of 8000 e\kW is
assumed. The assets are depreciated linearly for a useful life of 25 years. This
yields a yearly cost of 320,000 e per MW installed.
In chapter 7 a cost per MWh is used and calculted according to 6.9. An average
load of 2000 hours, and a useful life of 25 years is used [181]. Taking into account
a cost of investment of 8,000 e\kW, the hourly cost of investment amounts to
160 €\MWh. This methodology proposed by the International Energy Agency
[181].
6.6 Results for DSO Demand for Flexibility
First, the results of the HV power flow are presented for the three node network
in consideration. Then, these results are scaled and passed on to the MV
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fig. 6.11. Box plot analysis of power flow in each line of the transmission system.
network described above.
6.6.1 Dataset Created for Distribution Network
The results of the power flow analysis in the transmission system over each
line can be observed in figure 6.11. Positive values mean power flowing in the
direction indicated in the line name, and the opposite for negative values. For
example, L3-1 represents the power flowing from node one to node three. As
the values are mostly negative, it means that most of the time power flows form
node one to node three through L3-1. The graph analyses the data through a
box plot, the middle line of each plot represents the median of the values. The
box represents the values where 50% of the data fall and the upper and lower
whiskers represent the top and bottom quartiles of data respectively. In the
results this means that for lines L1-2 and L2-3 most of the values fall between
zero and 350 MW. While for L3-1, most values are located at around -350 MW,
meaning that power is flowing into node 3 most of the time. All values fall well
inside the acceptable line limit which is set at 1350 MW.
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fig. 6.12. Box plot analysis of net injection at transmission system nodes.
A similar type of analysis is carried out regarding the values of net injection in
each node. Net injection is the sum of all generation in the node plus incoming
power flows minus demand and outgoing power flows. A positive value for
net injection means that the node is exporting energy and a negative value
importing. A zero value would mean that production and consumption are
equal in the node. The results can be observed in figure 6.12. The results for
net injection follow the same trend as the results of power flowing through the
lines. The boxplot analysis shows that node 1 is the main exporter, and node
3 is the main importer, while node 2 falls in between. This occurs because
node 1 has the least expensive generators, while node 3 has peaking units only
dispatched during high load hours in the previous wholesale market results.
6.6.2 DSO’s Request for Flexibility
The purpose of this analysis is to determine when the given schedule would
be higher than the transformer capacity limits at the MV substation. This
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outcome provides the flexibility needed to solve a congestion problem at the
DSO-TSO interface.
Illustrative examples with different scenarios of RES penetration are presented.
Thre scenarios are presented, one without any renewable energy, the base
scenario with scaled RES data from 2015 as explained before, and a high
penetration RES scenario where the base case is scaled up to 200%. When
there is more RES covering demand in the feeder, there is less need to use the
transformer. Figure 6.13 presents the power profile that can be expected at the
transformer across the year at three different cases of RES penetration. It is
evident that when DG increases the power at the transformer decreases, because
the biggest use of the transformer is to import power to the feeder. There is
a point, where a big increase in RES penetration will lead to a case where
transformer limits are crossed due to backflows. When the DRES production in
the feeder is larger than the load this event might occur. Figure 6.14 represents
a statistical analysis of the power profile throughout the whole evaluation period
for every scenario. In the analysis, the top horizontal line represents the median
of the observations. The box represents the values where 50% of the data fall
and the upper and lower whiskers represent the top and bottom quartiles of
data respectively. For the cases with low RES penetration, the peaks in load
cause violations of the transformer limit. While for cases where there is a DRES
increase of over 70% with respect to the base case, there are outliers that cross
the lower bound of the transformer. Every instance where power is outside of
the bounds of the transformer limit causes a need for flexibility.
The DSO can use flexibility in order to solve congestion problems at the
transmission interface. Figure 6.15 outlines the DSO’s power profile at the
transformer under different scenarios. Following the results outlined in the
previous section, for the base case and the case without DRES the DSO’s need
is for downward flexibility since the power is trespassing the upper bound of
the transformer. However, as RES grows also upward flexibility will be needed
to compensate for backflows that arise as can be observed in fig. 6.14. RES
scenarios are presented to illustrate the possibilities of the methodology. In the
results that follow the base case is analyzed.
6.7 DSO’s Local Market: Results for Investment
versus Flexibility Decision
The DSO has a need for flexibility that can be fulfilled by either buying demand
response or investing in grid reinforcement. The DSO makes requests for
flexibility based on a congestion analysis. The cost of DR is assumed to be
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fig. 6.13. Resulting power profile at transformer and transformer limit during a year
for a case without DRES (top), Base Case (center), and 200% RES (bottom).
fig. 6.14. Statistical analysis of profile instances with respect to transformer limits for
every scenario.
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fig. 6.15. The DSO’s need for flexibility in a case without RES (top), the base case
(center), a case with 200% RES (bottom)
unknown to the DSO, but lying in the range of grid tariffs that consumers pay.
Otherwise it would not make sense for them to participate in the local market.
The costs contained in the objective function are shown in figure 6.16. The DSO
incurs a relatively low flexibility cost shown in the first bar. An expansion cost
for the amount of flexibility that demand is not able to provide is shown in the
second bar. The price benefit, shown in the third bar, that demand response
creates for consumers is subtracted from the total costs.
The base case assumes a cost of DR of 40 €\MWh. Figure 6.17 presents the
total costs that the DSO would incur if it used a combination of flexibility and
grid investment in the first bar labeled ’With Flexibility’ or in the absence of
flexibility in the second bar labeled ’Without Flexibility’. In this scenario the
DSO would save up to 66% in grid expansion. Cost concepts in the first bar
are separated into the actual cost of flexibility and the cost of expansion. The
cost of flexibility considers that the price benefit of demand response for the
final consumer has been subtracted from it.
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fig. 6.16. Cost concept detail for DSO for the evaluation period for the base case.
fig. 6.17. Aggregated DSO costs for the evaluation period for the base case.
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The costs of flexibility for the DSO depend on the amount of demand response
activated. The more demand response, the higher the price benefit for consumers,
which decreases overall costs for the DSO. Figure 6.18 presents the total amount
of upward and downward demand response activated during the whole year.
The figure represents the sum of all flexibility dispatched, upward and downward
for the entire year under each scenario. The upward flexibility dispatched is
depicted as positive flexibility and the downward flexibility as negative. Four
demand response cost scenarios are presented in the x-axis, 0, 15, 20 and
40 e\MWh respectively. Due to the shifting constraint total upward and
downward activation values are equal for each scenario. Demand response is
activated when the cost of demand response is lower than the price difference
between peak and off-peak hours. In this case, the peak price for consumers is
set at 50 e\MWh and the off-peak price at 30 e\MWh. The price difference
in the presented case is then 20 e\MWh. It can be observed that demand
response is used much more when it costs less than the price difference. This is
due to the price benefit incurred through load shifting.
A sensitivity analysis to the cost of demand response of the total costs for
the DSO using flexibility or not is shown in figure 6.19. As mentioned earlier,
when the cost of demand response is less than 20 e\MWh, the price difference
between peak and off-peak hours, a price benefit is incurred by consumers.
Since the DSO pays only the cost of demand response above the benefit that
consumers receive due to shifting, the first three scenarios generate a negative
cost (profit) at 0, 5 and 15 e\MWh respectively. After that the DSO must
compensate users or they would not be willing to offer demand response.
6.8 Conclusion
The DSO’s demand for flexibility to solve grid congestion was determined
qualitatively and quantitatively. The DSO needs to use flexibility when expected
load flows would surpass transformer limits at the substations that connect
transmission to distribution systems. In the analysis it is assumed that the rest
of the network components are dimensioned according to transformer limits,
but the same type of reasoning could apply to other components or performance
indicators in the distribution network.
The value of flexibility for the DSO was studied. The price that the DSO is
willing to pay for flexibility is capped by the cost it would incur if it decided
to invest in grid expansion instead of buying flexibility. This constitutes the
reservation price that the DSO is willing to pay for flexibility resources. The
value is depicted by the white bar in figure 6.17, representing the total investment
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fig. 6.18. Total demand response activation during the evaluation period sensitivity to
demand response cost scenarios, where 40 e\MWh is the reference case
fig. 6.19. Sensitivity of total costs for DSO under different scenarios of DR costs with
and without using flexibility.
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in grid expansion that the DSO would face in the absence of demand response
flexibility.
It was shown in the case study that the DSO can reap savings of up to 66% in
total grid expansion through local flexibility contracting. The price-benefit of
demand response is deducted from the cost that the DSO has to pay consumers
as an incentive for offering the service. This price benefit is based on peak
off-peak grid tariffs. It is profitable for consumers to offer demand response
to the DSO as long as the internal cost of providing it is less than the price
difference between the peak and off peak tariff. When their cost would be
greater than that they would need an additional incentive to cover their costs
and be motivated to offer demand response services to the DSO. Even when this
would be the case it would still be profitable for the DSO to procure demand
response to avoid grid reinforcements.
The time-frame for this type of decision-making for the DSO is long term. This
is due to the time that it takes to reinforce the network in order to ensure the
proper accommodation of RES. For the DSO, the methodology proposed can
be used as a guide towards making a decision a year or months in advance on
whether to build new lines or go into flexibility contracts.
The key element in this study is to create mechanisms that allow parties to
access flexibility resources that do not currently participate in markets. This
chapter presented a regulated market for reserves where the DSO buys flexibility
resources at their cost value and is the only buyer of flexibility. In the following
chapter a BRP who demands flexibility and a profit-maximizing aggregator are
introduced.

Chapter 7
Local Competition for
Flexibility
In this chapter a profit maximizing aggregator and a BRP are introduced. A
simple representation of competition for flexibility between the DSO and the
BRP is staged. In this chapter, the local market for flexibility is assumed to be
bilateral, where the aggregator sells to the highest bidder.
A reasoning similar to chapter 6 is used in this chapter to define a quantity
and a value that the BRP is willing to pay for flexibility. The BRP’s need for
flexibility is defined, also in the intraday horizon, based on differences between
day-ahead RES forecast and real-time availability of resources. The value of
flexibility for the BRP is given implicitly by the TSO through the imbalance
prices that the BRP would incur if it does not settle its open position due to
variations in the expected RES profile.
A profit maximizing aggregator decides who to allocate available flexibility to.
The aggregator is subject to the transfer payment value mechanism proposed
in the wholesale market and examined in chapter 4. The aggregator must
make the decision of flexibility allocation well in advance of operation time
because the DSO’s need for flexibility is in the long-term. The aggregator must
decide whether to sell flexibility to the DSO or keep it available for the BRP.
The rebound effect is expected to occur, and the aggregator foresees enough
flexibility capacity to comply with demand shifting within a 24 hour period.
The focus of this chapter is to examine the competition for flexibility between
the BRP and the DSO. Therefore, the effects of demand response on the BRP’s
profits are not described in detail once more.
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The BRP’s demand for flexibility is qualitatively described in section 7.1. The
value of flexibility for the BRP is explained in section 7.2. The DSO’s demand
for flexibility is brought over from chapter 6 and paired with the BRP’s demand
in the aggregator’s profit making decision in section 7.3. Input data to test the
model is described in section 7.4. Results of flexibility allocation and profits for
each party are presented in 7.5. Chapter conclusions are presented in section 7.6.
7.1 The BRP’s Demand for flexibility
The BRP’s need for flexibility is given by the difference between the day-ahead
RES forecast and the actual RES availability in real time. Other deviations
due to errors in load forecasting are not taken into account.
The change in RES profile is calculated by (7.1) to (7.3) as the difference between
the real-time and the DA wind and PV profiles assuming perfect information.
∆Windt = RealWt −DAWt (7.1)
∆PVt = RealPVt −DAPVt (7.2)
∆RESt = ∆Windt + ∆PVt (7.3)
where
∆RES Change in renewable energy profile [MWh]
RealWt Real time wind generation [MWh]
DAWt Day-ahead wind generation forecast [MWh]
RealPVt Real time PV generation [MWh]
DAPVt Day-ahead PV generation forecast [MWh]
The BRP can have a positive (injection exceeds offtake) or a negative imbalance
(offtake exceeds injection). A positive ∆RES means that there is a positive
imbalance; and vice versa. The BRP needs flexibility as follows:
• Upward regulation: a need to buy energy in the form of downward demand
response or an increase in generation. It is needed when there is a negative
imbalance, (∆RESt < 0).
BRPdowndrt = ∆RESt (7.4)
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• Downward regulation: a need to sell energy in the form of upward demand
response or a decrease in generation. It is needed when there is a positive
imbalance (∆RESt > 0).
BRPupdrt = ∆RESt (7.5)
7.2 Value of Flexibility for the BRP
Rationally, the BRP requires flexibility only when it incurs a penalty imbalance
tariff, it has to pay the TSO for its imbalance. The nature of the imbalance
tariff depends on the deviation of the entire system, and whether the BRP’s
specific time deviation helps or hinders the global network.
Changes in RES causes an imbalance depending on the direction of the change
with respect to the forecasted amounts. The BRP must either compensate for
these imbalances in the intraday market or face the imbalance tariffs placed by
the TSO. For simplicity, it is assumed that the BRP values local flexibility at
the value set by the TSO. This is because during moments of congestion, as
given by the DSO, the BRP would not be able to trade those resources in the
wholesale market.
A dual imbalance pricing method is assumed under the following conditions:
• When the BRP has a positive imbalance, where injection exceeds off-take,
prices can be positive or negative:
– Positive: payment from the TSO to the BRP.
– Negative: payment from the BRP to the TSO.
• When the BRP has a negative imbalance, where off-take exceeds injection,
prices can be positive or negative:
– Positive price: payment from the BRP to the TSO.
– Negative price: payment from the TSO to the BRP.
It is assumed that the BRP’s reservation price for buying flexibility is the
imbalance penalty itself minus a value to account for transaction costs of
participating in the local market. The BRP only has a demand for flexibility
when it will incur a penalty, meaning it has to pay monety to the TSO due to
its imbalance. In order to account for transaction costs of participating in the
local market it is assumed that the BRP’s reservation cost will be set at 80% of
the imbalance penalty. Thus, the BRP will only buy flexibility in the real-time
market when doing so is less expensive than paying the imbalance tariff.
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7.3 The Aggregator’s Decision
In this section it is assumed that the aggregator is the only supplier of flexibility
in an area. All available flexibility is contracted and aggregated through this
one party. The objective of the aggregator is in this case a profit maximization
defined by (7.6). The aggregator is interested in selling to the highest bidder
for flexibility at every time step so that its profits for the entire period are
maximized.
A model where the aggregator decides between participation in reserves for
transmission balancing and the day-ahead market is proposed in [190]. The
author finds that the aggregator tends to participate in the reserves market
more, and hedge price differences in the day-ahead market. Given that in this
case the aggregator is deciding between selling to a DSO or a BRP the same
reasoning applies with a few modifications. First, in [190] bidding is done for
either the reserves market at TSO level or the wholesale market. In this section
bidding is done for a local zone limited to a DSO feeder as described in chapter
6. The demand for flexibility for the DSO is given by the DSO’s need for
flexibility to relieve congestion. Second, in the model presented in [190] the
need for reserves is given by system balancing needs coming from TSO data. In
this section, the BRP is introduced as a market participant with an expected
demand and a valuation for flexibility.
Perfect information is assumed about the reservation price of both the DSO and
the BRP as explained earlier in this chapter. In addition, the aggregator must
satisfy a shifting constraint, for which he also dispatches up and downward
flexibility qadjupt and qadjdownt. Continuing the proposals studied in the
wholesale market, the aggregator will pay a transfer payment cost G to the BRP
for all downward demand response. It is assumed that the aggregator only pays
a transfer G for downward demand response dispatched, and is not responsible
for the upward demand when consumers shift their load to a different hour.
∑
t
{(qdsodownt + qdsoupt) ∗ COSTDSO
+
∑
f
(qbrpupt,f ∗ COSTBRPUPt,f + qbrpdownt,f ∗ COSTBRPDWNt,f )
− (qdsodownt +
∑
f
qbrpdownt,f + qadjdownt) ∗G} (7.6)
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where
qdsodownt downward flexibility won by DSO at time t [MWh]
qdsoupt upward flexibility won by DSO at time t [MWh]
qbrpupt,f variable of upward flexibility won by BRP f at time t
[MWh]
qbrpdownt,f variable of downward flexibility won by BRP f at time
t [MWh]
COSTDSO reservation cost of the DSO for flexibility purchasing
[€\MWh]
COSTBRPUPt,f reservation cost of BRP f at time t for upward demand
response [€\MWh]
COSTBRPDWNt,f reservation cost of BRP f at time t for downward
demand response [€\MWh]
G transfer payment cost for agregator for providing
demand downward demand response [€\MWh]
qadjdownt aggregator’s need for downward demand adjustment
at time t [MWh]
The aggregator’s decision on flexibility allocation is constrained by the requested
up and downward flexibility amounts of the DSO and BRP (7.7) to (7.10).
BRP limits are absolute values of the BRP’s demand for flexibility defined in
section 7.1.
qdsodownt ≤ DSOdownt ∀t (7.7)
qdsoupt ≤ DSOupt ∀t (7.8)
qbrpdownf,t ≤ BRPdowndrf,t ∀t (7.9)
qbrpupf,t ≤ BRPupdrf,t ∀t (7.10)
The total amount of flexibility that the aggregator can provide is conditioned
by (7.11) and (7.12). The same limit is used for both up and downward demand
because only one of the two is dispatched in a certain time period. Binary
variables ut and vt are used to ensure that only either upward or downward
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flexibility is offered at a certain period of time. This relationship is dictated
by (7.13), where it is determined that only one of the binary variables can have
a value of 1 at a certain time t. Finally, the aggregator must respect a demand
shifting constraint within a subset of time ts, usually 24 hours, (7.14).
qdsodownt +
∑
f
(qbrpdownf,t) + qadjdownt ≤ AGGMAXt ∗ ut ∀t (7.11)
∑
f
(qbrpupf,t) + qdsoupt + qadjupt ≤ AGGMAXt ∗ vt ∀t (7.12)
ut + vt ≤ 1 ∀t (7.13)∑
ts
{
∑
f
[qbrpupf,t − qbrpdownf,t] + qdsoupt − qdsodownt
+ qadjupt − qagdjdownt} = 0 ∀ts (7.14)
7.4 Input Data
The data used in this simulation is taken from the analysis in chapter 6. The
DSO’s bidding criteria is modified to account for a price per MWh. The BRP’s
need for flexibility is described using forecasted and real time values for RES
during 2015 in Belgium, scaled down to the feeder size as described in chapter 6.
7.4.1 The DSO’s Need for Flexibility
In this case, the DSO’s reservation price of using flexibility is the value defined
in section 6.5.3 of grid expansion per MWh, 160 e\MWh calculated according
to 6.9. Similar to the BRP’s reservation cost, this value is reduced by 20% to
account for transaction costs and risk management. Thus, the value used in
the simulations is 128 e\MWh.
7.4.2 The BRP’s need for Flexibilty
As explained in section 7.1 the BRP’s need for flexibility is given by the difference
between the day-ahead RES forecast and the actual RES availability in real
time. In the simulations it is assumed that the BRP’s need for flexibility is
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fig. 7.1. The BRPs need for flexibility is given by changes in the expected RES profile,
∆WIND (top), ∆PV (center) and combined ∆RES (bottom). Data is scaled based
on RES production in Belgium during 2015.
known at the time of the local market clearing. As mentioned earlier, the
BRP can have a positive (injection exceeds offtake) or a negative imbalance
(offtake exceeds injection). Input values used in the base case can be observed
in figure 7.1 and are based on forecasted and measured RES production values
for Belgium during 2015.
Rationally, the BRP will require flexibility only when it incurs a penalty
imbalance tariff. The BRP requires flexibility when it would have to pay the
TSO for its imbalance. The nature of the imbalance tariff depends on the
deviation of the entire system, and whether the BRP’s specific time deviation
helps or hinders the network. This data is assumed to be input, and perfectly
known in advance based on the imbalance tariffs in Belgium during 2015. It
is also assumed that the BRP’s reservation price for buying flexibility is the
imbalance penalty itself. Thus, the BRP will only buy flexibility in the real-time
market when doing so is less costly than paying the imbalance tariff.
Figure 7.2 represents the need for flexibility which is given by the imbalance
160 LOCAL COMPETITION FOR FLEXIBILITY
fig. 7.2. The BRPs need for flexibility expressed as needed upward regulation (top),
and downward regulation (bottom).
caused by changes in RES. As outlined in section 7.1 the BRP will need flexibility
as follows:
• Upward regulation: needed when there is a negative imbalance, meaning
that ∆RES < 0.
• Downward regulation: needed when there is a positive imbalance, meaning
that ∆RES > 0.
Figure 7.3 presents the imbalance price that BRP would have to pay to the TSO
in the absence of corrective actions. This value becomes the reservation price for
flexibility, for upward regulation (top), and for downward regulation (bottom).
In this case, the BRP is only a buyer of flexibility in order to demonstrate a
simple case of how it would compete for flexibility against the DSO. Other cases
can be envisaged in future research where the BRP also provides flexibility in
the local market from its own portfolio.
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fig. 7.3. The imbalance price for upward regulation (top), and for downward regulation
(bottom).
7.5 Results of Aggregator’s Decision
As a commercial actor the aggregator aims to maximize profits in the local
market. The available demand response is sold to the highest bidder at each
actor’s bid price. The base case is defined at at DR transfer price of 40 €\MWh.
Figure 7.4 shows the allocated amount of downward demand response for the
BRP (top) and the DSO (Bottom) over the year. The aggregator must dispatch
flexibility to compensate the shifting constraint as depicted in figure 7.5. Upward
demand response is displayed as positive values and downward as negative ones.
All of the DSO’s initial request is for downward flexibility, and most of the
BRP’s also, therefore the aggregator dispatches mostly upward demand response
to compensate. In this scenario the DSO wins 89% of it’s bid and the BRP
wins 60% of it’s bid. Several time periods can be observed when both the DSO
and the BRP have a high request for flexibility at the same time. When this is
the case the highest bidder will win the available flexibility since the aggregator
is looking to maximize profits. The reservation cost of the DSO is fixed at 128
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e\MWh and the BRP’s cost is variable through time, as can be observed in
figure 7.6.
For the DSO the cost of managing the congestion encountered in the network is
equal to the cost of purchasing flexibility plus the cost of grid reinforcements
where flexibility is not estimated to be available. Figure 7.7 compares the costs
of covering the grid congestion through either flexibility contracting (the left
bar) or through grid reinforcements (right bar). It can be observed that costs
can be reduced by 10% for the DSO. The new costs for the DSO as calculated
by adding the total cost of buying flexibility in the market, plus the cost of
investing in grid expansion to cover the remaining peak that the aggregator
cannot offer. In this case, compared to the case without competition, the DSO
wins less flexibility use and therefore has higher costs.
A similar calculation is done for the BRP, where the cost of covering part of
the imbalance through available flexibility is compared to the cost of paying
the imbalance price. Figure 7.8 represents the costs that the BRP would have
to pay if part of the imbalance is solved through the local market (left bar),
or what the BRP would have to pay to the TSO otherwise. The BRP’s costs
decrease by 17% when flexibility is used.
Figure 7.9 represents the aggregator profits’ sensitivity to different transfer
payment values. Each bar represents the profits the aggregator makes over the
entire evaluation period. Thus, each bar is one run of the model. The top chart
presents the selected scenarios that were discussed in chapter 4, at 0, 30 and
45 e\MWh. It can be observed, that in contrast to chapter 4, the aggregator
reaps a profit even at the higher proposed value for the transfer payment at 45
e\MWh. In the bottom chart, more scenarios are introduced in order to assess
the aggregator’s profits under more scenarios of transfer payment values. It can
be observed that at the point where the DSO is no longer willing to pay for
flexibility, 128 e\MWh in this case, the aggregator still makes a profit since the
BRP has at times a higher willingness to pay given by the imbalance penalties
it would incur if it doesn’t buy flexibility.
Figure 7.10 shows the total amount of flexibility dispatched for each scenario
of transfer pricing. The DSO wins flexibility in every case until the transfer
payment surpasses its willingness to pay at 128 e\MWh. The BRP is more
affected by transfer payment values, and wins considerably less bids after the
transfer payment value is above 80 e\MWh. Nevertheless, given that the BRP’s
willingness to pay varies over time, there are peaks in the bidding price and
therefore the BRP still wins a small amount of flexibility even at higher transfer
pricing scenarios for the aggregator. The aggregator must always balance out
the bids allocated in order to satisfy the shifting constraint, therefore, the
aggregator dispatches an amount of flexibility equal to the sum of the BRP and
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fig. 7.4. Allocation of downward demand response flexibility or upward regulation, for
the BRP (top), for the DSO (Bottom).
fig. 7.5. Total demand response including additional flexibility needed by aggregator
to satisfy demand shifting constraint.
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fig. 7.6. Reservation price of BRP versus DSO
the DSO’s won bids.
Figure 7.11 represents the total flexibility allocated to the DSO with respect to
the initial requested bid. For the selected scenarios of 0, 30, and 45 e\MWh
the DSO wins almost its entire requested bid, as depicted in the top of the
figure. The DSO continues to win almost its entire bid up until the transfer
price is equal to the DSO’s willingness to pay. After that point, the DSO does
not win any bid at all.
Figure 7.12 depicts the same concept of flexibility allocation for the BRP as was
presented for the DSO. In the selected scenarios, observed in the top half of the
figure, the BRP sees a decrease in it’s bidding fulfillment since it’s willingness to
pay varies over time and is sometimes lower than the selected transfer payment
values. In the third scenario, at 45 e\MWh transfer price only 62% of its bid is
fulfilled, compared to 98% in the absence of a transfer price. In the extended
scenarios it can be observed that the BRP’s won bids diminish significantly
when the transfer payment values increase. After the transfer payment value
reaches 80 e\MWh less than 10% of the BRP’s bid is fulfilled.
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fig. 7.7. Costs for the DSO of congestion management with or without flexibility
during the evaluation period
fig. 7.8. Costs for the BRP of imbalance management with or without flexibility during
the evaluation period.
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fig. 7.9. Aggregator profits sensitivity to transfer payment value, selected scenarios
(top), extended scenarios (bottom)
7.6 Conclusion
The aggregator is introduced as a profit maximizer who decides to sell to the
highest bidder. In this setting, the DSO competes with the BRP for demand
response resources. The modeling illustrates the decision making process that
the aggregator undertakes in order to decide whether to provide flexibility to
the DSO, in advance, or keep it available for the BRP. Flexibility for the DSO
must be reserved in advance since the DSO’s decision is a long-term one.
This chapter presented a case where one aggregator is the sole supplier of
flexibility. Given this scenario the aggregator is likely to set monopoly prices in
the absence of competition on the supply side. The simple case is representative
of the rationality of the actors, but an extension of the case to include
competition on the supply side would contribute insights to the discussion.
The setting is tested under the proposed transfer payment schemes discussed in
the previous chapters. The transfer payment means that the aggregator has
to pay the BRP (or retailer) of consumers providing demand response, for all
downward demand response provided.
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fig. 7.10. Total amount of demand response dispatched per BRP, DSO and aggregator
for selected scenarios of transfer pricing, in both upward and downward directions
(top) and for extended scenarios (bottom)
In the base case, where the transfer payment is equal to 40 e\MWh it is shown
that the aggregator chooses to fulfill all of the DSO’s bid first, as long as the
shifting constraint is maintained, while fulfilling only 64% of the BRP’s bid. This
is because the DSO’s willingness to pay is at a constant of 128 e\MWh, while
the BRP’s willingness varies depending on balancing fees set by the TSO and is
generally lower than the DSO’s. In a sensitivity analysis of different possible
transfer payment prices, it is shown that up to the DSO’s limit reservation
price, the DSO wins almost all of it’s bid.
In all cases the aggregator maintains a positive business case, even when it’s
profits logically decrease with higher transfer payment values. This is different
from the case shown in the wholesale market, where at transfer payments higher
than 20 e\MWh, the aggregator did not make a profit any more. Overall, given
transfer payment rules, the aggregator prefers to sell flexibility to the DSO,
when needed. The remainder of the available flexibility is sold to the BRP. It is
preferable for the aggregator to sell to the BRP in the local market rather than
the wholesale market.
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fig. 7.11. DSO Bid Request Versus won Bids Sensitivity to Transfer Payment Value
for selected scenarios (top) and for extended scenarios (bottom)
fig. 7.12. BRP Bid Request Versus won Bids Sensitivity to Transfer Payment Value
for selected scenarios (top) and for extended scenarios (bottom)
Chapter 8
General Conclusions
This chapter summarizes the main discussions and findings of this thesis in
section 8.1. The conclusions are presented based on the research questions posed
in chapter 1. Opportunities for future research are presented in section 8.2.
8.1 Answers to Research Questions
Faced with growing RES penetration flexibility has become a commodity that
many parties can profit from in different ways. Flexibility, in the form of system
and market flexibility, provides a solution to growing problems due to the
introduction of RES. These problems include grid concerns such as congestion
and voltage stability as well as commercial concerns related to the interactions
between stakeholders and the use of limited resources. Markets for flexibility
arise in order to cover the need caused by variability and unpredictability of
RES. It was identified that flexibility can be used for varying purposes at
different levels of the grid. The main findings of the thesis are described below
by answering the research questions proposed in chapter 1. Part I analyzed the
integration of flexibility into the wholesale market while Part II studied the use
of flexibility at a local level.
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8.1.1 Part I
How is aggregated demand response integrated into the wholesale market?
In order to study possible mechanisms of contracting flexibility key aspects of
electricity market design were distilled from the literature. The main dimensions
of trading identified were:
• Temporal: relating to the timing of contracting, whether it be long or
short- term.
• Market clearing and price formation: resources could be remunerated
under a pay-as-bid or a pay-as-cleared marginal pricing scheme.
• Spatial: relating to the geographical area for which electricity is contracted
and prices are settled.
• Contractual: relating to the way in which agents engage in trade among
each other. The most common being bilateral contracting and power
exchanges.
Demand response was placed within a reference day-ahead wholesale market
design using the characteristics presented above. This thesis considers explicit
demand response, where consumers receive direct incentives to modify their
consumption patterns. As such, demand response bids into the wholesale market
alongside generators of electricity. Proposed mechanisms for remunerating
demand response were studied. One main variant argues that demand response
should receive the full marginal price for providing a service to the market
equivalent to that of generation. Another variant argues that the savings
achieved by the consumer for providing demand reductions should be enough
motivation for demand to change its consumption patterns according to price
signals. The notion of transfer pricing is proposed where a value, G, equivalent to
the cost of sourcing the demand reductions is subtracted from the full marginal
price. This scheme is named MP-G. Prominent markets like PJM adopted a
full marginal price approach, while other markets like EPEX spot in France and
ERCOT in Texas adopted variations of the MP-G approach. Most discussions
in literature talk about demand reductions only, and neglect that consumers
will most likely increase their consumption at a later hour after a demand
response event. The effect of demand shifting was not taken into account in
the discussions. The effects of demand response on the market and on other
market participants were analyzed next.
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What is the effect of the participation of aggregated demand response in
the wholesale market?
The rebound effect is key to analyzing the effect of demand response on the
wholesale market transactions. The rebound effect is defined as the shifting
of load from a high price hour to a lower price hour due to actions of demand
response initiated by a consumer or by an aggregator at the consumer’s site.
If optimally placed, the rebound means that consumers will observe a price
benefit of demand response by shifting consumption from high price hours to
low priced ones.
When demand response is initiated by a third party aggregator, the consumer’s
retailer is affected by actions over which it doesn’t have control. Given the
rebound effect it was concluded that demand response has an effect on the
BRP’s portfolio:
• Market Effect: if the BRP has sent a schedule of supply and demand that
will be affected by third-party aggregator actions, an imbalance in the
DA-market is expected for the BRP. The BRP’s profits are affected in
different ways depending on whether the BRP has information about the
aggregator’s actions in advance or not as follows:
– BRP observes aggregator’s actions prior to the market: in this case
the BRP can solve its long or short positions in the market itself.
– BRP doesn’t observe the aggregator’s actions: if an imbalance is
created, and not solved through market actions at day-ahead or
intraday level, there will be an imbalance price for not complying
with the proposed production and consumption schedules.
• Retail Effect: the BRP’s profits depend partly on the retail contracts in
place. If actions by the aggregator will change consumer’s behavior this
will also have an impact on the expected retail profit. This effect will
occur in both scenarios of information on the market effect for the BRP.
How are the costs and benefits of demand response in the wholesale market
allocated among market participants?
Proposals for dealing with the effects of demand response were analyzed. The
solutions vary according to the attribution of balancing responsibility to the
aggregator, the BRP, or a sharing of responsibility through adjustments of the
open positions caused by demand response actions. The main trends identified
are:
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• Day-Ahead market effect: if the BRP has sent a schedule of supply
and demand that will be affected by third-party aggregator actions, an
imbalance in the DA-market is expected for the BRP. The BRP’s profits are
affected in different ways depending on whether the BRP has information
about the aggregator’s actions in advance or not as follows:
– The BRP observes the actions of the aggregator before the day-ahead
wholesale market under the following settlement mechanisms:
∗ Full MP: The BRP has balancing responsibility and covers
the imbalanced position at the market Marginal Price. The
aggregator receives the full MP.
∗ MP-G: The Aggregator has balancing responsibility and covers
the imbalanced position at a regulated price G representative of
the sourcing costs of the energy sold as demand response.
– The BRP does not observe the actions of the aggregator and the
BRP’s imbalanced position is left open. The attribution of this
imbalance is studied in chapter 4 as follows:
∗ The imbalance is attributed to the BRP.
∗ The imbalance is attributed to the Aggregator.
∗ The imbalance is neutralized by the system operator and its
costs are socialized.
• Retail Effect: the BRP’s profits depend partly on the retail contracts in
place. If actions by the aggregator will change consumer’s behavior this
will also have an impact on the expected retail profit. This effect will
occur in both scenarios of information on the market effect for the BRP.
A dynamic model to analyze the effects and proposals is introduced. The model
represents the optimal dispatch that would be expected in a wholesale market
taking into account demand response availability. BRPs that own a portfolio
of generation and load are introduced. BRPs must be in balance through
either the use of own resources or purchases and sales from other BRPs or
the aggregator. The aggregator is remunerated only for downward demand
response for simplicity. The rebound is assumed to occur at the best possible
moment. Scenarios of demand response remuneration are tried out varying
between remuneration at the full MP, and remuneration at MP-G. Two different
values of G are initially tested, 30e\MWh and 45e\MWh. A sensitivity analysis
of different values of G from 0 e\MWh to 100 e\MWh is also done.
Results show that demand response substitutes peaking generation. Demand
response has two effects on the profits of the BRP. There is a market and a
retail effect. On the market side, the BRPs who own the peaking generators
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earn less on sales, but they benefit from buying cheaper energy to cover their
load portfolios on the retail side. It is shown that the sum of net market
and retail effects for the BRP is positive over the evaluation period. This is
because demand response has an arbitraging effect with respect to market price
differences. In the case where the aggregator pays a transfer value, the BRP
also receives this price on top of the price benefit of demand response due to
arbitrage. In these cases, though, much less demand response is dispatched.
When the BRP does not observe the actions of the aggregator its position is left
open. There is a discrepancy between its nominations of load and generation to
the system operator and the actual off-take and injections of the users within
the BRP’s perimeter. When the position of the BRP would be left open due to
the actions of the aggregator it would incur an imbalance. This is the imbalance
effect of demand response. Prices for positive and negative imbalances are
given by system conditions and set by the TSO. In the model they are input
values. With the values used, the activation of demand response generally helps
the system. Three proposals for the imbalance allocation are proposed: the
BRP covers the imbalance, the aggregator covers the imbalance, or the system
operator absorbs the imbalance and socializes the costs. The results show that
the party responsible gains in the imbalance market in the presence of demand
response.
The retail effect for the BRP is caused by a loss of tariff income at a time of
demand reduction and an increase at a time of demand rebound. The transfer
payment affects the total amount of demand response dispatched, thus indirectly
affecting also the retail income of the BRP. Intuitively, it was deducted that
the retail effect would cause a loss for the BRP, however, in the simulations
the result was the opposite. This happened due to two main reasons. The
first is that a shifting horizon of 24 hours was applied to demand response.
Therefore the shifting sometimes occurs at times of intermediate price hours.
The second is that the peak and off-peak tariff regime does not accurately
represent the price peaks and valleys observed in the wholesale market. An
aggregator optimizing sales of consumer flexibility, and making decisions based
on wholesale market prices, might not always act in the best interest of the
consumer.
The effect on the market itself is given by the total costs of running the market
with or without demand response. Savings of about 6 % of the total costs are
achieved with an available demand response flexibility equivalent to 5% of the
peak load. With the introduction of transfer pricing at 30e\MWh the expected
savings are cut by more than 50%.
The aggregator’s profits suffer significantly with the introduction of transfer
pricing when it is being remunerated for downward demand response at the
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market price for energy. In the model when the transfer payment of the
aggregator is higher than 20 e\MWh the aggregator makes a loss. At this point
a rational aggregator would no longer participate in the market and the benefit
of demand response would be lost.
It can be argued that the market savings achieved are only a transference
of wealth from the peaking generators to the consumers. Nevertheless, when
peaking generators are not needed due to demand reductions society as a whole
uses less resources. When demand reduction would be created through the
use of in-house generation, for example, then it can be said that there is a
transference of wealth from peaking generators to demand response providers.
Gains for society are created when existing, more efficient, plants are used more
often through load curve flattening.
Market flexibility is key to facilitate the integration of RES given its variability
and limited predictability. Allowing the aggregation role to participate in the
market on equal terms as other generation enables the growth of flexibility
supply. This flexibility supply ought to come from resources that previously
were not able to reach and respond to market signals. These are resources
such as aggregated household consumers, small businesses, and even small DER
not having the expertise to bid in markets. When new participants respond
to the market, available resources can be used more efficiently, creating gains
for society. The thesis goes on to study the relationship between the decisions
taken in the wholesale market and the network at different voltage levels in
order to determine when and how a local market could be organized.
8.1.2 Part II
Why is a local market necessary?
A local market is necessary when distributed renewable energy resources causes
disturbances in the local distribution grid. The issue of grid congestion at the
distribution-transmission interface is analyzed in particular. When congestion
occurs in the grid during a limited amount of hours per year, it is more cost
efficient to manage it through the use of flexibility than through the conventional
solution of reinforcing the grid. Throughout the last two decades there have been
variations of proposals to deal with local grid issues, such as microgrids, technical
virtual power plants and commercial virtual power plants. The definition of
a local market is set by the purpose of using the flexibility either for system
services or for commercial purposes. These concepts were initially location
specific, but later grew to encompass financial transactions for flexibility that
might be located in different areas. The market design in place defines how
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stakeholders interact with each other with respect to the use of flexibility. After
studying the evolution of concepts related to local flexibility contracting this
thesis arrived at the following definition of local market:
Local Market: Long- or short-term trading actions for flexibility in a specific
geographical location, voltage level and system operator (DSO and TSO), given
by grid conditions or balancing needs, where participants in a relevant market
can be aggregated to provide flexibility services.
How can a local market for flexibility be organized?
Given that the market participants include commercial parties such as the BRP
and the aggregator, as well as regulated parties such as the DSO and the TSO
there is a need for flexibility contracting structures that cover the needs of
every participant. Current market design proposals were analyzed and it was
clear that there is a lack of consensus regarding who should take up the role of
flexibility market operator as evidenced in chapter 5. The DSO, the TSO, and
an independent party have all been designated as flexibility market operators in
different proposals. Main approaches for flexibility contracting as identified in
the literature were outlined and described through the characteristics of market
design identified previously:
• Local Reserves market: single buyer market, open to competition only on
the supply side. It is assumed that the single buyer is a regulated actor,
one of the system operators. Two main variants arise:
– DSO-priority in flexibility contracting.
– TSO-priority in flexibility contracting.
• Local competition for flexibility: a market open to competition on supply
and demand.
The thesis focuses on analyzing DSO-priority in flexibility contracting, given
that at the very local level the DSO needs to determine when there is a need
for flexibility. The topic of TSO-priority in local flexibility contracting, while
also relevant, is out of the scope of the rest of the thesis. It is the DSO who
will be impacted by growth in RES and would have to either actively manage
the network or reinforce it.
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What is the local need for flexibility and what is its value?
The need for local flexibility is given by grid congestion conditions at the
transmission distribution interface. It is defined by the expected power flows
above transformer substation limits in a specific feeder. Two main cases are
defined for either downward or upward flexibility depending on grid conditions.
Downward flexibility is needed when expected power flows would surpass
substation limits. In this case a demand reduction would help the system
to relieve congestion. Upward flexibility is needed when too much renewable
energy is expected in the feeder and powerflows would be reversed and above
substation limits. In this case an increase in demand would help the system to
relieve congestion.
A methodology to determine the need for flexibility is proposed based on a power
flow analysis. Current and voltage values resulting from the power flow are
converted to active power and reactive power. Active power above transformer
limits constitutes the DSOs need for either flexibility or grid reinforcements.
Thus, the value of flexibility for the DSO is equivalent to the savings achieved
in grid reinforcements through flexibility contracting.
How can a DSO-led reserves market for flexibility be organized?
The case of a DSO-led market is proposed through a decision making model
where the DSO decides whether to buy flexibility at cost value or invest in
grid reinforcements. The cost value of flexibility is treated as an unknown
parameter as it varies significantly according to the type of consumer providing
flexibility. It is assumed that the DSO is buying directly from consumers. In
turn, consumers receive a price benefit of offering demand response coming from
the difference in price hours between demand reduction and demand increase.
This price benefit is subtracted from the cost value that the DSO has to pay
consumers for providing flexibility. It is shown in the results that the DSO
can save up to 66% in the value of grid reinforcements through purchasing
flexibility in this way. Consumers are motivated to offer flexibility as long as
their internal cost of providing it is less than the price difference between the
peak and off-peak tariffs that they face. If their cost increases, it is not longer
profitable to offer services to the DSO without additional remuneration.
If the DSO competes for flexibility with the BRP, who is better off?
The case of a competitive market for local flexibility is introduced through a
model where a profit maximizing aggregator decides whether to sell it’s available
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flexibility to the DSO or a BRP. The BRP’s need for flexibility is defined by the
change in renewable energy forecasts to the real-time availability. The value of
flexibility for the BRP is equal to the penalty it would face for being imbalanced
as set by the system’s imbalance prices set by the TSO. Both the DSO and the
BRP decide to bid in the local market at 80% of their defined reservation costs
in order to account for unknown transaction costs of participation.
The aggregator once more faces possible transfer payments to the BRP which
affects its profits. In this setting though, both parties are willing to pay more
than the wholesale market price. The aggregator continues to make a profit
even with higher transfer payment values. A sensitivity is done regarding the
transfer payment values and the willingness of the aggregator to offer flexiblity
under increasing costs of provision.
In the study the DSO wins his bid in every case right up until the aggregator’s
transfer payment is higher than its reservation cost. The BRP wins only about
40% of its bid in the base case where the aggregator faces a transfer payment of
40 e\MWh. This occurs because the BRP’s willingness to pay for flexibility is
on average lower than the DSO’s, with some exceptions when imbalance prices
tend to have peaks. This situation could change, though, as it depends on the
imbalance prices set by the TSO as given by grid conditions.
The tool presented is an indicative planning tool for the aggregator. Since the
DSO needs to make a decision at the beginning of an evaluation period, the
aggregator needs to decide then whether to sell to the DSO or keep it available
for the BRP who requires it in real time.
The market mechanisms used to contract flexibility ought to accommodate the
full exploitation of the flexibility potential. Electricity market design aims to
promote competition and free access to resources. Therefore market design
rules should allow parties to compete for flexibility resources. In this work it is
proposed that the party who values flexibility the most is the one who ought to
use it, even when different purposes are intended.
8.2 Future Research
This work focuses on proposing a methodology to implement a local flexibility
market. However, the optimal size of the local market is yet to be determined.
It has been proven in literature that flexibility on a residential feeder level
can improve grid operation. It remains to be seen if the transaction costs of
organizing such small markets are worth the effort.
178 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis mainly the economic local issues arising from the introduction of
DER are taken into account. Future work could explore the economic value of
using flexibility to solve other technical issues such as voltage control and grid
stability.
The relationship between the possible local markets and the intraday market
could be further explored. Further research could elaborate on when it would be
profitable for the BRP to move towards the local market or bid in the existing
intraday market.
The determination of where in the distribution grid there will be a need to
make decisions of flexibility use is also out of the scope of this work. Further
study is needed to create a methodology that studies the different connecting
substations between DSO and TSO and determines where the most issues could
be found.
Regarding the regulated market participants, this thesis focuses on providing
a thought methodology for the DSO. It is assumed that the TSO already has
mechanisms to contract reserves. Nevertheless future research could study the
needed evolution of reserves contracting on a TSO level with respect to resources
located in the distribution system.
Uncertainty in this thesis is modeled through the use of scenarios. It is assumed
that all flexibility will be available as predicted. A deeper study of uncertainty
in flexibility contracting is relevant for the DSO when flexibility is meant to
substitute grid investment. The DSO faces an unknown value at risk in case of
non-compliance of the available resources.
Chapter 7 presents a case where a BRP competes with a DSO for flexibility
resources provided by one aggregator. In this case the aggregator is likely to
set monopoly prices in the absence of competition on the supply side. The
simple case is representative of the rationality of the buyers, an extension of
the case to include competition on the supply side would contribute insights to
the discussion.
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